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ABSTRACT 
Our motor and somatosensory cortices originally evolved to control our movement through the 
environment. In the past decade, one of the most exciting developments in cognitive neuroscience is 
the discovery that the same sensorimotor brain regions that are used to control our body are involved 
in the perception of others’ actions, sensations and emotions. Human beings are equipped with a 
mechanism mapping perceptual representations of actions, sensations, and emotions onto 
sensorimotor representations, thus, perception of others might be inherently grounded in the same 
brain regions involved in first-hand subjective experiences. While the notion that observing, or 
imagining actions, emotions, and sensations in others triggers vicarious activations in the 
sensorimotor network is widely accepted, evidence about the specific role of these activations in 
social cognition is meagre and still largely based on correlational data. The experiments included in 
the present thesis aim at exploring the functional role of the sensorimotor network in understanding 
others’ internal emotional and cognitive states. We used neuromodulation tools to interfere with brain 
activity in regions involved in moving and sensing the body while participants were asked to 
understand others’ emotions or intentions. In experiment 1 to 7 we focused on the ability to accurately 
understand amusement from observed smiles, while in experiment 8 to 10 we explored the ability to 
rate the pain felt by another individual when her/his experience is described only through text. Our 
results show that interference with activity within somatosensory and motor cortices impairs 
participants’ ability to understand others’ emotions. Combining complex naturalistic tasks to 
neuromodulation tools, the present thesis sheds novel light on the behavioural relevance of vicarious 
activations in the sensorimotor network, by establishing a strong and direct causal link between 
sensorimotor brain networks and others’ understanding that was only suggested in the past. 
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
I. SENSORIMOTOR EXPERIENCE SHARING / VICARIOUS ACTIVATIONS 
Social cognition encompasses all the cognitive processes underlying interactions with conspecifics. 
These include perceiving, interpreting, and generating responses to the behaviours others are 
exhibiting. Our motor and somatosensory cortices originally evolved to allow our interactions with 
the environment and with others in the environment, after all, our bodies are the tool we use to interact 
with others and react to them.   In the past decade, one of the most exciting developments in cognitive 
neuroscience is the discovery that the same sensorimotor brain regions that are used to control our 
own actions and experience our own sensations and emotions are involved in the perception of others’ 
actions, sensations and emotions (Bastiaansen et al., 2009; Keysers et al., 2010; Rizzolatti et al., 2014; 
Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2016). The link between perception and the body is not new to psychology, 
but since the discovery of mirror neurons in the macaque brain social cognitive neuroscience shifted 
from cognitivist approaches to embodied approaches (Gallese, 1998) 
Seminal studies in monkeys  showed that neurons in the premotor and parietal cortices respond both 
during action production and to the observation of an action with a similar goal (di Pellegrino et al., 
1992; Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al., 1996; Fogassi et al., 2005).  
After the discovery of mirror neurons in monkeys, several studies suggested the existence of vicarious 
activations in the human inferior frontal gyrus / premotor cortex (IFG / vPMc), coupling action 
perception and action production (Fadiga et al., 1995; Hari et al., 1998; Buccino et al., 2001, 2004; 
Gazzola et al., 2006; Avenanti et al., 2007; Mukamel et al., 2010). The IFG is consistently active both 
during the execution and the observation of actions, and is considered a key region of the mirroring 
network involved in simulating observed actions within one’s own motor system (Caspers et al., 
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2010; Gallese and Sinigaglia, 2011; Avenanti et al., 2013b). These vicarious activations, though, are 
not limited to the premotor cortex, but can be observed in several brain regions involved in action 
production like the primary somatosensory cortex (SI).  Recent work in humans suggests that the SI 
responds to action observation (Gazzola and Keysers, 2009; Caspers et al., 2010; Jacquet and 
Avenanti, 2015) and to the observation of touch (Keysers et al., 2004, 2010; Blakemore et al., 2005; 
Bufalari et al., 2007). 
This suggests that mirror-like mechanisms in the sensorimotor network might be deeply involved 
social interaction: a mechanism mapping visual representations of the observed actions onto 
corresponding sensorimotor representations providing meaning to others’ motor acts by a common 
coding for both first and third person perspectives (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004; Wilson and 
Knoblich, 2005; Kilner et al., 2007; Schütz-Bosbach and Prinz, 2007b; Gazzola and Keysers, 2009; 
Friston et al., 2011; Press et al., 2011; Schippers and Keysers, 2011; Avenanti et al., 2013b; Pezzulo 
et al., 2013). Keysers 2010, valchev 2016 These observation of shared activations have motivated 
sensorimotor simulationist models, which suggest that perception of others’ behavior is grounded in 
the same network that is involved in moving and sensing the body (Goldman and Sripada 2005; 
Gallese 2007; Keysers et al. 2010; Niedenthal et al. 2010; Wood et al. 2016). Therefore, the mirror 
system might provide a basis not just for understanding actions and somatic sensations, but also for 
all domains of social cognition (Gallese et al., 2004), including processing of others’ emotions. 
Evidence shows that the same system linking first-hand and third-hand experiences has been observed 
for emotions, suggesting that internal simulation might occur also for others’ emotional experiences 
(Keysers and Gazzola, 2006; Niedenthal, 2007; Bastiaansen et al., 2009).  
Interestingly, several studies show that those sectors of the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) that are 
involved in controlling facial movements and those sectors of the somatosensory cortex (SI) that are 
involved in processing sensations from the body, are involved in processing others’ emotional 
behavior whether it is perceived or imagined (Adolphs et al., 2000; Wicker et al., 2003; Winston et 
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al., 2003; Carr et al., 2003; Leslie et al., 2004; Avenanti et al., 2005; Hennenlotter et al., 2005; Warren 
et al., 2006; Dapretto et al., 2006; Gazzola et al., 2006; Lamm et al., 2007b; van der Gaag et al., 2007; 
Cheng et al., 2007; Valeriani et al., 2008; Gallese, 2008; Keysers et al., 2010; Bolognini et al., 2011, 
2013b, 2014; Tamietto et al., 2015).  
In sum, human beings are capable of understanding internal states in others by looking or imagining 
others’ behaviour. In this view, internal simulation in the sensorimotor network can be used to 
interpret the internal mental state that caused an action. Previous studies indicate that others’ internal 
emotional states are represented in the mind of the observer and that sensorimotor regions are 
involved in  processing others’ emotion and social cognition in general (Pobric and Hamilton, 2006; 
Avenanti et al., 2007; D’Agata et al., 2011; de Gelder et al., 2012; Tidoni et al., 2013; Bolognini et 
al., 2014; Costa et al., 2014; Urgesi et al., 2014; Jacquet and Avenanti, 2015; Tamietto et al., 2015; 
Valchev et al., 2016).  Embodied simulation of others’ action and sensations might constitute the 
basis of a form of mind-reading that is not propositional and is based on the body and mirror-like 
mechanisms in the human brain are its neural substrate. 
 
II. PERSPECTIVE TAKING / THE MENTALIZING NETWORK 
 
A different approach to social cognition focuses on explicit attribution of mental states to others. 
Scholars following this theory-theory approach claim that when we are asked to explicit infer others’ 
intentions, beliefs, thoughts, we don’t rely on simulation, but instead we build a propositional 
representation of the internal state we assume others have (Mitchell et al., 2002; Saxe, 2005; Shamay-
Tsoory et al., 2005). Therefore, they propose a system providing a different route to understanding 
others that it is not through sharing, but through the creation of explicit cognitive knowledge about 
what others are feeling. This approach to social cognition was also fuelled by critiques to the 
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simulative approach to social cognition, mainly focused on the problem of self/other distinction in a 
pure simulative framework and on the lacking of behavioural evidence in favour of a central role of 
mirror mechanisms in understanding others (Jacob and Jeannerod, 2005; Saxe, 2005; Southgate and 
de C. Hamilton, 2008; Hickok, 2009, 2013; Heyes, 2010; Baird et al., 2011). Scholars focusing on 
the neural substrate of cognitive processes involved in reasoning about others’ mental states isolated 
a subset of brain regions that is consistently involved in thinking about others’ minds: the mentalizing 
network. This network includes dorsomedial and ventromedial prefrontal (dm/vmPFC) cortices, 
posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus (PCC/PC), temporoparietal parietal junction (TPJ), the posterior 
superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), and the anterior temporal cortex (aTC) (Amodio and Frith, 2006; 
Frith and Frith, 2006; Saxe, 2006; Mitchell, 2009; Mar, 2011; Schurz et al., 2014; Kanske et al., 2015) 
and is active when participants are asked to make explicit judgments regarding the internal states of 
others, such as their beliefs (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Bzdok et al., 2012), preferences (Mitchell et 
al., 2006) or emotional state (Budell et al., 2010; Ochsner et al., 2004). The temporo-parietal junction 
is a key structure within the mentalizing network whose  activity has been reliably associated with 
tasks in which individuals are asked to infer another person’s mental state (Saxe and Kanwisher, 
2003; Decety and Lamm, 2007; Van Overwalle, 2009) and in tasks requiring to explain actions in 
terms of mental states (Grèzes et al., 2004; Brass et al., 2007; de Lange et al., 2008; Spunt et al., 
2010).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
III. CONTRIBUTION OF SENSORIMOTOR SIMULATION AND MENTALIZING 
NETWORKS IN COMPLEX SOCIAL TASKS 
 
Beyond pure simulationist or theorist approaches to social cognition, it seems that both the 
sensorimotor and the mentalizing network participate in understanding others (Olsson and Ochsner, 
2008; Bastiaansen et al., 2009; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009; Zaki et al., 2012). However, several 
critical issues remain unexplored. Among these, the main one pertains the actual functional 
contribution of sensorimotor simulation and mentalizing network in understanding others’ internal 
states and the interactions (or lack thereof) between the two networks in social cognition.  
The two systems are anatomically independent and several studies show that they might even be 
functionally independent (van Overwalle and Baetens, 2009)(Keysers and Gazzola, 2007; Olsson and 
Ochsner, 2008). During emotion perception, the two systems appear to process distinct categories of 
social information, with the mirror system engaged by nonverbal, motor features and the mentalizing 
system engaged by either contextualizing verbal information (cf. Waytz and Mitchell, 2011; Zaki et 
al., 2010) or the explicit evaluation of another's emotional state (Budell et al., 2010). However, recent 
imaging studies suggest that the two systems might be concurrent active in complex social tasks 
especially when observers are explicitly induced to make judgments regarding the target's internal 
state (Brass et al., 2007; Zaki et al., 2009b; Lombardo et al., 2010; Schippers et al., 2010; Spunt et 
al., 2011; Schippers and Keysers, 2011; Spunt and Lieberman, 2013, 2012a, 2012b; Harvey et al., 
2013; Sperduti et al., 2014; Kanske et al., 2015; McGettigan et al., 2015). 
Although, these studies suggest the possibility that the two systems may work in synergy to enable 
fine-grained emotion understanding, no study to date has explicitly tested this possibility, as most of 
the evidence about the involvement of the sensorimotor network and the mentalizing network in high-
level inferences about another’s internal state comes from neuroimaging studies. Correlational 
approaches to social cognition, despite being fundamental in exploring the neural substrate of 
10 
 
cognitive function, cannot inform about the functional role of the two networks in understanding 
others’ internal cognitive and emotional states.  
How does the brain understand the emotional states of other brains? 
Simulation and mentalizing, despite their differences represent two routes for the same goal: 
understanding others’ internal states. It is thus plausible (and even supported by indirect evidence) 
that both processes and corresponding brain networks might be involved in every social interaction. 
The aim of the present thesis is to provide causal evidence of the role of vicarious activations within 
the sensorimotor cortices and of the mentalizing network in social cognition.  To this aim, in a series 
of experiments, we used neuromodulation techniques to independently alter activity of key regions 
within the two networks to assess their functional contribution in understanding others’ emotional 
and cognitive states. Moving beyond simple tasks designed to explore specific aspects of social 
cognition, we employed specifically designed naturalistic tasks, with the aim to grasp the complexity 
of everyday social interactions. 
From Experiment 1 to 7 we focused on the emotional facial expression of amusement. The smile is a 
prominent facial expression in social life, however, it is also the most ambiguous expression we 
encounter.  We designed two novel tasks to track participants’ accuracy in judging others’ internal 
emotional states (Empathic Accuracy, EA) and used repetitive TMS to interfere with key regions of 
the sensorimotor simulation and the mentalizing network. This way, we explored if these networks 
are critical for fine-grained judgments about amusement from observed smiles.  
In Experiment 8, 9 and 10 we focused on the involvement of the somatosensory cortex in moral 
judgment and in explicit judgments of another’s emotional experience described through text. We 
know from previous studies that healthy moral judgments in adulthood strongly rely on our theory 
about others’ intentions, however, observing or imagining a person causing pain to another leads to 
vicarious activation in brain regions involved in our first-hand painful experiences. Here we used 
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tDCS to inhibit the sensorimotor simulation or the mentalizing network while participants were asked 
to read written narratives describing harmful situations involving two individuals and judge different 
aspects of these. 
Finally, in Appendix A and B we explored the role of premotor and primary motor cortices in 
predicting others’ actions. We devised a novel action prediction task where participants observed the 
initial phases of right-hand reaching-to-grasp actions and had to predict their outcome (i.e., the 
goal/object to be grasped). We found that suppression by cathodal (inhibitory) tDCS of the left IFC, 
selectively impaired performance on the action prediction task. Remarkably, anodal (excitatory) 
tDCS of the left IFC brought about a selective improvement in the action prediction task. These 
findings indicate that the left IFC is necessary for predicting the outcomes of observed human right-
hand actions. Crucially, this study shows for the first time that down- and up-regulating excitability 
within the motor system can hinder and enhance AP abilities, respectively.  In Appendix B, we 
explored the role of the primary motor cortex in predicting others’ actions. Although correlational 
studies suggest that the motor cortex (M1) might be involved in this process, it is unclear whether M1 
is also causally essential for making predictions about observed actions. To test the functional 
relevance of M1 to action prediction we used offline monopolar transcranial direct current stimulation 
(tDCS) in healthy participants. We found that 2mA cathodal tDCS selectively impaired performance 
on the action prediction task. The effect was specific to polarity (it was not present after anodal 
currents) and intensity (it was not present after 1mA tDCS). These findings establish specific tDCS 
parameters for effective M1 stimulation in action prediction and highlight the functional relevance of 
M1 to making accurate predictions about the outcome of human actions.  
Altogether, results found in Appendix A and B, support predictive coding theories of action 
perception and have implications for enhancement of action prediction abilities. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Sensorimotor network crucial for inferring amusement from smiles 
 
Introduction 
Understanding whether a smiling individual is experiencing authentic amusement is a common 
challenge in everyday social interactions. A smile is, without any doubt, the most easily recognizable 
facial expression, and yet the most nuanced one. Indeed, a smile can be flexibly used to communicate 
a wide range of feelings (Ekman, 2001; Shiota et al., 2003; Niedenthal et al., 2010). Critically, in 
many social contexts, it can be used deceptively by showing that amusement is felt when it is not. 
People are typically accurate in classifying smiling faces as emotionally positive expressions, but 
commit many more errors when they are asked to evaluate the emotional feeling behind a smile 
(Niedenthal et al., 2010). Accurate recognition of the emotion felt by another person (a social target) 
is often referred to as empathic accuracy (EA), and is commonly operationalized as the 
correspondence between the feelings reported by the social target and the feelings that perceivers 
infer from the social target’s behavior (Ickes and Stinson 1990; Levenson and Ruef 1992; Ickes 1997; 
Zaki et al. 2008, 2009). EA requires accurate perception of the social target’s behavior and explicit 
inferences of the underlying feelings based on available information (e.g. facial expressions, prior 
knowledge or contextual information). It is believed that perceptual and cognitive processes 
underlying EA could provide a key mechanism for empathy, i.e., the ability to share the feelings of 
others, grounded affective brain regions engaged during first-hand emotion experiences (de 
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Vignemont and Singer 2006; Singer and Lamm 2009; Batson 2011; Decety et al. 2012; Lamm and 
Majdandžić 2015; Rütgen et al. 2015a, 2015b; Zaki et al. 2016). 
Inferring amusement from another person’s smile requires the perceiver to visually process and 
integrate multiple morphological and dynamic features of the observed facial expression (Ekman, 
2001; Ambadar et al., 2009; Krumhuber and Manstead, 2009; McLellan et al., 2010). However, for 
accurate recognition of the underlying emotional feeling, further non-visual brain mechanisms are 
likely involved (Zaki et al., 2009b, 2012). Previous studies suggest that at least two related but distinct 
sets of brain regions may be involved in EA: i) sensorimotor “mirroring” regions which support 
perception and understanding of others’ behavior, possibly through an embodied simulation of the 
observed actions; and ii) “mentalizing” regions which support the ability to explicitly consider others’ 
mental states and their sources, and to draw explicit inferences about them (Preston and de Waal 
2002; Gallese et al. 2004; Amodio and Frith 2006; Frith and Frith 2006; Saxe 2006; Mitchell 2009; 
Gallese and Sinigaglia 2011; Decety et al. 2012; Zaki et al. 2012; Zaki 2014).  
However, it is still debated whether and when these sensorimotor and cognitive networks provide 
routes to understanding others, or merely reflect such understanding (Gallese et al. 2011; Uithol et al. 
2011; Avenanti et al. 2013b; Lamm and Majdandžić 2015). This is because knowledge of these 
networks is mostly based on indirect correlational imaging evidence, and the need for novel methods 
and causal approaches is increasingly recognized by social neuroscientists (Decety 2011; Hétu et al. 
2012; Avenanti et al. 2013b; Rütgen et al. 2015a, 2015b; Zaki et al. 2016; Lamm et al. 2016). In 
particular, to date no studies have specifically tested the critical role of sensorimotor and mentalizing 
networks in the empathic ability to infer authentic amusement from the smiles of others. Establishing 
this role is the goal of the present study. 
Indirect correlational evidence has suggested that sensorimotor networks may support EA. For 
example, watching emotional motor behavior such an emotional facial expression vicariously 
activates those sectors of the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) that are involved in controlling facial 
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movements and those sectors of the somatosensory cortex (SI) that are involved in processing 
sensations from the face (Carr et al., 2003; Leslie et al., 2004; Dapretto et al., 2006; Keysers et al., 
2010; Tamietto et al., 2015). These observation of shared activations have motivated sensorimotor 
simulationist models, which suggest that perception of others’ facial expressions is (at least partially) 
grounded in the same network that is involved in performing and sensing facial movements (Goldman 
and Sripada 2005; Gallese 2007; Keysers et al. 2010; Niedenthal et al. 2010; Wood et al. 2016). Yet, 
it should be noted that studies exploring vicarious activations during perception of emotional facial 
expressions have traditionally used passive viewing tasks without asking participants to make explicit 
inferences about the targets’ emotional feelings (for a review see Zaki et al. 2012).  
On the other hand, studies focusing on the mentalizing network have commonly asked participants to 
make explicit judgments about another’s internal state using verbal material (i.e., scripts) or highly 
stylized nonverbal social cues, including vignettes, static displays of facial expressions or even more 
isolated cues such as target eye gaze (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Frith and Frith, 2006; Saxe, 2006; 
Mitchell, 2009). These studies highlighted a midline and lateral temporo-parietal network supporting 
mental state attribution, which includes the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and the temporo-parietal 
junction (TPJ) (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Frith and Frith, 2006; Saxe, 2006; Mitchell, 2009). However, 
none of these studies presented participants with dynamic expressions of natural behaviors. 
Recently, more naturalistic neuroscientific paradigms combining dynamic social cues and explicit 
inferential tasks (Redcay et al., 2010; Wolf et al., 2010; Spunt and Lieberman, 2013) have revealed 
co-activation and functional coupling of sensorimotor and mentalizing networks during complex 
social tasks (Wheatley et al., 2007; Zaki et al., 2009b; Lombardo et al., 2010; Schippers et al., 2010; 
Raz et al., 2014), including EA tasks. Notably, studies have shown that neural activity in both 
networks predicts EA performance in tasks requiring observation of others’ expressive behavior and 
inferences of the underlying emotional feelings (Zaki et al., 2009b; Harvey et al., 2013). Activity in 
both sensorimotor and mentalizing networks also predicts EA performance in simpler tasks, for 
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example, when evaluating emotion authenticity from sounds of laughter (McGettigan et al., 2015). In 
this case, there was no contextual information about the possible source of the emotion, so the explicit 
inference about the emotion had to be based only on social cues. While these studies have underscored 
the integrated nature of empathic processing during naturalistic social inference and the potential 
contributions of the sensorimotor and mentalizing networks to accurate empathic inferences, no study 
has thus far addressed the key question of whether these networks play causal roles in EA. Indeed, it 
should be noted that the above-mentioned conclusions about the involvement of sensorimotor and 
mentalizing networks in EA were mostly based on imaging methods. These methods can only provide 
indirect correlational data, and cannot establish direct causal links between brain structures and 
cognitive functions. 
Here, we administered repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) to perturb key regions 
within the sensorimotor network (i.e., the face representation in IFG and SI) and the mentalizing 
network (i.e., mPFC and TPJ), and provide direct evidence for their functional relevance to EA. To 
this aim, we designed a novel EA task combining dynamic displays of smiles with the explicit 
empathic inferences of whether the social target is feeling authentic amusement or not. We used signal 
detection theory to test whether interference with key nodes of the two networks would disrupt 
participants’ sensitivity to the authenticity of amused expressions.  
 
Materials and Methods 
 
Participants 
A total of 180 healthy subjects took part in the study. Sixty-four subjects participated in one of the 
four TMS experiments. In each TMS experiment, we targeted a different brain area: right IFG 
(Experiment 1: 16 participants, 8 females, mean age ± SD: 23.6 y ± 1.9), right SI (Experiment 2: 
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16 participants, 8 females, 22.3 ± 2.3), mPFC (Experiment 3: 16 participants, 9 females, 22.5 y ± 
0.5) or right TPJ (Experiment 4: 16 participants, 10 females, 23.6 y ± 1.5). Sixteen subjects (8 
females; 25.4 y ± 2.2) participated in a peripheral stimulation experiment, and 100 subjects 
(Experiment 5: 50 females) were tested in one of five pilot studies, whose aim was to validate the 
two behavioral tasks. All subjects were right-handed, had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity 
in both eyes, and were naïve to the purposes of the experiment. None of the participants had 
neurological, psychiatric, or other medical problems or any contraindication to TMS (Rossi et al., 
2009; Rossini et al., 2015). Participants provided written informed consent. The procedures were 
approved by the ethics committee at the Psychology Department of Bologna University and were in 
accordance with the ethical standards of the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki. No discomfort or adverse 
effects of TMS were reported by participants or noticed by the experimenter. 
 
Stimulus creation and selection  
Stimuli consisted of 32 dynamic movies (lasting 2 seconds, 60 frames) presented centrally on a 19-
inch monitor (resolution: 1024 x 768; refresh rate: 60 Hz) subtending 27 x 21° of visual angle. Movies 
depicted 8 individuals (“social targets”; including 4 females and 4 males, aged 24.5 y ± 2.1) who 
were filmed individually while smiling. Movies were edited using Adobe Premiere Pro C6 software 
in order to correct lighting, contrast and color, and remove the audio tracks. 
During stimulus creation, social targets sat against a white background, and lighting equipment was 
used to avoid the formation of shadows. The social targets were instructed to gaze directly towards 
the camera and try not to move their bodies. Ten social targets (5 females) were initially filmed while 
making smiling expressions associated with authentic positive feelings of amusement or posed 
expressions associated with an emotionally neutral state. Authentic and fake expressions of 
amusement were recorded in two separate sessions that were performed under emotionally congruent 
contexts to provide realistic stimuli. 
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In the “authentic” session, the social targets used a laptop with loud speakers to select audio clips that 
elicited strong feelings of amusement and spontaneous smiles (Instruction: “Please watch the camera 
and smile only if you feel like doing so”). Auditory stimuli were chosen based on social targets’ 
preferences and were retrieved from the internet (e.g., http://www.youtube.com). In the “fake” 
session, social targets were not presented with auditory stimuli, and were instead instructed to produce 
a voluntary smile (Instruction: “Please watch the camera, think about something neutral and produce 
a smile that you think could be interpreted as an authentic expression of amusement by an observer”). 
They were allowed to watch the pre-recorded authentic smiles in order to achieve more convincing 
posed facial expressions.  
Notably, after each smiling expression, social targets were instructed to provide subjective 
evaluations of the amusement they felt while smiling using a 9-step Likert scale (0 = neutral state; 9 
= maximal amusement). Moreover, they were asked to evaluate their subjective confidence in their 
amusement judgments using a categorical response (I am 100% sure of my judgment / I am not 100% 
sure of my judgment) (cf. Ickes and Stinson 1990; Levenson and Ruef 1992). These subjective reports 
allowed us to select only smiling expressions that were associated with the highest subjective ratings 
of amusement (authentically amused smiles) or without any emotional feeling (falsely amused smiles) 
and with strong subjective confidence in the ratings. For each social target, only smiles associated 
with the highest ratings of felt amusement (mean values across social targets: M = 6.3, SD = 1.4) and 
full amusement judgment confidence (i.e., “I am 100% sure of my judgment”) were considered 
authentic expressions of amusement. False expressions of amusement were smiles with subjective 
amusement ratings equal to zero and full amusement judgment confidence.  This initial selection 
brought about a sample of 30 authentic and 30 fake expressions of amusement for each social target 
(600 movies).   
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Smile dynamics  
Each movie showed a transition from a neutral/moderately positive facial expression to an apparent 
expression of amusement: in the initial phase (lasting 500 ms, 15 frames) the social target’s face was 
still, and in the subsequent phase (lasting 1500 ms, 45 frames) showed the smiling expression. The 
last frames of each video clip contained the apex of the smile. Although smile offset can also be 
informative of amusement authenticity, the smile offset was excluded from the video clips in order 
to cover their entire duration (2 s) with a short rTMS train. 
We analyzed facial markers of authentically and falsely amused smiles (Ekman, 2001; Shiota et al., 
2003; Ambadar et al., 2009; Krumhuber and Manstead, 2009; McLellan et al., 2010; Niedenthal et 
al., 2010). To analyze the key muscles involved in smiling, two independent raters blind to the 
experimental conditions evaluated the activation of the orbicularis oculi (i.e., the muscle that makes 
crow’s feet at the outer corner of the eye; AU6 according to the Ekman’s Facial Action Coding 
System; Ekman et al. 2002), and the zygomaticus major (i.e., the muscle that extends the mouth and 
acts as a lip corner puller; AU12), in the 16 authentically and 16 falsely amused smiles using a 3-
point scale (scored 0, 0.5, 1). Rater’s judgments were highly correlated (r > .7) and were thus 
averaged. Using movement analysis software (Kinovea 0.8.15), we also tracked changes in mouth 
extension (distance in pixels between the two lip corners) over time, and checked the size of the 
maximal enlargement (increase in lip corner distance relative to the initial frame), when it occurred 
in time, and the peak velocity of the movement. Table 1 shows activation ratings, motion parameters 
and statistical comparisons between the 16 authentically and 16 falsely amused smile movies. 
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Table 1. Mean values ± SD of activation ratings and motion parameters computed for authentically and falsely amused 
smiles. 
 
AU6 activation rating 
(0-1) 
AU12 activation 
rating (0-1) 
Maximal mouth 
enlargement (change 
in pixel) 
Time of             
maximal mouth 
enlargement (ms) 
Mouth enlargement 
peak velocity 
(pixel/ms) 
Authentic 
amusement 
0.72 ± .21 0.92 ± 0.14 24.19 ± 4.48 1510 ± 318 0.018 ± 0.006 
False 
amusement 
0.58 ± .22 0.82 ± 0.15 21.06 ± 6.50 1515 ± 295 0.015 ± 0.005 
Statistical 
comparison 
t30 = 1.79, P = 0.08 t30 = 1.82, P = 0.08 t30 = 1.58, P = 0.12 t30 = 0.07, P = 0.94 t30 = 1.53, P = 0.14 
 
Mean AU6 and AU12 activation ratings, maximal mouth enlargement and peak velocity tended to be 
greater for authentically amused smiles relative to falsely amused smiles, although none of the 
analyses reached statistical significance. Also, maximal mouth enlargement occurred non-
significantly earlier for authentically than for falsely amused smiles (Table 1). In a further analysis, 
we z-transformed these dependent variables and submitted them to a Measure (AU6 activation, AU12 
activation, maximal mouth enlargement, time of maximal mouth enlargement, mouth enlargement 
peak velocity) x Expression type (authentic vs. falsely amused) ANOVA that showed a main effect 
of Expression type (F1,30 = 5.63, P = 0.02), with greater values for authentically than for falsely 
amused smiles. Taken together, these analyses suggest that, while none of the facial markers alone 
could have been used to robustly discriminate between the two types of facial expressions, observers 
could have used a combination of the different markers to infer amusement authenticity (for similar 
conclusions see Abe et al. 2002; Niedenthal et al. 2010). 
 
Experimental tasks  
In the Empathic accuracy (EA) task (Fig. 1A), participants were presented with authentic and falsely 
amused smile movies and asked to monitor the social target’s expression to explicitly infer what 
she/he truly felt (i.e., authentic amusement, no amusement). To rule out that any change in EA task 
performance could have been due to nonspecific effects of rTMS, we also assessed participants’ 
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performance on a difficulty-matched non-social (NS) control task (Fig. 1B) using the same set of 
stimuli used in the EA task. Similarly to the EA task, the NS task required participants to constantly 
monitor the social target’s face, particularly the eye and mouth regions (which are critical for 
discriminating between real and fake expressions of amusement; Ekman 2001; Shiota et al. 2003; 
Ambadar et al. 2009; Krumhuber and Manstead 2009; McLellan et al. 2010; Niedenthal et al. 2010). 
However, in contrast to the EA task, the NS task required participants to judge spatial features of the 
observed expressions (i.e., whether a white bar presented for 350 ms at the end of each clip was 
located below or above the social target’s eye or mouth corners), rather than empathically 
understanding whether these expressions were associated with authentic amusement or not (Fig. 1B, 
D).  
Using custom software (programmed in C#), we extracted the X and Y coordinates of each social 
target’s outer canthus and labial commissure (over both the left and right sides of the face) from the 
very last frame of each video-clip. The estimated positions were then shifted vertically on the Y axis 
in order to locate the white bars above and below the mouth or the eye. To ensure subjects explored 
the whole face for the duration of the video, the white bar appeared after the end of the video clip, 
and observers were instructed to pay attention to the social target’s facial movements and track the 
position of the outer canthus and labial commissure throughout the entire movie. The white bar 
remained onscreen for 350 ms and was followed by the instruction: “Mouth: above or below” or 
“Eye: above or below”. The position of the white bar was equally distributed above and below our 
landmarks (eyes and mouth). 
Stimuli and task validation 
Videos were selected based on the results of five pilot studies carried out with a total of 100 subjects 
who did not participate in any of the subsequent rTMS or electrical stimulation experiments.  
Five sequential pilot experiments (Pilot 1, Pilot 2, Pilot 3, Pilot 4 and Pilot 5) were conducted to 
select the video clips for the main interferential experiments. Only stimuli associated with ~75% 
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accuracy in both the EA and the NS tasks were included in the final pool. In each pilot experiment, 
20 participants (10 females) were tested.  
-Pilot 1: In the first pilot experiment, participants watched the whole set of 600 clips (30 authentic/30 
fake expressions x 10 social targets) and performed the EA task. Each clip was presented only once. 
Based on participants’ EA performance, 30 clips were selected for each social target so that each clip 
was associated with a percentage of correct responses ranging between 65% and 85% across 
participants. One social target (a female) was excluded from the final sample because of an 
insufficient number of videos meeting the accuracy criterion. 
-Pilot 2: Participants performed the EA task on a set of 270 clips (15 authentic/15 fake expressions x 
9 social targets) that were selected in PE1. Each clip was presented twice. Based on PE2, 8 clips for 
each social target were selected (accuracy range 65-85%) and another social target was excluded. 
-Pilot 3: Participants performed both the EA and the NS tasks on a set of 64 clips (4 authentic/4 fake 
expressions x 8 social targets). In the EA task, each of the 64 clips was presented only once. In the 
NS task, each movie was repeated 4 times for a total of 256 trials. For each movie, a facial landmark 
(left/right outer canthus, left/right labial commissure) and a position of the bar (above or below the 
landmark) were selected. Then, for each of the 4 movie repetitions, we manipulated the Y coordinates 
of the white bar by gradually spacing it from the selected landmark by 4-5 pixels. In this way, we 
manipulated the difficulty of the spatial judgment across the 4 movie repetitions and could select the 
position of the white bar that was closest to the 75% accuracy criterion in the NS task (8 smiles x 8 
social targets x 4 positions).  
-Pilot 4: Participants performed both the EA and the NS tasks on the same set of movies used in PE3. 
For the NS task, we rearranged the position of the white bar and tested 3 positions for each movie 
(192 trials) on the basis of the PE3 data; the position of the white bar that came the closest to yielding 
75% accuracy in PE3 was selected as the median bar in PE4, and two additional bars, one above and 
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one below, were added. Based on participants’ performance in PE4, we selected the final set of stimuli 
that included 4 smiles (2 authentic/2 fake expressions) x 8 social targets (4 female). 
-Pilot 5: In the last pilot experiment, the final set of 32 stimuli was tested again for both the EA and 
NS tasks to ensure the tasks were matched for difficulty. Results confirmed that the percentage of 
correct responses ranged between 65% and 85% for all the stimuli in both tasks. Moreover, a paired 
t-test comparing the percentages of correct responses in the two tasks confirmed the successful 
matching (t19 = 0.38, P = 0.71). 
These pilot studies allowed us to select a subset of 32 movies from 8 social targets, and ensured that 
performance on the two experimental tasks was similar for each stimulus used in the main 
experiments (~75% accuracy). 
 
Figure 1. Schematic representation of the experimental paradigm. (A) In the EA task, participants were asked to judge 
whether the smiling social target was feeling authentic or false amusement. (B) In the NS task, participants had to judge 
whether the white bar appeared above or below the social target’s mouth/eye (above the mouth in the example). (C) In 
both tasks, a continuous 6 Hz train of 12 pulses of rTMS or electrical stimulation was applied at onset of the movies. (D) 
Exemplar representation showing (in red) the possible locations of appearance of the white bar relative to the social 
target’s mouth and eye. 
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Procedure 
Custom software (written in C#) was used to control the video clip sequence and trigger TMS or 
electrical stimulation. For the rTMS experiments, participants were initially tested in 
electrophysiological and neuronavigation sessions in which rTMS intensity and coil position over the 
scalp were determined, respectively (see below). Then, participants were presented with task 
instructions and an example of the trial structure. Each subject performed the EA and NS tasks in two 
separate sessions presented in a counterbalanced order. For each task, two blocks of 16 active rTMS 
trials and two blocks of 16 sham rTMS trials were performed in an ABBA/BAAB counterbalanced 
order (i.e., active-sham-sham-active or sham-active-active-sham). After each block, a break of ~1 
minute was allowed. A break of ~5 minutes was allowed between the two sessions. 
For both tasks, each trial started with a grey screen (1000 ms) followed by the video clip (2000 ms). 
After the clip, a white bar (24 x 1 pixels subtending 0.72 x 0.03° of visual angle) appeared on a black 
screen (350 ms), followed by a response screen (presented until response). Participants provided their 
response by pressing one of two keys on the keyboard. They were asked to answer as accurately as 
possible, using the index and middle fingers of the right hand (ipsilateral to the target stimulation 
site). After the keypress, the response screen was replaced by a black screen (inter-trial interval: 7000-
9000 ms).  
On each trial, a time-locked single train of subthreshold 6Hz rTMS (12 pulses) was administered 
using a figure-of-eight coil (diameter: 70 mm) connected to a Magstim Rapid2 stimulator (Magstim, 
Whitland, Dyfed, U.K.). The coil was placed over a target brain region that differed by participant 
group (IFG, SI, mPFC or TPJ). The rTMS train lasted 2 seconds. It was administered at the onset of 
the movie and thus covered its entire duration (Fig. 1C). The stimulation intensity corresponded to 
90% of the resting motor threshold (see below). During active rTMS blocks, the intersection of the 
coil was placed tangentially to the scalp directly above the scalp location of the target region. Sham 
rTMS blocks were performed by tilting the coil at 90° over the same target region, to provide some 
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scalp sensations and TMS sounds similar to active stimulation but without inducing a current in the 
brain. 
Since online rTMS may cause slight activations of facial muscles, and altering facial mimicry can 
impair visual recognition of positive expressions (Oberman et al., 2007; Wood et al., 2016), we 
performed a peripheral site control experiment (PS). In the PS experiment, we directly stimulated 
participants’ face using electric pulses. Specifically, we stimulated the right masseter muscle by 
applying a time-locked single train of 6Hz electrical square wave pulses (pulse duration: 0.2 ms), thus 
mimicking the stimulation frequency used in the rTMS experiments. Ag-AgCl surface electrodes 
connected to a DS7A Digitimer Constant Current Stimulator (Digitimer, Hertfordshire, UK) were 
placed between the condyle and the coronoid process of the mandible, immediately below the 
zygomatic process. Electrode position and stimulation intensity were individually adjusted to evoke 
facial contractions that were visually similar to those evoked by active rTMS (mean intensity = 0.41 
mA, SD = 0.06). For each task, two blocks of 16 active stimulation trials and two blocks of non 
stimulation (control) trials were performed in an ABBA/BAAB counterbalanced order.  
At the end of the experimental session, participants in the TMS or PS experiments were asked to 
provide subjective ratings of the unpleasant sensations caused by the magnetic or electrical 
stimulation, using a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (‘not unpleasant at all’) to 5 (‘extremely 
unpleasant’). 
 
Electrophysiological and neuronavigation sessions 
To set rTMS intensity, the resting motor threshold (rMT) was estimated for all participants in a 
preliminary phase of the experiment using standard procedures (Rossi et al., 2009). Motor-evoked 
potentials (MEPs) induced by stimulation of the right motor cortex were recorded from the left first 
dorsal interosseous (FDI) by means of a Biopac MP-35. EMG signals were band-pass filtered (30-
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500 Hz) and digitized (sampling rate: 5 kHz). Pairs of Ag-AgCl surface electrodes were placed in a 
belly-tendon montage with a ground electrode on the wrist. The intersection of the coil was placed 
tangentially to the scalp with the handle pointing backward and laterally at a 45° angle away from the 
midline. The rMT was defined as the minimal intensity of stimulator output that produces MEPs with 
an amplitude of at least 50 μV in the FDI with 50% probability (Rossini et al., 2015). 
Each brain area was individually targeted using image-guided neuronavigation. The coil position was 
identified on each participant’s scalp using the SofTaxic Navigator System (Electro Medical Systems, 
Bologna, Italy). Skull landmarks (nasion, inion and 2 preauricular points) and ~80 points providing a 
uniform representation of the scalp were digitized by means of a Polaris Vicra digitizer (Northern 
Digital), as in our previous research (Avenanti et al. 2007, 2012, 2013a; Tidoni et al. 2013; Jacquet 
and Avenanti 2015). An individual estimated magnetic resonance image (MRI) was obtained for each 
subject through a 3D warping procedure that fits a high-resolution MRI template with the 
participant’s scalp model and craniometric points. This procedure has been proven to ensure a global 
localization accuracy of roughly 5 mm, a level of precision closer to that obtained using individual 
MRIs than can be achieved using other localization methods (Carducci and Brusco, 2012).  
Stimulation sites were identified on the basis of previous fMRI studies using the SofTaxic Navigator 
(IFG, SI and TPJ), or established anatomical methods (mPFC). For IFG, SI and TPJ, Talairach 
coordinates of target regions and corresponding scalp projections were automatically estimated by 
the SofTaxic Navigator from the MRI-constructed stereotaxic template. When necessary, coordinates 
in Talairach space were obtained by converting MNI coordinates reported in previous studies using 
GingerALE 2.3.1. To target sensorimotor regions, we selected Talairach coordinates corresponding 
to the cortical face representations in premotor and somatosensory sites. The IFG scalp site was 
localized based on the following coordinates: x = 47, y = 8, z = 28, which were identified on the basis 
of previous fMRI meta-analyses exploring activations associated with the execution and/or 
observation of facial movements and emotional expressions (Molenberghs et al., 2009; Caspers et al., 
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2010; Grosbras et al., 2012). The S1 site was identified based on the following coordinates: x = 56, y 
= -16, z = 40, corresponding to the face representation in the post-central gyrus (Huang and Sereno, 
2007; Dresel et al., 2008; Kopietz et al., 2009; Holle et al., 2013).  
Key nodes of the mentalizing network were identified as follows: the mPFC site was identified at 
one-third of the distance between the nasion and the inion on the midline between the left and the 
right preauricular points, as in previous TMS studies (Harmer et al., 2001; Mattavelli et al., 2011, 
2013). The right TPJ site was localized based on the following coordinates: x = 51, y = -54, z = 21, 
which were identified on the basis of neuroimaging studies exploring areas related to theory of mind 
and mentalizing (van Overwalle and Baetens, 2009; Mar, 2011; Bzdok et al., 2012). 
Locations of scalp regions identified by neuronavigation (IFG, SI, TPJ) or anatomical methods 
(mPFC) were marked with a pen on each participant’s head and used to place the rTMS coil. Then, 
individual Talairach coordinates corresponding to the projection of the targeted scalp sites on the 
surface of the MRI-constructed stereotaxic template were automatically estimated through the 
neuronavigation system. These estimated coordinates indicate the most superficial cortical site where 
rTMS effects are expected to be maximal. Group mean coordinates are illustrated in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Schematic representation of the brain stimulation sites reconstructed on a standard template using MRIcron 
(MRIcron/NPM/dcm2nii). Talairach coordinates corresponding to the projection of the IFG, SI, mPFC and TPJ scalp 
sites on the brain surface were individually estimated through the neuronavigation system. Group mean brain surface 
coordinates ± SD for the IFG site were: x = 56.1 ± 1.1; y = 7.4 ± 1.2; z = 29.6 ± 2.3. Coordinates for the SI were: x = 
57.8 ± 0.8; y = -17.0 ± 0.9; z = 39.2 ± 1.0. Coordinates for the mPFC were: x = 0.0 ± 0.7; y = 22.0 ± 4.8; z = 56.6 ± 4.3. 
Coordinates for the TPJ were: x = 58.0 ± 0.8; y = -54.8 ± 1.8; z = 22.1 ± 1.5. Talairach coordinates were then converted 
to the MNI space (using GingerALE 2.3.1) for visualization with the MRIcron software. 
 
Data Analysis: 
Behavioral data were processed offline. Accuracy on each task (EA, NS) was converted into measures 
of sensitivity (d’) and response bias (β) in accordance with signal detection theory (Macmillan and 
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Creelman, 1991) for each stimulation type (active, control) and stimulation site (SI, IFG, TPJ, mPFC, 
PS). For the EA task, two types of responses were scored as correct: a “fake” response to a false 
expression of amusement (hit) and a “true” response to an authentic expression of amusement (correct 
rejection). Two types of responses were scored as incorrect: a “fake” response to an authentic 
expression (false alarm) and a “true” response to a fake expression (miss). For the NS task, responses 
were coded as follows: “above” to a white bar above the mouth or the eye (hit), “below” to a white 
bar below the mouth or the eye (correct rejection), “above” to a white bar below the mouth or eye 
(false alarm) and “below” to a white bar above the mouth or eye (miss). Mixed factors ANOVAs 
were performed on d’ and β with stimulation type (active, sham) as a within-subjects factor and 
stimulation site (IFG, SI, mPFC, TPJ, PS) as a between-subjects factor. Post-hoc analysis was 
performed using the Newman-Keuls test to correct for multiple comparisons. Partial eta2 was 
computed as a measure of effect size for the main effects and interactions, whereas repeated measures 
Cohen’s d was computed for post-hoc comparisons. To test the robustness of the ANOVA results, we 
additionally performed Wilcoxon matched-pairs tests to confirm the significance of critical 
comparisons (i.e., sham vs. active stimulation) across stimulation sites. 
 
Results 
rTMS over IFG and SI interferes with EA task sensitivity, not response bias 
The stimulation type x stimulation site ANOVA conducted on measures of EA task sensitivity (d’) 
revealed significant main effects of stimulation site (F4,75 = 3.02, P = 0.02, Partial eta
2 = 0.14) and 
stimulation type (F1,75 = 11.79, P = 0.001, Partial eta
2 = 0.14; Fig. 3A). Importantly, these two main 
effects were qualified by a significant two-way stimulation site x stimulation type interaction (F4,75 = 
4.82, P = 0.001, Partial eta2 = 0.20). Post-hoc analysis showed that the interaction was accounted for 
by the strong reduction in task sensitivity found in the IFG and SI groups during active rTMS (mean 
d’ value ± SD.: IFG = 1.20 ± 0.10; SI = 1.07 ± 0.09) compared to sham rTMS (IFG = 1.81 ± 0.13; SI 
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= 1.58 ± 0.14; all Cohen’s d > 0.94, all P < 0.002). No change in sensitivity due to active stimulation 
was found when stimulating mPFC (sham rTMS: 1.87 ± 0.81; active rTMS: 1.80 ± 0.65; P = 0.96), 
TPJ (sham rTMS: 1.66 ± 0.18; active rTMS: 1.65 ± 0.11; P = 0.96), or peripheral site (no stimulation: 
1.84 ± 0.18; active stimulation: 1.94 ± 0.14; P = 0.80).  
 
 
Figure 3. (A) Mean sensitivity (d’) in the EA task. Dark-gray and light-gray columns represent control and active 
stimulation, respectively. Active stimulation of IFG and SI, but not of mPFC, TPJ or PS, reduced sensitivity in the EA 
task. No change in sensitivity due to active stimulation was observed in the NS task. (B) Mean sensitivity (d’) in the NS 
task. Dark-gray and light-gray columns represent control and active stimulation, respectively. No change in sensitivity 
due to active stimulation was observed. Asterisks indicate significant post-hoc comparisons (P < 0.05). Error bars denote 
s.e.m. 
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The stimulation type x stimulation site ANOVA performed on the β index (Table 2) showed no 
significant no main effects or interactions (all F < 2.14, P > 0.1), indicating that neither magnetic 
stimulation of the cortex nor electrical stimulation of the face muscles affected response bias in the 
EA task.  
 
Table 2.  Mean β index ± SD computed for the EA task and the NS task in the control (sham rTMS or no electrical 
stimulation) and active interference conditions (active rTMS or active electrical stimulation). 
 IFG SI mPFC TPJ PS 
 Control Active Control Active Control Active Control Active Control Active 
EA task 2.2 ± 3.1 1.5 ± 0.5 1.2 ± 1.2 0.9 ± 0.3 1.3 ± 0.6 1.2 ± 0.7 1.2 ± 0.6 1.1 ± 0.6 1.5 ± 1.0 1.3 ± 0.9 
NS task 1.7 ± 1.8 1.6 ± 1.4 1.7 ± 1.4 1.9 ± 1.4 1.9 ± 1.6 1.8 ± 1.8 1.6 ± 1.3 1.4 ± 1.1 2.5 ± 1.8 1.6 ± 1.2 
 
 
The stimulation type x stimulation site ANOVA performed on d’ for the NS task (Fig. 3B) showed 
no significant main effects or interactions (all F < 0.61, P > 0.66). A further ANOVA performed on 
the β index (Table 2) showed no main effects or interactions (all F < 1.51, P > 0.22).  
Thus, performance on the NS task was not affected by interference with sensorimotor regions, the 
mentalizing network, or peripheral facial muscles. This suggests that rTMS over sensorimotor regions 
did not simply impair visual processing of facial stimuli but specifically worsened the ability to 
accurately infer mental states based on such processing. 
 
Changes in task sensitivity are selective  
In a further analysis, we directly compared performance on the two tasks. A task (EA, NS) x 
stimulation type x stimulation site mixed factors ANOVA on d’ showed significant main effects of 
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stimulation type (F1,75 = 5.69, P = 0.02, Partial eta2 = 0.07) and stimulation site (F4,75 = 2.65, P = 
0.04, Partial eta2 = 0.12), a significant two-way task x stimulation type interaction (F1,75 = 4.83, P = 
0.03, Partial eta2 = 0.06) and, critically, a significant three-way task x stimulation type x stimulation 
site interaction (F3,75 = 2.69, P = 0.04, Partial eta2 = 0.13). This interaction was driven by greater 
active rTMS interference with EA task performance relative to NS task performance in the IFG and 
SI groups, compared to the mPFC, TPJ and PS groups {[(sham-active)EA - (sham-active)NS]IFG,SI > 
[(sham-active)EA - (sham-active)NS]mPFC,TPJ,PS; two sample t-test, P = 0.002}. The significance of 
the triple interaction provided the statistical grounds for carrying out separate stimulation type x 
stimulation site ANOVAs for the two tasks (see previous paragraph). 
To directly test the interferential effect of rTMS over different brain regions, a stimulation site x task 
mixed factors ANOVA was conducted on the difference in performance (d’) between the sham and 
active rTMS conditions for each group of participants (Fig. 4). The ANOVA showed no significant 
main effect of stimulation site (F4,75 = 2.01, P = 0.10), a significant main effect of task (F1,75 = 4.83, 
P = 0.03, Partial eta2 = 0.06) and, most importantly, a significant stimulation site x task interaction 
(F4,75 = 2.69, P = 0.04, Partial eta
2 = 0.13). Greater interference with EA task performance was 
obtained with IFG (0.61 ± 0.45) and SI stimulation (0.51 ± 0.57) than with mPFC (0.07 ± 0.69), TPJ 
(0.01 ± 0.51) and PS (-0.09 ± 0.63) stimulation (all Cohen’s d > 0.69, all P < 0.042) which in turn did 
not differ from one another (all P > 0.63). Statistically comparable interferential effects were found 
for EA task performance when stimulating IFG and SI (P = 0.64). These interferential effects were 
greater for the EA task than for the NS task when stimulating the same regions (all Cohen’s d > 0.74, 
P < 0.013). No significant effects were found for the NS task (all P > 0.49). 
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Figure 4. Interferential effect of active relative to control stimulation on sensitivity (d’) in the EA (dark-gray) and NS 
(light-gray) tasks. Positive values indicate greater interference with task performance. Greater EA interference was 
obtained with IFG and SI stimulation relative to mPFC, TPJ and PS stimulation. No similar effects were found for the 
NS task. Asterisks indicate significant post-hoc comparisons (P < 0.05). Error bars denote s.e.m. 
 
 
To ensure that any interferential effects of rTMS were not due to speed-accuracy trade-offs, we also 
analyzed response times (RTs) in the two tasks (Table 3). The task x stimulation type x stimulation 
site ANOVA performed on RTs revealed no main effects or interactions (all F < 1.42, P > 0.23), 
ruling out any speed-accuracy trade-offs.  
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Table 3. Mean RTs ± SD computed for the EA task and the NS task in the control (sham rTMS or no electrical stimulation) 
and active interference conditions (active rTMS or active electrical stimulation). 
 IFG SI mPFC TPJ PS 
 Control Active Control Active Control Active Control Active Control Active 
EA task 665 ± 281 689 ± 240 659 ± 200 633 ± 191 730 ± 243 712 ± 227 756 ± 349 721 ± 295 689 ± 213 689 ± 246 
NS task 727 ± 322 675 ± 256 670 ± 230 651 ± 233 699 ± 247 735 ± 255 712 ± 348 705 ± 356 668 ± 235 682 ± 179 
 
Ruling out nonspecific effects 
Finally, we performed a series of control analysis to test the influence of nonspecific effects. We 
checked whether the unpleasantness of the stimulation could explain our results. A one-way ANOVA 
on unpleasantness ratings showed no significant effect of stimulation site (F4,75 = 2.06, P = 0.1; see 
Table 4). Adding these ratings as covariates in the preceding analyses (d’, β, RTs) did not change the 
pattern of statistical results reported above and revealed no main effects of or interactions with the 
covariate. 
Table 4. Mean subjective ratings ± SD of the unpleasantness felt during active brain stimulation (active rTMS over IFG, 
S1, mPFC and TPJ) or peripheral stimulation (electrical stimulation of the PS). 
IFG SI mPFC TPJ PS 
3.0 ± 1.3 2.3 ± 0.9 2.1 ± 0.5 2.4 ± 1.2 2.6 ± 0.8 
 
In a series of analyses restricted to the four rTMS groups (IFG, SI, mPFC, TPJ), we checked the 
influence of rTMS intensity. Values of rMT (mean ± SD) were not statistically different across the 
four rTMS groups although there was a non-significant trend (IFG group: 55 ± 4%; S1 group: 59 ± 
6%; mPFC group: 48 ± 4%; TPJ group: 57 ± 8%; F3,60 = 2.53, P = 0.07). To rule out that rTMS 
intensity affected our results, we first repeated all the previously reported mixed factors ANOVAs on 
d’, β and RTs, focusing only on the four rTMS groups, and fully replicated the pattern of statistical 
results reported above for the rTMS groups. Then, we entered stimulation intensity as a covariate 
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(alone or in combination with unpleasantness ratings) in the same analyses and found no influence of 
such covariate(s). 
 
Non-parametric control analyses of task performance  
The main analyses indicated that EA task sensitivity (d’) was strongly affected by rTMS over IFG 
and SI, as shown by the large effect sizes of the critical comparisons (active vs. control stimulation). 
Although d’ values were normally distributed (Shapiro Wilk tests: all P > .18), to further show the 
robustness of our findings, we additionally performed non-parametric analyses on the critical 
comparisons.  
Wilcoxon matched-pairs tests performed on d’ values in the EA task confirmed the significance of 
the critical comparisons for the IFG and SI groups (all P < 0.0097), whereas the same comparisons 
were not significant for the mPFC, TPJ or PS groups (all P > 0.53). No significant comparisons were 
found for the NS task across groups (all P > 0.36).  
Additionally, confirming the results of the parametric analyses, Wilcoxon matched-pairs test 
performed on the β index (Table 2) and RTs (Table 3) showed no significant difference between 
active and control stimulations across tasks and groups (all P > 0.36). 
 
Discussion 
Sensorimotor and mentalizing networks have often been conceptualized as supporting mutually 
exclusive mechanisms for social perception and empathy. However, recent theoretical (Keysers and 
Gazzola, 2007; Uddin et al., 2007; Zaki et al., 2012; Lamm and Majdandžić, 2015) and empirical 
(Wheatley et al., 2007; Zaki et al., 2009b; Lombardo et al., 2010; Redcay et al., 2010; Schippers et 
al., 2010; Wolf et al., 2010; Lamm et al., 2011; Spunt and Lieberman, 2013; Raz et al., 2014) work 
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suggests that both networks are recruited during complex social tasks and could provide routes to 
understanding others. Therefore, a central aim of neuroscience is to clarify the circumstances in which 
these networks are critical for social cognition (Mitchell 2009; Zaki et al. 2012; Avenanti et al. 
2013b).  
This is particularly relevant for the development of mechanistic models of EA (i.e., the ability to 
accurately recognize and understand what another individual is experiencing;  Ickes and Stinson 
1990; Levenson and Ruef 1992; Ickes 1997; Zaki et al. 2008, 2009), but also for empathy in general, 
as sensorimotor and cognitive processes underlying EA are supposed to provide a key mechanism for 
evoking affective sharing processes underlying the empathic response (Preston and de Waal 2002; 
Singer and Lamm 2009; Batson 2011; Decety et al. 2012; Bird and Viding 2014; Zaki 2014). Previous 
empathy research has established a close link between vicarious experience of the emotions felt by 
others and neural activity in affective brain regions like the anterior insula and the anterior 
midcingulate cortex (Wicker et al. 2003; Singer et al. 2004; Jabbi and Keysers 2008; Fan et al. 2011; 
Lamm et al. 2011; see in particular Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al. 2011; Rütgen et al. 2015a, 2015b; Zaki 
et al. 2016 for recent advancements supporting a simulative account of affective sharing).  
Yet, multiple mechanisms are likely involved in EA, possibly depending on task demands and the 
information available to make inferences about what other people are feeling. 
 In the present study, we provide causal evidence that sensorimotor networks, more so than 
mentalizing networks, play a crucial role in evaluating the authenticity of observed smiles. We 
designed a new EA task adapted from previous psychological and neuroscientific research (Ickes and 
Stinson, 1990; Levenson and Ruef, 1992; Ekman, 2001; Shiota et al., 2003; Zaki et al., 2008; 
Ambadar et al., 2009; Krumhuber and Manstead, 2009; McLellan et al., 2010; Tidoni et al., 2013) 
and used rTMS to test whether sensorimotor (IFG and SI) and mentalizing areas (mPFC and TPJ) are 
necessary for drawing explicit inferences about the amusement supposedly felt by smiling social 
targets.  
36 
 
We observed that active rTMS administered over the observers’ face representation in IFG and SI, 
but not over mPFC or TPJ, disrupted EA. Thus, the reduction in EA performance was not due to 
nonspecific effects of rTMS, but to the interference with fronto-parietal regions involved in 
controlling and sensing facial movements. A further control experiment also assured that the 
reduction in EA was not due to the peripheral interference with facial muscles indirectly caused by 
rTMS. Indeed, direct electrical stimulation of facial muscles (PS stimulation) did not affect EA. Thus, 
the reduction in EA performance was due to cortical sensorimotor interference. Our signal detection 
approach demonstrated that the EA disruption consisted of a pure reduction in participants’ sensitivity 
to the authenticity of amused expressions, rather than a change in participants’ response bias. Further 
analyses ruled out that the decrease in sensitivity was caused by a trade-off in which participants 
achieved faster RTs by sacrificing accuracy. Moreover, differences in stimulation unpleasantness or 
rTMS intensity could not explain the results. 
Remarkably, no change in performance due to sensorimotor (or mentalizing network) interference 
was found in a difficulty-matched NS task requiring participants to monitor the social target’s 
expression but not to explicitly infer amusement authenticity. Thus, the reduction in EA performance 
did not simply reflect impaired low-level processing of the social target’s facial movements (i.e., the 
emotion expression), but, rather, a disruption of explicit inferences about the covert mental state 
underlying those movements (i.e., the social target’s emotional feeling). These findings highlight, for 
the first time, the functional relevance of IFG and SI to accurate recognition of the authenticity of 
amused expressions, and thus suggest a grounding of EA in sensorimotor networks.  
 
From neural correlates to neural bases of EA 
Mounting evidence suggests that both sensorimotor and mentalizing networks are engaged during EA 
tasks (Zaki et al., 2009b; Harvey et al., 2013), although none of these studies have used causal 
methods to establish the neural bases for discrimination between authentic and false emotional 
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expressions. Zaki and colleagues (2009; see also Harvey et al. 2013) recently found that both 
sensorimotor and mentalizing networks show increased activity during accurate relative to inaccurate 
explicit inferences about social targets’ emotional states. In their EA task, participants watched 
individuals discussing emotional autobiographical events and had to infer the underlying emotional 
feelings (Zaki et al., 2009b; Harvey et al., 2013). In the auditory domain, McGettigan and colleagues 
(2015) investigated brain activity associated with the ability to discriminate between authentic and 
fake laughter (McGettigan et al., 2015). As already mentioned in the introduction, in that study, 
inferences about laughter authenticity had to be based on social cues only, as participants had no prior 
knowledge or contextual information about the laughter. Under these conditions, McGettigan and 
colleagues (2015) found that neural activity in both networks predicted accurate emotion recognition. 
However, those correlational data could not answer the key question of whether sensorimotor and 
mentalizing networks are also essential for EA. 
Here, by using a novel EA task and active stimulation of cortical sites, compared to control 
stimulations, we were able to provide the first direct causal evidence that the motor and 
somatosensory face representations in IFG and SI are functionally relevant to empathic inference of 
amusement authenticity from smiles, whereas frontal and parieto-temporal regions involved in mental 
state reasoning, i.e., the rTPJ and mPFC, do not appear to play similarly critical roles. These findings 
indicate that EA performance is (at least partially) grounded in the self: inferring amusement 
authenticity from smiling facial expressions requires one’s own sensorimotor networks for making 
and sensing facial movements.  
Sensorimotor grounding of EA 
A growing body of evidence suggests that sensorimotor regions play key roles in emotion processing 
and social cognition (Pobric and Hamilton, 2006; Avenanti et al., 2007; D’Agata et al., 2011; de 
Gelder et al., 2012; Tidoni et al., 2013; Bolognini et al., 2014; Costa et al., 2014; Urgesi et al., 2014; 
Jacquet and Avenanti, 2015; Tamietto et al., 2015; Valchev et al., 2016). It is well established that 
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IFG and SI show overlapping activations when participants make emotional expressions and when 
they see the same expressions or hear associated nonverbal vocalizations (Carr et al., 2003; Winston 
et al., 2003; Leslie et al., 2004; Dapretto et al., 2006; Warren et al., 2006; Keysers et al., 2010). IFG 
and SI are also active both during the execution and the observation of actions, and are considered to 
be part of a mirroring network involved in simulating observed actions within one’s own sensorimotor 
system (Caspers et al. 2010; Keysers et al. 2010; Gallese and Sinigaglia 2011; Avenanti et al. 2013b; 
Valchev et al. 2016). Also, previous studies have shown that more empathic people show stronger 
activation in the IFG and SI (and interconnected sensorimotor regions) than less empathic people 
when they are watching the actions or the emotions of others (Gazzola et al., 2006; Schulte-Rüther et 
al., 2007; Pfeifer et al., 2008; Avenanti et al., 2009). However, a major issue hampering the 
development of a neuroscientific model of EA has been the lack of established connections between 
these neuroimaging findings and key behavioral indices of EA (but see (Zaki et al., 2009b; Harvey et 
al., 2013; McGettigan et al., 2015). Our study significantly expands upon previous evidence by 
demonstrating that those sectors of IFG and SI showing vicarious activations are not only correlated 
with stable empathic dispositions for sharing emotions, but also critical for EA performance. These 
findings establish a strong and direct causal link between sensorimotor brain networks and emotion 
understanding that was only suggested in the past (e.g. Carr et al. 2003; Avenanti et al. 2005).  
What is the specific role of sensorimotor networks in understanding others’ emotions?  
Theoretical models propose that one mechanism for inferring the unobservable emotional feelings of 
others is to simulate their observed facial movements within one’s own sensorimotor system (Adolphs 
et al. 2000; Adolphs 2002; Gallese et al. 2004; Goldman and Sripada 2005; Gallese 2007; Keysers et 
al. 2010; Niedenthal et al. 2010; Gallese and Sinigaglia 2011; Avenanti et al. 2013b; Wood et al. 
2016). According to these models, sensory representations of observed facial expressions in high-
order visual regions (e.g., the superior temporal sulcus, STS) would be coupled with sensorimotor 
representations of the same expressions in the IFG and SI. This sensorimotor embodiment would help 
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observers to intuitively grasp what the other person is experiencing. Some theorists also maintain that 
sensorimotor simulation would support access to stored knowledge, grounded in the distributed 
emotion system (including the anterior insula and cingulate cortex), about the emotional states 
associated with the facial expression (Goldman and Sripada, 2005; Niedenthal et al., 2010; Wood et 
al., 2016). Thus, when observing facial expressions in others, activity in sensorimotor networks may 
partially or fully reactivate related concepts and affective states and thus contribute not only to 
accurate cognitive inferences about the underlying emotional feeling (i.e., EA) but also its sharing – 
as theorized by current neuroscientific models of empathy.  
Remarkably, these theoretical models imply that sensorimotor regions are not only essential for 
perceptual processing of overt movements (i.e., the social target’s facial expression), but also for 
accurate inference of the covert mental state underlying those movements (i.e., the social target’s 
emotional feeling).  
However, to date these hypotheses have received only partial empirical support from studies using 
causal methods. Those studies have established that both stable brain lesions and transient rTMS 
interference with inferior frontal and somatosensory regions reduce performance on tasks requiring 
participants to process mouth actions (Pazzaglia et al., 2008a; Michael et al., 2014) and emotional 
facial expressions (Adolphs et al. 2000; Pitcher et al. 2008; see also Keysers et al. 2010; Avenanti et 
al. 2013b). However, they used static pictures of actions or facial expressions and did not clarify to 
what extent IFG and SI: i) are necessary for perceptual processing of the dynamic facial movements 
which constitute the observed emotional expressions; or ii) play a role in higher-level explicit 
inferences about the emotional feelings underlying those facial movements (possibly via access to 
stored knowledge in affective brain regions). Our study provides evidence supporting the latter 
hypothesis. Indeed, one important feature of our findings is that rTMS over IFG and SI selectively 
disrupted performance on the EA task but not on the NS task. Similarly, to the EA task, the NS task 
required participants to monitor and track facial movements. Thus, we suggest that rTMS over 
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sensorimotor regions did not simply interfere with visual processing of facial movements. Rather, 
rTMS disrupted sensorimotor processing necessary for making sense of those movements and 
inferring the underlying emotional feelings. 
 
Altering facial feedback does not affect EA  
Our study appears to support an as-if loop hypothesis (Damasio, 1994; Adolphs et al., 2000; Atkinson, 
2007; Wood et al., 2016) more than the classical facial feedback hypothesis (for excellent reviews 
see Goldman and Sripada 2005; Niedenthal et al. 2010), as we obtained behavioral impairments while 
interfering with cortical sensorimotor networks for moving and sensing the face (rTMS over IFG and 
SI), but not while interfering with peripheral facial muscles (PS stimulation). However, our findings 
do not necessarily speak against the facial feedback hypothesis or conflict with the evidence that 
altering facial feedback impairs recognition of emotional expressions. Effective manipulations of 
facial feedback typically require participants to constantly bite a pen (Oberman et al., 2007), to wear 
mouthguards (Rychlowska et al., 2014), or to prevent mimicry over time, either intentionally (Davis 
et al., 2009) or as consequence of botulinum toxin-induced denervation of target muscles (Neal and 
Chartrand, 2011). On the other hand, manipulations like chewing gum that only transiently alter facial 
mimicry (and somatosensory facial feedback) are not effective at altering emotion recognition 
(Oberman et al., 2007). It should be noted that our PS stimulation was not designed to constantly alter 
facial feedback during observation of smiles, but rather to mimic the potential peripheral 
consequences of rTMS, i.e., the transient contractions of facial muscles. Thus, while our data do not 
conflict with the facial feedback hypothesis, they can firmly rule out that rTMS-induced facial 
contractions per se are the key factor driving our EA impairments. 
It could be further considered that effective facial feedback manipulations reported in the literature 
are sensorimotor rather than purely somatosensory in nature, as they also entail altered facial motor 
commands. However, many of these manipulations also plausibly alter several brain processes (e.g., 
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they may reduce attention or increase cognitive load) in addition to affecting sensorimotor brain 
regions controlling and sensing facial movements. Therefore, our study extends prior behavioral 
research by showing that selective targeting of cortical face representations in IFG and SI disrupts 
EA performance. Indeed, based on our findings, it could be suggested that sensorimotor regions like 
the IFG and SI may mediate the behavioral effects that are known to be induced by altering facial 
feedback. 
 
Final remarks  
Two final issues require attention for drawing appropriate conclusions from our findings. First, 
although we show site-specific effects of rTMS, it is unlikely these effects are site-limited. The effect 
of IFG or SI stimulation might be at least partially due to the spread of TMS-induced excitation along 
interconnected regions (Siebner et al. 2009; Avenanti et al. 2013b; Valchev et al. 2015, 2016) that 
may have contributed to the observed impairment in EA. The IFG and SI are strongly interconnected 
with other parietal regions of the sensorimotor mirroring network, but also anterior insular and frontal 
opercular regions involved in affective sharing mechanisms of empathy (Wicker et al., 2003; Gallese 
et al., 2004; Jabbi and Keysers, 2008; Lamm et al., 2011). Therefore, in keeping with simulationist 
models (Goldman and Sripada, 2005; Niedenthal et al., 2010; Wood et al., 2016), it is possible that 
interconnected affective regions – possibly involved in emotional rather than sensorimotor simulation 
– may contribute to explicit inferences about the authenticity of amused expressions.  
Second, while it is widely assumed that seeing emotional facial expressions triggers sensorimotor 
simulation in the observer’s IFG and SI face representation —and, indeed, we may have interfered 
with simulation processes necessary for EA— caution is needed when using such reverse inferences 
logic because IFG and SI functioning may include additional processes (Avenanti et al. 2013b; 
Borgomaneri et al. 2015; Press and Cook 2015; Zaki et al. 2016). For example, studies have suggested 
that cortical motor areas (near to or interconnected with the sector of the IFG we have stimulated) 
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may be involved in interval timing or orienting processes (Eimer et al., 2005; Schubotz, 2007; Coull 
et al., 2008; Borgomaneri et al., 2015; Press and Cook, 2015), which in turn could contribute to 
processing the temporal dynamics of facial expressions and thus to EA task performance. Although 
these domain-general motor system processes themselves have been interpreted within the simulation 
framework (Schubotz, 2007), the possibility that our rTMS effects were partially due to interference 
with non-simulative processes should not be excluded. This does not undervalue our findings that the 
IFG and SI are crucial for EA, as it is theoretically plausible that domain-general processes could 
contribute to domain-specific social cognitive functions (Michael and D’Ausilio, 2015). Yet, our 
study allows us to conclude that, under our experimental conditions, EA performance is grounded in 
sensorimotor networks that are primarily involved in controlling face movements and sensing feelings 
from the face. 
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Mentalizing network and EA 
Experiments 1 to 5 provide insights into the neural bases of EA under conditions in which explicit 
inferences about another’s emotional feelings can be drawn only on the basis of social cues.  Similarly 
to McGettigan and colleagues (2015), our dynamic social cues were not embedded in a context that 
could provide information about why the actors were smiling.  On this point, previous imaging studies 
have suggested that the purpose of understanding others might trigger activity in the mentalizing 
network, despite the lack of a context. For example, watching deceptive actions (Grèzes et al., 2004) 
and discriminating between authentic and false emotional vocal expressions (Drolet et al., 2012) 
activate a mentalizing network encompassing the mPFC and TPJ regions, and this network was found 
to predict accurate emotion recognition as in the study of McGettigan and colleagues (2015). It could 
thus be suggested that the mental attitude to infer another’s mental state – even if based on social cues 
only – might be sufficient to trigger neural activity in the mentalizing network, even when the social 
cues are not contextually embedded.  The kind of mind-reading performed in the simulation network 
is almost automatic and is not explicit or propositional. Moreover, previous studies suggest that 
activity in the simulation network precedes activity in the mentalizing network during social 
cognition. In this framework, the lack of behavioural effects when TMS was applied on mentalizing 
regions might be due to our dichotomic EA task (authentic/false amusement). Therefore, in 
Experiment 6 and 7 we modified our dichotomic EA task to make it more deliberate and explicit, 
asking participants to rate the amusement felt by the social target on a Likert scale from 1 to 9. 
Experiment 6 and 7 thus have three main aims: i) Exploring the lack of causal effects with interference 
over the mentalizing network in Experiment 3 and 4, ii) Exploring the boundaries of the functional 
role of the sensorimotor network in more fine-grained judgments about the internal emotional state 
of another individual and iii) Exploring the contribution of high- and low-level visual regions to 
Empathic Accuracy. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Visual, motor and cognitive routes to accurate understanding of 
amusement from smiles 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Among all the faces we encounter during social interactions, the smiling face is both one of the most 
common and yet one of the most ambiguous ones (Niedenthal et al., 2010). Smiles are readouts of 
felt amusement and are essential for the creation and maintenance of social bonds (Cashdan 2004; 
Fridlund 1991; 2002). Thus, being able to accurately understand the amusement behind a smile is a 
key challenge in social life. The ability to accurately understand the internal emotional state felt by 
another individual (a social target) is often referred to as Empathic Accuracy (EA) (Ickes and Stinson, 
1990; Levenson and Ruef, 1992; Ickes, 1997; Zaki et al., 2008, 2009a). The chain of processes 
ultimately leading to accurate understanding (EA) of the amusement behind an observed smile starts 
with the visual processing of morphological and dynamic features of the social target’s expression 
(Ambadar et al., 2009; Vuilleumier and Huang, 2009; Pourtois et al., 2013). This processing is 
supported by high-order visual regions such as the superior temporal sulcus (STS) which encodes 
socially relevant cues and biological motion (Allison et al., 2000; Grossman and Blake, 2002; 
Nummenmaa and Calder, 2009) (Narumoto et al., 2001; Fusar-Poli et al., 2009; Peelen et al., 2010; 
Skerry and Saxe, 2014). Further sensorimotor and cognitive processes might support EA (Paracampo 
et al. 2016; Wood et al. 2016), including; 1) sensorimotor simulation, i.e., a process by which a viewer 
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partially reproduces the social target’s facial expression in their own sensorimotor system; and 2) 
“mentalizing” processes allowing the viewer to explicitly consider others’ mental states and their 
sources, and to draw explicit inferences about them (Haxby et al., 2000; Preston and de Waal, 2002; 
Gallese et al., 2004; Amodio and Frith, 2006; Frith and Frith, 2006; Saxe, 2006; Mitchell, 2009; 
Atkinson and Adolphs, 2011; Gallese and Sinigaglia, 2011; Zaki et al., 2012; Decety and Svetlova, 
2012).  
Involvement of sensorimotor simulation in EA has been supported by the evidence that people often 
mimic the observed facial expressions and such facial mimicry appears to contribute to EA (Wood et 
al., 2016). It is held that when people simulate a perceived facial expression, they partially reactivate 
the corresponding emotional state in themselves, which provides a basis for inferring the underlying 
emotion of the observed social target. Neural evidence supporting sensorimotor simulation comes 
from functional studies showing that watching emotional facial expressions vicariously activates the 
inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), a region involved in controlling facial movements (Carr et al., 2003; 
Leslie et al., 2004; Dapretto et al., 2006) and interfering with the face representation in the IFG 
hindered the ability to accurately recognize whether a smiling individual was feeling authentic 
amusement or not (Paracampo et al. 2016), suggested a grounding of emotion understanding in 
sensorimotor regions involved in performing the same expression (Goldman and Sripada, 2005; 
Gallese, 2007a; Niedenthal et al., 2010; Wood et al., 2016). 
In addition to perception and sensorimotor simulation, EA implies the creation of cognitive 
propositional representation of others’ minds for explicit judgments about the internal emotional state. 
Studies exploring mental state attributions highlighted a specific subset of regions including the 
medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) (Amodio and Frith, 2006; 
Frith and Frith, 2006; Mitchell, 2009). 
Extant studies have often tested visual, motor and mentalizing involvement in social cognition 
through separate tasks (Zaki et al., 2012). Visual regions like the STS are usually tested using tasks 
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focusing on specific features of facial expressions like eye gaze or head movements (Nummenmaa 
and Calder, 2009). Vicarious motor involvement during observation is often assessed by simple 
emotion discrimination tasks or tasks requiring passive view of others’ actions or somatic states ().  
Studies exploring mentalizing processes typically used verbal materials, abstract visual cues or 
stylized cues like static facial expressions or in which internal emotional states are implied in pictures 
or verbal descriptions (Frith and Frith, 2006; Saxe, 2006; Mitchell, 2009).   
Recently, more naturalistic neuroscientific paradigms combining dynamic social cues and explicit 
inferential tasks have revealed a coactivation and functional coupling of sensorimotor and 
mentalizing networks during complex social tasks (Wheatley et al., 2007; Zaki et al., 2009b; 
Lombardo et al., 2010; Schippers et al., 2010; Harvey et al., 2013; Spunt and Lieberman, 2013; Raz 
et al., 2014). 
While until recently most of the studies addressing EA did not take into account participants’ 
behaviour, a recent neuroimaging study (Zaki et al., 2009b) provided correlational evidence about the 
involvement of these neural networks in EA. In specific, in a task requiring observation of others’ 
expressive behaviour and explicit inferences about the underlying emotions, they showed that EA 
performance can be predicted (among the others) by activity within visual system for emotional faces, 
the motor system and the mentalizing system. 
While these studies hinted at an interplay between visual, motor and mentalizing regions in emotion 
recognition, no study has tested their functional role in EA and whether these neural systems are 
crucial for accurate understanding of others’ emotional states remains unclear. 
In the present study, we used repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) to perturb regions 
within the visual system for emotional face perception (i.e., the primary visual cortex – V1 and STS), 
the premotor simulation network (i.e., IFG) and the mentalizing network (i.e., TPJ) to explore their 
causal involvement in accurate understanding of others’ amusement through smiles. 
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In two experiments, we applied rTMS while participants performed a novel EA task adapted from 
previous psychological and neuroscientific research (Ickes and Stinson, 1990; Levenson and Ruef, 
1992; Zaki et al., 2008; Paracampo et al., 2016). The EA task required participants to watch dynamic 
smiles (see Paracampo 2016) to rate the quantity of amusement felt by the observed social target.  
In Experiment 6, we perturbed activity within V1 and the right STS. In Experiment 7 we applied 
rTMS over the right IFG and the right TPJ. 
 
Materials and Methods 
Participants 
A total of 56 healthy participants took part in the study. Thirty-two subjects participated in one of the 
2 TMS experiments. In each TMS experiment, we targeted two different brain regions: V1 and right 
STS for Experiment 6 (xx participants, x females, mean age ± SD: ), right IFG and right TPJ for 
Experiment 7 (xx participants, x females, mean age ± SD: ). Moreover, 24 subjects were tested in a 
pilot study (Pilot6), conducted to select the stimuli for the TMS experiments. All subjects were right 
handed, had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity in both eyes, and were naive to the purposes 
of the experiment. None of the participants had neurological, psychiatric, or other medical problems 
or any contraindication to TMS (Rossi et al. 2009; Rossini et al. 2015). Participants provided written 
informed consent. The procedures were approved by the ethics committee at the Psychology 
Department of Bologna University and were in accordance with the ethical standards of the 1964 
Declaration of Helsinki. No discomfort or adverse effects of TMS were reported by participants or 
noticed by the experimenter. 
Task and Stimuli 
Stimuli consisted of 90 dynamic movies (lasting 2 s, 60 frames) presented centrally on a 24-inch 
monitor (resolution: 1024 × 768; refresh rate: 60 Hz) subtending 27 × 21° of visual angle. Movies 
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depicted 6 individuals (“social targets”; including 3 females and 3 males, aged 24.5 ± 2.1 years) who 
were filmed individually while smiling (Paracampo et al. 2016) (see Chapter 1 for stimuli creation).  
During stimuli creation, non-professional actors were filmed while making smiling expressions 
associated with authentic positive feelings of amusement. After each smiling expression, they were 
asked to provide subjective evaluations of the amusement felt while smiling using a 10-step Likert 
scale (0 = neutral state; 9 = maximal amusement). Moreover, they were asked to evaluate their 
subjective confidence in their amusement judgments using a categorical response (I am 100% sure of 
my judgment/I am not 100% sure of my judgment) (Ickes and Stinson, 1990; Levenson and Ruef, 
1992). Stimuli for which actors reported ratings of 0 (no amusement) were excluded from the present 
study.  Participants in the rTMS experiments were asked to watch all the smile videos and were asked 
to rate how much amusement they believed actors had felt after each movie on a 9-step Likert scale 
(1 = low/mild amusement; 9 = maximal amusement). Participants’ ratings and actors’ ratings were 
then correlated to provide a measure of Empathic Accuracy (EA) (Zaki et al., 2008, 2009a). Videos 
for the final experiments were selected based on the result of a pilot study conducted on 24 subjects 
who did not participate in the subsequent rTMS experiments. The pilot study allowed us to select 90 
movies from 6 actors which were associated with moderately accurate EA ratings (mean r = 0.50). 
Procedure 
Experiments were programmed using a custom software (Matlab 7.13) to control video clip sequence 
and trigger TMS stimulation. Participants were initially tested in an electrophysiological and a 
neuronavigation session in which intensity and coil position for rTMS were determined (see below). 
Then, they were presented with task instructions and they performed a training on a subset of stimuli 
not included in the main session.  
In the rTMS experiments three conditions were included (two active conditions and one sham 
condition). Each subject performed 3 blocks of 30 EA trials for each rTMS condition, for a total of 
270 trials. Blocks were presented in a counterbalanced order. Each trial started with a gray screen 
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(1000ms) followed by the video clip (2000ms). After the clip, a response screen appeared and it was 
presented until participant’s response (Figure 5A). Participants provided their response by pressing 
one of 9 keys on the keyboard. They were asked to answer as accurately as possible using their right 
hand. After keypress, the response screen was replaced by a black screen (intertrial interval: 5000-
6000 ms). On each trial, a time-locked single train of 6 Hz rTMS (12 pulses) was administered using 
a figure-of-eight coil (diameter: 70 mm) connected to a Magstim Rapid2 stimulator (Magstim).  
 
Figure 5. Trial example for the EA task (A). Participants were asked to rate the quantity of amusement felt by the actor 
on a Likert-scale from 1 to 9. A continuous 6 Hz train of 12 pulses of rTMS was applied at onset of the movies (B). 
 
In each TMS experiment, the coil was placed over two target brain regions (V1 and STS in 
Experiment 6; IFG and TPJ in Experiment 7). The rTMS train was administered at the onset of each 
movie and covered its entire duration (Fig. 5B). The stimulation intensity corresponded to 90% of the 
resting motor threshold (rMT) (see below). During active rTMS blocks, the intersection of the coil 
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was placed tangentially to the scalp and directly above the scalp location of the target region. Sham 
rTMS blocks were performed by tilting the coil at 90° over the same target region, to provide some 
scalp sensations and TMS sounds similar to active stimulation but without inducing a current in the 
brain. 
At the end of the session, participants were asked to evaluate the discomfort caused by the TMS, on 
a 5-point Likert scale with 1 indicating “not unpleasant at all” and 5 corresponding to “extremely 
unpleasant”. 
Electrophysiological and Neuronavigation Sessions  
To set rTMS intensity, the rMT was estimated for all participants in a preliminary phase of the 
experiment using standard procedures (Rossi et al. 2009). Motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) induced 
by stimulation of the right motor cortex were recorded from the left first dorsal interosseous (FDI) by 
means of a Biopac MP-35. Electromyography (EMG) signals were band-pass filtered (30–500 Hz) 
and digitized (sampling rate: 5 kHz). Pairs of Ag-AgCl surface electrodes were placed in a belly-
tendon montage with a ground electrode on the wrist. The intersection of the coil was placed 
tangentially to the scalp with the handle pointing backward and laterally at a 45° angle away from the 
midline. The rMT was defined as the minimal intensity of stimulator output that produces MEPs with 
an amplitude of at least 50 μV in the FDI with 50% probability (Rossini et al. 2015).  
Each brain area was individually targeted using image guided neuronavigation. The coil position was 
identified on each participant’s scalp using the SofTaxic Navigator System (Electro Medical 
Systems). Skull landmarks (nasion, inion and 2 preauricular points) and ~80 points providing a 
uniform representation of the scalp were digitized by means of a Polaris Vicra digitizer (Northern 
Digital), as in our previous research (Avenanti et al. 2007, 2012, 2013a; Tidoni et al. 2013; Jacquet 
and Avenanti 2015; Paracampo 2016; Avenanti 2017). An individual estimated magnetic resonance 
image (MRI) was obtained for each subject through a 3D warping procedure that fits a high-resolution 
MRI template with the participant’s scalp model and craniometric points. This procedure has been 
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proven to ensure a global localization accuracy of roughly 5 mm, a level of precision closer to that 
obtained using individual MRIs than can be achieved using other localization methods (Carducci and 
Brusco 2012). Stimulation sites were identified on the basis of previous fMRI studies, using the 
SofTaxic Navigator (STS, IFG, TPJ) or established anatomical methods (VI). For STS, IFG and TPJ, 
Talairach coordinates of target regions and corresponding scalp projections, were automatically 
estimated by the SofTaxic Navigator from the MRI-constructed stereotaxic template. When 
necessary, coordinates in Talairach space were obtained by converting MNI coordinates reported in 
previous studies using GingerALE 2.3.1. To target sensorimotor regions, we selected Talairach 
coordinates corresponding to the cortical face representations in premotor and somatosensory sites.  
The VI site was identified at two centimetres above the inion, as in previous TMS studies (Silvanto 
et al., 2005; Koivisto et al., 2010; Romei et al., 2016a). 
The right STS site was localized based on the following coordinates: x = 48 , y = -49 , z = 4 , which 
were identified on the basis of a meta-analysis including 100 neuroimaging studies exploring brain 
regions involved in emotional face processing (Sabatinelli et al., 2011).  
The right IFG scalp site was localized based on the following coordinates: x = 47, y = 8, z = 28, which 
were identified on the basis of previous fMRI meta-analyses exploring activations associated with 
the execution and/or observation of facial movements and emotional expressions (Molenberghs et al. 
2009; Caspers et al. 2010; Grosbras et al. 2012).  
The right TPJ site was localized based on the following coordinates: x = 51, y = −54, z = 21, which 
were identified on the basis of neuroimaging studies exploring areas related to theory of mind and 
mentalizing (van Overwalle and Baetens 2009; Mar 2011; Bzdok et al. 2012).  
Locations of scalp regions identified by neuronavigation (STS, IFG, TPJ) or anatomical methods (VI) 
were marked with a pen on each participant’s head and used to place the rTMS coil. Then, individual 
Talairach coordinates corresponding to the projection of the targeted scalp sites on the surface of the 
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MRI-constructed stereotaxic template were automatically estimated through the neuronavigation 
system. These estimated coordinates indicate the most superficial cortical site where rTMS effects 
are expected to be maximal. Brain surface coordinates were converted to MNI space (using 
GingerALE 2.3.1) for visualization with the MRIcron software (MRIcron/NPM/dcm2nii). Fig. 6 
illustrates the estimated group mean MNI surface coordinates. 
 
 
Figure 6. Schematic representation of the brain stimulation sites reconstructed on a standard template using MRIcron 
(MRIcron/NPM/dcm2nii). Talairach coordinates corresponding to the projection of the V1, STS, IFG, and TPJ scalp sites 
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on the brain surface were individually estimated through the neuronavigation system. Group mean brain surface 
coordinates ± SD for the V1 site were: x = 1.6 ± 4.0; y = -75.6 ± 16.8; z = -4.7 ± 14.9. Coordinates for the STS were: x 
= 60.5 ± 5.1; y = -52.2 ± 1.9; z = 3.8 ± 1.2. Coordinates for the IFG were: x = 58.8 ± 1.9; y = 13.1 ± 0.7; z = 25.8 ± 0.7. 
Coordinates for the TPJ were: x = 61.0 ± 0.9; y = -53.8 ± 0.8; z = 24.0 ± 0.9. Talairach coordinates were then converted 
to the MNI space (using GingerALE 2.3.1) for visualization with the MRIcron software. 
 
Data Analysis 
Behavioral data were processed offline. Empathic Accuracy (EA) was calculated as the correlation 
between participants’ ratings and actors’ ratings for each Condition (V1 and STS for Experiment 6; 
IFG and TPJ for Experiment 7). 
A direct comparison was performed for EA in the SHAM condition between Experiment 6 and 7 to 
make sure that the two experiments had the same EA at baseline 
After this, for each experiment a one-way ANOVA was performed on EA ratings with Condition (3 
levels: V1, STS, SHAM for Experiment 6 and IFG, TPJ, SHAM for Experiment 7) as within-subjects 
factor. Post hoc analysis was performed using Newman-Keuls test to correct for multiple 
comparisons. Partial eta2 was computed as a measure of effect size for the main effects and 
interactions, whereas repeated measures Cohen’s d was computed for post hoc comparisons. 
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Results 
To make sure that our two groups had the same EA at baseline, a t-test was conducted on participants’ 
scores in the SHAM condition for both experiments. Our t-test showed that these scores were 
comparable (t(30) = 1.36, P = 0.18), thus, no difference existed at baseline between our experimental 
groups (Figure 7). 
 
 
Figure 7. Baseline EA for participants and Average EA for Experiment 6 (above) and 7 (below).  
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The ANOVA conducted on EA ratings for Experiment 6 revealed a significant effect of Condition 
(F2,30 = 6.67, P = 0.004, Partial eta
2 =). Post hoc analysis showed that the STS condition caused this 
effect. In specific, in the STS condition (0.44 ± 0.12) participants had a significant reduction in EA 
when compared to the SHAM condition (0.51 ± 0.11; P = 0.004) and to the V1 condition (0.49 ± 
0.12; P = 0.01). No difference was found when comparing the V1 and the SHAM conditions (P = 
0.42). 
 
 
Figure 8. EA scores for the three experimental conditions. Active stimulation over STS reduced EA compared to both V1 
stimulation and SHAM condition. Asterisks indicate significant post-hoc comparisons (P < 0.05). Error bars denote s.e.m. 
 
The ANOVA conducted on EA for Experiment 7 revealed a significant effect of Condition (F2,30 = 
5.70, P = 0.008). Interestingly, post hoc analysis showed that both in the IFG (mean EA ± SD: 0.50 
± 0.09) and TPJ (0.48 ± 0.13) condition participants had a reduction in EA when compared to the 
SHAM condition (0.55 ± 0.10; ALL P < 0.03). Moreover, the two active conditions did not show any 
significant difference (P = 0.28)   
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Figure 9. EA scores for the three experimental conditions. Active stimulation over IFG and TPJ reduced EA compared 
to SHAM condition. Asterisks indicate significant post-hoc comparisons (P < 0.05). Error bars denote s.e.m. 
 
To ensure that any interferential effects of rTMS were not due to speed-accuracy trade-offs, we also 
analyzed response times (RTs) in the two experiments (Table 5). The ANOVA performed on RTs 
revealed no main effect of Condition both for Experiment 6 (F (2,30) = 1.82, P = 0.18) and for 
Experiment 7 (F (2,30) = 2.73, P = 0.08), ruling out any speed-accuracy trade-offs.  
 
 
 
Table 5. Mean RTs ± SD and Raw Amusement Ratings for the EA task in the sham rTMS and active interference conditions 
(V1-STS and IFG-TPJ). 
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 Experiment 6 Experiment 7 
SHAM V1 STS SHAM IFG TPJ 
RTs 1.23 ± 0.31 1.22 ± 0.34 1.30 ± 0.43 1.42 ± 0.46 1.57 ± 0.64 1.54 ± 0.49 
Amusement 5.03 ± 0.94 5.12 ± 0.95 5.11 ± 0.98 5.14 ± 0.82 5.19 ± 0.86 5.09 ± 0.74 
 
Finally, we performed an ANOVA on participants’ raw amusement ratings for each condition (Table 
5), to make sure that our rTMS-related effects were not due to a generic lowering of participants’ 
ratings. The ANOVA performed on Amusement Ratings revealed no main effect of Condition both 
for Experiment 6 (F (2,30) = 1.70, P = 0.20) and for Experiment 7 (F (2,30) = 2.04, P = 0.15). 
 
 
Discussion 
The process ultimately leading to accurate understanding the emotional state behind a facial 
expression (EA) is complex and is composed by multiple stages. Visual, motor and cognitive 
mechanisms are all involved in social perception.   Recent theoretical (Keysers and Gazzola, 2007; 
Uddin et al., 2007; Zaki et al., 2012; Lamm and Majdandžić, 2015) and empirical (Wheatley et al., 
2007; Zaki et al., 2009b; Lombardo et al., 2010; Redcay et al., 2010; Schippers et al., 2010; Wolf et 
al., 2010; Lamm et al., 2011; Spunt and Lieberman, 2013; Raz et al., 2014) work suggests that during 
complex social tasks, these mechanisms might all be involved. However, the link between activity in 
brain regions supporting these mechanisms and participants’ behavior is often not explored because 
of the characteristics of the techniques or the paradigms used. In the present study, we provide causal 
evidence for the role of visual, motor and mentalizing processes in accurate ratings of amusement 
through observed smiles.  In two separate experiments we used rTMS to test whether visual (V1 and 
STS), premotor (IFG) and mentalizing (TPJ) regions are functionally involved in accurate judgments 
about the amusement felt by a smiling individual (Zaki et al., 2008, 2009a; Paracampo et al., 2016). 
Our results show that the STS, IFG and TPJ are all crucial for understanding amusement in smiles.  
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Visual representation: The contribution of the Superior Temporal Sulcus to Empathic 
Accuracy 
The face conveys crucial information during social interactions. Among the brain regions involved 
in face processing , the STS is a key region in directing attention towards dynamic features of faces 
(Puce et al., 1998; Allison et al., 2000; Hoffman and Haxby, 2000; Nummenmaa and Calder, 2009).  
The STS has a role in the perception of biological motion in general (Grossman et al., 2000; Grossman 
and Blake, 2002; Keysers and Perrett, 2004; Peelen et al., 2006) responding to the observation of 
bodies implying motion (Peigneux et al., 2000; Jellema and Perrett, 2003; de Gelder et al., 2015) and 
is believed to be one of the main sources of visual information for the Action Observation Network 
(AON), a subset of frontoparietal regions coupling action production and action observation 
(Nishitani and Hari, 2000; Nishitani et al., 2004; Rizzolatti et al., 2014). Interestingly this region is 
specifically tuned to emotionally salient visual cues. Previous evidence shows that the activity within 
the STS is preferentially associated with perception of emotional facial expressions (Fusar-Poli et al., 
2009; Sabatinelli et al., 2011) even when this perception is passive (Dricu and Frühholz, 2016) with 
a preference for dynamic expressions over static ones (Pitcher et al., 2011). 
Our study sheds novel light on our knowledge about the functional role of the STS in accurate 
understanding of emotion in facial expressions by showing that transiently disrupting activity in this 
region impairs accuracy in judging amusement from a smile. This evidence expands upon previous 
behavioural evidence, showing that stable and virtual lesions of the STS impair biological motion 
perception (Grossman et al., 2005; Saygin, 2007; Candidi et al., 2011) and interference with STS 
activity impairs simple facial expression recognition tasks (Pitcher, 2014), reduces responses to 
dynamic faces (Pitcher et al., 2014) and is able to produce changes in eye-gaze perception (Saitovitch 
et al., 2016) Models of face perception (Haxby et al., 2000; Calder and Young, 2005) suggest that the 
STS might have functional connections with the amygdala during observation of emotional facial 
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expressions and that this would (at least in part) explain its selectivity to emotion. Interestingly, a 
recent interferential study coupling TMS and fMRI showed that disruption of activity within the STS 
produces functional changes in the amygdala in response to faces (Pitcher et al., 2017). 
Moreover, even if the face representation in the STS is visual, we know both from imaging and 
neuromodulation studies that the STS is functionally connected to parietofrontal regions – like the 
IFG - responsible of coupling visual and motor representation of actions during observation and 
involved in action understanding (Schippers and Keysers, 2011; Avenanti et al., 2013a). On this point, 
a recent study using MEG (Sato et al., 2015) showed that, during observation of dynamic facial 
expressions connections between the IFG and the STS (both forward and backward) are activated.  
In this framework, the STS with its connections to regions in the limbic system and frontal regions 
within the action simulation network, is a perfect candidate to be the first stage of the face processing 
ultimately leading to accurate understanding of the emotion expressed by a facial expression. Our 
experimental design is not suited for exploration of the information flow during emotional facial 
expression, however, here we show that the STS is not only involved in eye-gaze perception or simple 
emotion discrimination as shown in previous studies, but plays a crucial role in accurate emotion 
understanding. Thus, STS might represent the first step in processing salient features of the smile that 
are afterwards used for simulative and mentalizing processes to work with.  
 
Simulation and Mentalizing in Empathic Accuracy 
The observation of actions in others, including facial expressions, activates subset of frontoparietal 
regions that are involved in performing the same action, in particular the IFG (Carr et al., 2003; 
Winston et al., 2003; Leslie et al., 2004; Dapretto et al., 2006; Montgomery and Haxby, 2008; Caspers 
et al., 2010; Rizzolatti et al., 2014; Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2016). These data show that the IFG is 
a key region within the mirroring network, involved in internal simulation of the observed action 
(Gallese 2011, Ave 2013). Interestingly for the present study, vicarious activations during visual 
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perception of emotional facial expressions are not limited to the IFG, but encompass limbic structures 
involved in first-hand emotional experiences (Carr et al., 2003; Wicker et al., 2003; Morrison et al., 
2004; Singer et al., 2004; Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2011).  
Evidence is now consistent in showing that the IFG is involved in emotion recognition and social 
cognition in general (Pobric and Hamilton, 2006; Avenanti et al., 2007; de Gelder et al., 2012; Tidoni 
et al., 2013; Costa et al., 2014; Urgesi et al., 2014; Jacquet and Avenanti, 2015; Tamietto et al., 2015; 
Paracampo et al., 2016). These data have motivated an embodied approach to social cognition posing 
that this correspondence of experienced and observed affective, sensory, and motor responses allows 
perceivers to vicariously experience what it is like to be the target of their perception.  This common 
coding between self and other states, in turn, is thought to aid perceivers in understanding targets 
emotions or intentions (Gallese et al., 2004; Goldman and Sripada, 2005; Niedenthal et al., 2010; 
Wood et al., 2016). During social interaction, the overt behaviour and covert emotional state are 
continuously associated. In a simulationist framework, the continuous association between the two 
could allow an observer to simulate the underlying emotion (amusement) embodying the observable 
motor behaviour (the smile) (Gallese, 2007a; Niedenthal et al., 2010). This view is consistent with 
data showing that more empathic people show stronger activations in the IFG when observing actions 
and emotions in others (Avenanti et al., 2009; Gallese and Sinigaglia, 2011; Bufalari and Ionta, 2013).  
However, we cannot always understand others using our internal states as a basis. A different line of 
research has focused on the hypothesis that understanding others is based on explicit inferential 
processes (Mitchell et al., 2002; Saxe, 2005; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2005).  Focusing on the neural 
bases of mental state attributions, scholars have isolated a network of brain regions recruited during 
explicit inferences about the intentions, beliefs, and feelings of others (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Frith 
and Frith, 2006; Mitchell, 2009; Bzdok et al., 2012; Schurz et al., 2014). The temporo-parietal 
junction is a key structure within this so-called mentalizing network.  Activity within the TPJ has 
been reliably associated with tasks in which individuals are asked to infer another person’s mental 
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state (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Decety and Lamm, 2007; Van Overwalle, 2009). Moreover it has 
been linked to observation of deceptive actions (Grèzes et al., 2004), discrimination of authenticity 
in vocal expressions (Drolet et al., 2012) and in tasks requiring to explain actions in terms of mental 
states (Grèzes et al., 2004; Brass et al., 2007; de Lange et al., 2008; Spunt et al., 2010). Therefore, 
the mentalizing system provides a different route to understanding others that it is not through sharing, 
but through the creation of propositional cognitive knowledge about what others are feeling, 
inherently based on self-other distinction. 
The present study significantly expands previous evidence about the role of these networks in social 
cognition. Here, we manipulated simulative and mentalizing processes independently in the same 
healthy participants and tested their causal involvement in EA. Our results, show that both the IFG 
and the TPJ are causally involved in accurate ratings of amusement from smiles. Beyond purist 
approaches to social cognition we propose that motor simulation and mentalizing might represent two 
processes with the same goal. Both participate in understanding others (Olsson and Ochsner, 2008; 
Bastiaansen et al., 2009; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009; Zaki et al., 2012). However, their actual 
contribution and (possible) interactions in social cognition are still unclear. The two systems are 
anatomically independent and several studies showed that they might even be functionally 
independent (van Overwalle and Baetens, 2009). However, recent imaging studies show that the two 
systems might be concurrent active in complex social tasks (Schippers et al., 2010; Schippers and 
Keysers, 2011; Spunt et al., 2011; Spunt and Lieberman, 2012a, 2013; Sperduti et al., 2014; Kanske 
et al., 2015) and might even show functional connectivity during social interactions (Lombardo et al., 
2010). Interestingly, recent correlational studies using EA tasks (Zaki et al., 2009b; Harvey et al., 
2013) showed that activity within premotor and mentalizing regions correlated with accuracy in 
making explicit inferences about the emotional states of individuals discussing emotional 
autobiographical events. In the auditory domain, a recent study showed that when judging laughter 
authenticity activity in both networks predicted participants’ accuracy, even if participants where not 
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provided with contextual information of prior knowledge about the person laughing (McGettigan et 
al., 2015). These studies suggested a link between neuroimaging data and behavioural indices of EA. 
However, they could only provide correlational evidence about the involvement of motor and 
mentalizing regions in EA. Here, we show that the IFG and the TPJ are not only active, but are 
causally involved in accurate understanding of others’ internal emotional state, as active interference 
with activity in both regions impaired our participants’ performance in the EA task. 
As in the previous experiments (1 to 5), in experiments 6 and 7, participants were asked to make 
inferences about another’s emotional state (amusement) based exclusively on the facial expression 
(smile). Our facial expressions were not embedded in contexts that might provide a framework to 
interpret the covert emotional state. Despite this, in experiment 7 we found that interference with the 
mentalizing network was able to impair participants’ accuracy in the EA task. As stated in the 
previous chapter, imaging studies suggest that activity within the mentalizing network can be 
observed despite the lack of contextual information to drive interpretations about others’ internal 
states (Grèzes et al., 2004; Drolet et al., 2012). However, using our dichotomic EA task we were not 
able to find any detrimental effect for interference over the mentalizing network (experiment 3 and 
4) 
One possible interpretation of this result is that the shift from a dichotomic EA task to a Likert-based 
EA task was associated with a shift in the mechanisms used to perform the task. The simulation 
network is responsible for a non-explicit, preverbal form of mind-reading, on the other hand the 
mentalizing network is preferentially involved in creating propositional knowledge about others’ 
internal states. In this framework, at the behavioral level, the Likert-based EA task, being more 
cognitive and explicit, might trigger the mentalizing network more than the dichotomic one. 
Moreover, the sensorimotor network, even when more fine-grained judgments about the internal 
emotional state are involved, proved to be crucial in interpreting amusement from smiles. 
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Conclusions 
The present study sheds novel light on the involvement of visual, motor and cognitive regions in EA. 
Previous evidence suggested that visual processing, motor simulation and mental state attributions 
are all needed for fruitful and complete interactions in social environment. However, extant studies 
could not establish their functional role in complex social tasks. Here, by using rTMS we showed that 
visual analysis of emotionally salient cues performed in the STS, the internal simulation of the 
observed facial expression performed in the IFG and cognitive mental inferences performed in the 
TPJ are all crucial in accurate understanding of amusement from observed smiles. Our study cannot 
highlight the specific interactions between the explored regions during judgments of the internal 
emotional state of an individual. Further studies are necessary to gain deeper knowledge of the 
complex interplay of visual processing, motor simulation and mental state attributions in accurate 
understanding of emotion through facial expressions. One possible development might involve the 
use of a cortico-cortical paired associative stimulation (ccPAS) protocol (Buch et al., 2011; Romei et 
al., 2016a, 2016b) to enhance connection between these regions to observe possible effects on 
behaviour. On a different point, we know from previous evidence that simulation and mentalizing 
can be modulated by different elements, such as context, prior knowledge, emotional state or gender 
(Singer et al., 2006; Lamm et al., 2007b; Hein and Singer, 2008; Hein et al., 2010; Christov-Moore 
et al., 2014; Proverbio, 2017). Another possible development of the present study would be to 
modulate one of these elements to test if, at the behavioural level, they can lead to prioritize one 
system over the other. Finally, future studies could manipulate task features to provide double 
dissociations within the same set of experiments, and/or use contextually-embedded social cues to 
test the generalizability of the present findings to “real-life” scenarios involving multiple sources of 
information. 
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Flexible use of the sensorimotor and mentalizing network in social cognition 
Rather than being tied to specific experimental stimuli, the sensorimotor and the mentalizing network 
seem to be triggered by the specific mechanism used to interpret others’ behaviour (whether it is 
internal simulation or cognitive propositional inferences). In the next chapter, we aim at exploring 
whether modulations of activity within the sensorimotor and mentalizing network can affect 
participants’ behaviour when they are asked to rate others’ internal states when information is 
conveyed using text. Following our view of the involvement of these networks in social cognition, 
the mechanism used by participants to perform the task will be central for the flexible use of the two 
networks. 
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Chapter 3 
 
The moral and empathic brain: distinct neural representations of 
agent's intention and victim's suffering in judging harmful actions – a 
transcranial direct current stimulation study 
 
 
Introduction  
 
Unfortunately, we often read about episodes in which pain was caused by an individual to another. 
For a moral evaluation of the situation we have, among the others two main sources of information: 
the beliefs of the person performing the action, and the outcome of the action on the victim. These 
two elements are particularly important if we want to judge whether an action is morally right or 
wrong. Multiple mechanisms, however, may interact and compete during moral cognition (i.e., 
outcome processing versus mental state processing) (Greene, 2001; Greene et al., 2004; Young et al., 
2007; Cushman, 2008; Cushman et al., 2010; Buon et al., 2016). Despite existing agreement on the 
role of multiple processes in moral judgment, it is widely believed that mature moral judgment largely 
depends on intentions (see (Barrett et al., 2016). 
Therefore, cognitive neuroscience research on the neural substrate of moral judgment largely focused 
on the role of neural mechanisms supporting mental state reasoning and belief attribution for third 
party moral judgments (for reviews, see (Young and Tsoi, 2013).  
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Prior neuroimaging studies have found that mental state (e.g., beliefs, intentions) attribution for moral 
judgment is supported by a subset of brain regions mainly referred to as the Mentalizing Network 
(Frith and Frith, 2003; Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Bzdok et al., 2012; Schurz et al., 2014). The 
Mentalizing network, including sub-regions of medial prefrontal cortex, precuneus, and right and left 
temporoparietal junction (TPJ), has previously been associated with mental state reasoning (Saxe and 
Kanwisher, 2003; Frith and Frith, 2006; Jackson et al., 2006b; Lamm et al., 2007a; Hein and Singer, 
2008; Mitchell, 2009; Bzdok et al., 2012). Among these regions, the pattern of activation observed in 
the right TPJ (rTPJ) is particularly interesting and seems to be linked to the ability to take others’ 
perspective, self-other distinction and cognitive representations of others’ intentions (Young et al., 
2007, 2010). 
Going back to the example at the beginning, while reading we are likely to rapidly respond to the 
victim’s suffering. The aversive outcome on the victim (i.e., pain) is processed by a different network 
of brain regions. Several studies show that observing or imagining pain in others activates several 
brain regions that are active during first-hand experience of pain associated with the affective-
motivational aspects of experienced pain, like the Anterior Insula and the Cingulate Cortex (Morrison 
et al., 2004, 2007; Singer et al., 2004; Botvinick et al., 2005; Jackson et al., 2005, 2006b; Morrison 
and Downing, 2007; Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2011). 
Interestingly, several studies show that brain regions involved in processing the sensory dimension 
of experienced pain, like the primary somatosensory cortex (SI) are also activated by the observation 
and imagination of pain felt by other individuals (Osaka et al., 2004; Avenanti et al., 2005, 2006, 
Jackson et al., 2005, 2006b; Bufalari et al., 2007; Gu and Han, 2007; Lamm et al., 2007b; Perry et 
al., 2010) see (Keysers et al., 2010) for a review).  
 
In this vein, moral judgment might be the product of both intent- and outcome- based processes. 
Further evidence supporting this dual view comes from developmental studies or research on clinical 
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populations. Studies on the evolution of moral cognition across the life span show that young children 
tend to prioritize outcomes over intentions (Cushman 2013, Zelazo 1996, Yuill-Perner 1988) 
becoming more sensitive to the information about the intentions across age and that their moral 
judgments change accordingly (Baird and Astington, 2004; Saxe et al., 2004). This process probably 
reflects the maturation of structures associated with mental state attributions like the TPJ allowing to 
take into consideration others’ minds for our judgments about their actions ToM as the recruitment 
of TPJ increases with increasing age (Young and Saxe, 2009; Güroğlu et al., 2011; Killen et al., 2011; 
Koster-Hale et al., 2013). 
Clinical studies are another way of exploring mechanisms leading to moral judgments in adulthood. 
In particular individuals with psychopathy, showing reduced reaction to aversive outcome in others, 
tend to consider accidental harm as more morally permissible than controls (Young et al., 2012). 
Another clinical population that might help in understanding this issue are individuals with autism 
spectrum disorder (ASD). Individual with ASD usually have impairments in mental state attributions 
and studies show that they consider accidental harm as less morally permissible than controls (Buon 
et al., 2013). These findings suggest that forgiving an agent for causing an accidental harm requires 
strong mental state representations. 
Finally, correlational evidence show that healthy adults observing visual stimuli depicting a person 
causing pain to another show activity within brain regions involved in first-hand experience of pain, 
like the somatosensory cortex and in regions within the mentalizing network like the TPJ (Decety et 
al., 2008; Akitsuki and Decety, 2009) and that in children this integration of somatosensory and 
mentalizing activation gradually changes with age (Decety et al., 2011).  
In sum, indirect evidence points towards both outcome-based and intention-based processes to be 
present in adults’ moral judgments and both developmental and clinical studies seem to support this 
view (Greene et al., 2004; Greene, 2009; Reniers et al., 2012). However, the specific functional role 
of these processes, and their possible interactions, has never been tested in healthy adults. Brain 
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stimulation techniques represent promising tools, allowing to directly modulate cortical excitability 
to infer causal relationship between activity within a target brain region and a specific cognitive 
function (Romei et al., 2016b). Among these techniques, tDCS is a valuable method of non-invasive 
cortical stimulation that allows researchers to induce polarity-dependent excitability changes in the 
underlying stimulated area. Using weak offline cathodal or anodal DC currents, tDCS can induce 
cortical inhibition or excitation, respectively, and alter neural functioning for several minutes after 
the end of the stimulation (Nitsche, 2003; Antal et al., 2004; Horvath et al., 2015). Thus far, studies 
employing brain stimulation techniques mainly focused on modulation of the temporoparietal 
junction to explore the role of mental state attributions in moral judgments (Young et al., 2010; Sellaro 
et al., 2015; Ye et al., 2015).  
Here we used tDCS to test the role of the right temporoparietal junction (r-TPJ) and the right primary 
somatosensory cortex (r-SI) in evaluations of verbal description of painful interactions between two 
individuals. Participants were asked to read textual scenarios involving an active character harming 
or trying to harm a passive character (Young et al., 2010b, 2007; Young and Saxe, 2009b) in order to 
provide moral judgments for the action performed. Additionally, for each scenario, they were asked 
to provide explicit judgments concerning the mental state of the active character (belief/intention) or 
the outcome on the passive character. By independently modulating key regions involved in 
processing others’ mental states and in reaction to others’ outcomes we will shed novel light on the 
processes involved in implicit and explicit use of intent- and outcome-related information in 
evaluations of harmful situations. 
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Materials and Methods 
Participants 
A total of 48 healthy right-handed subjects (24 females; mean age ± SD: 23.64 years ± 2.85) 
participated in one of three tDCS experiments. In Experiment 8 (n = 16) tDCS was applied to the 
right primary somatosensory cortex (SI) (8 females; 23.80 ± 2.54), in Experiment 9 (n = 16) it was 
applied to the right temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) (8 females; 22.64 ± 3.03). Experiment 10 was 
used as our behavioural baseline and no tDCS was delivered (SHAM) (8 females; 24.38 ± 2.87). All 
subjects were right-handed according to a standard handedness inventory (Briggs and Nebes, 1975) 
had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity in both eyes, and were naïve as to the purposes of 
the experiment. Participants provided written informed consent and completed a tDCS safety 
screening form before taking part in the study (Nitsche, 2003; Poreisz et al., 2007; Brunoni et al., 
2011; Fregni et al., 2014). Procedures were approved by the ethics committee at the Psychology 
Department of Bologna University and were in accordance with the ethical standards of the 1964 
Declaration of Helsinki. No discomfort or adverse effect during or after tDCS were reported or 
noticed. 
 
Stimuli and Task 
Stimuli consisted of four variations of 48 textual scenarios for a total of 192 scenarios modified from 
a previously published set (Young et al., 2010). Situations described in each scenario always involved 
two characters: a protagonist and a passive character. Protagonists always performed an action that 
could cause a negative outcome (harm to the passive character) or a neutral outcome (no 
consequences for the passive character). Moreover, protagonists could act on a negative belief (that 
they will cause harm) or a neural belief. 
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Based on variations in outcomes and belief, four versions of each scenario were presented: Intentional 
Harm (Int-Harm: Negative Outcome/Negative Belief), Accidental Harm (Acc-Harm: Negative 
Outcome/Neutral Belief), Attempted Harm (Att-Harm: Neutral Outcome/Negative Belief) and 
Neutral (Neutral: Neutral Outcome/Neutral Belief). 
Scenarios consisted of four segments presented in a cumulative fashion:  
1- Background (8 sec): characters are introduced and information about the setting is 
given. 
2- Foreshadow (8 sec): the outcome is anticipated to the reader. 
3- Belief (8 sec): the protagonist’s belief (neutral/negative) is stated. 
4- Action + Outcome (8 sec): action performed by the protagonist and resulting outcome 
(neutral/negative) 
 
 
Figure 10. Example of scenario. Each segment is presented both in the negative (left) and neutral (version). Based on 
the combination of these segments 4 versions of each scenarios existed. Each participant was presented with only one 
version of each scenario. 
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Negative outcome for the passive character never resulted in her/his death but always involved 
emotional suffering and physical pain. Scenarios were divided in six categories based on the type of 
outcome for the passive character: Limb Crushes, Fractures, Nausea, Wounds, Burns and Skin 
Conditions. After each scenario participants performed a modified version of the Empathy for Pain 
task (EPT) (Decety et al., 2011; Baez et al., 2012, 2013, 2014; Couto et al., 2013).  They were asked 
to perform six judgments about the active and passive characters’ internal states in random order:  
Moral Judgment (moral correctness of the active character’s action), Punishment attributed to the 
active character’s action, Intention to Harm attributed to the active character. Physical Pain and 
Emotional Suffering attributed to the passive character, Displeasure felt for the outcome.  Three 
control judgments were added to control for participants’ understanding of scenarios: Intention to 
Act attributed to the active character, Positive Valence, Negative Valence. 
Participants were asked to answer using a Likert scale from 1 to 7 on a computer keyboard.  Four 
orders of presentation were created, each one containing only one version of each scenario and an 
equal number of scenarios for each version. This way, across subjects every scenario occurred in each 
of the four conditions, but individual subjects saw each scenario only once. These orders were then 
divided in two lists (List1 and List2), each one containing 24 scenarios (Fig. 10). 
 
Brain Stimulation 
tDCS is a non-invasive technique able to induce and modulate neuroplasticity in humans  through the 
application of weak electrical currents to specific brain regions (Nitsche et al., 2008; Nitsche and 
Paulus, 2011; Paulus, 2011; Ruffini et al., 2013).  In tDCS current flows from a negatively charged 
electrode (cathode) to a positively charged one (anode), the polarity and position of electrodes 
determines the physiological (Antal et al., 2004; Nitsche and Paulus, 2011) and behavioural (Jacobson 
et al., 2012) effects observed (see (Horvath et al., 2015) for a review. 
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tDCS was administered using a battery-driven electrical stimulator (neuroConn DC-Stimulator Plus) 
connected to a pair of rubber electrodes. In Experiment 1 (SI) the active electrode (Cathode – 5 X 5 
cm)  was placed 2 cm posterior to C4 (Bolognini et al., 2013a; Sehm et al., 2013; Sugawara et al., 
2014). In Experiment 2 (TPJ), active electrode was placed at the following coordinates: x=51, y=-54, 
z= 21 (van Overwalle and Baetens, 2009; Mar, 2011; Bzdok et al., 2012). The reference electrode 
(Anode – 5 X 7 cm) was placed over the left deltoid to avoid any effect due to a combination of the 
modulations of both the active and the reference electrode (Cogiamanian et al., 2007; Priori et al., 
2008; Bolognini et al., 2010; Brunoni et al., 2011). Before stimulation, electrodes were inserted in 
perforated sponges covered with conductive gel and soaked in saline solution. A current of 2mA was 
applied for 15 minutes (fade in/fade out: 40 seconds, current density: 0.06 mA/cm2 for the active 
electrode, 0.04 mA/cm2 for the reference). In the SHAM group (Experiment 3) a current of 2mA was 
applied for 30 seconds (fade in/fade out: 20 seconds), this produced the same initial itching sensation 
as in actual stimulation.  At the end of the tDCS modulation, participants were asked to provide 
subjective unpleasantness ratings of the sensations caused by the stimulation using a 5-point Likert 
scale from 1 to 5. 
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Figure 11. Experimental design. From left to right: Lists for Scenarios (1, 2), Outcome categories (Skin Conditions, 
Fractures, Nausea, Wounds, Burns, Limb Crushes), Orders of presentation (A, B,C,D), Structure for each participant in 
the three experiments 
 
 
Procedure 
Experiments were programmed using custom software (developed in MATLAB 7.12) controlling 
each scenario’s cumulative presentation and the global random order of scenarios in each session. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three groups (SHAM, SI, TPJ). Each target region 
was individually targeted using image-guided neuronavigation. Before starting the experimental 
sessions, the position for the active electrode was localized on each participant’s scalp using the 
SofTaxic Navigator System (Electro Medical Systems, Bologna, Italy). Skull landmarks (nasion, 
inion and 2 preauricular points) and ~80 points providing a uniform representation of the scalp were 
digitized by means of a Polaris Vicra digitizer (Northern Digital), as in our previous research 
(Avenanti et al., 2007; Tidoni et al., 2013; Jacquet and Avenanti, 2015; Paracampo et al., 2016). An 
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individual estimated magnetic resonance image (MRI) was obtained for each subject through a 3D 
warping procedure that fits a high-resolution MRI template with the participant’s scalp model and 
craniometric points. This procedure has been proven to ensure a global localization accuracy of 
roughly 5 mm, a level of precision closer to that obtained using individual MRIs than can be achieved 
using other localization methods (Carducci and Brusco, 2012).  After neuronavigation, position for 
the active electrode was marked on each subject’s scalp. Participants were then introduced to the 
experimental procedures and underwent a Training in which they performed a block of 4 scenarios 
not included in the final sample (Intentional Harm, Accidental Harm, Attempted Harm and Neutral) 
to familiarize with the task. After Training, participants were tested in two identical sessions: Pre-
Session and Post-Session. In each one, they performed the task on 24 scenarios (either List1 or 2 in 
counterbalanced order between participants) (Fig. 10). Between the two sessions, participants 
underwent 15 minutes of tDCS 
Data analysis  
A mixed-model ANOVA was performed on participants’ ratings for each question, with Version 
(Intentional, Accidental, Attempted, Neutral) and Session (Pre, Post) as within-subjects factors, and 
Group (SHAM, SI, TPJ) as between-subjects factor. Post-hoc analysis was performed using the 
Newman-Keuls test to correct for multiple comparisons.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
75 
 
Results  
A preliminary was conducted for every judgment, comparing the three tDCS experiments. This 
analysis revealed a main effect of Version for every judgment in the present study (Fig.12). This 
suggests that participants could distinguish between the different versions of the scenarios we 
proposed. 
 
Figure. 12. Participants’ ratings for each judgment (independent from Session and Group). Asterisks indicate significant 
post-hoc comparisons (P < 0.05). Error bars denote s.e.m. 
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Moral Judgment  
Analysis on moral judgments revealed a significant main effect of Session (F(1,45) = 4.45; p = 0.04), 
showing that participants expressed more permissive judgments in the Post-Session compared to the 
Pre-Session 
The main effect of Version (), explored using post hoc analysis, revealed that all the versions proposed 
were associated with significantly different moral judgments (ALL P < 0.001): Intentional Harm was 
judged as the least permissive scenario (mean rating ± SD: 1.41 ± 0.39) whereas the Neutral scenario 
was the most permissive one (5.90 ± 0.69). Judgments for Accidental (4.00 ± 1.08) and Attempted 
Harm (2.24 ± 0.70) scenarios reported values in between the other two, suggesting that both intention 
and outcome modulated participants’ responses.  
Interestingly, a significant three-way interaction, Session X Version X Group (F(6,135) = 6.22; p < 
0.001). Post-hoc analysis showed that participants, in judgments of Accidental Harm scenarios, only 
in the TPJ group, were less morally permissible in the Post-Session (mean rating value ± SD.: 3.70 ± 
1.01) compared to Pre-Session (4.19 ± 1.06; p = 0.04). Moreover, they were more morally permissible 
in judgments about Attempted Harm scenarios in the Post-Session (2.63 ± 0.69) compared to Pre-
Session (1.79 ± 0.55; p < 0.001). For Intentional Harm and Neutral scenarios no significant difference 
in moral judgments were observed in any group (all p > 0.30).  
For Accidental Harm scenarios, an opposite effect was found for the SHAM group, in which 
participants provided more morally permissible judgments in the Post-Session (4.33 ± 1.05) 
compared to the Pre-Session (3.85 ± 1.15; p = 0.05). (the same effect approached significance in the 
SI group: Tendency to be more morally permissible in Post-Session (4.20 ± 1.35) compared to Pre-
Session (3.74 ± 1.50; p = 0.07).) 
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Table 6. Mean ratings ± SD for Moral Judgment 
  Moral Judgment 
  Int-Harm Acc-Harm Att-Harm Neutral 
  mean SD mean SD mean SD mean SD 
SHAM 
Pre 1.45 ± 0.60 3.85 ± 1.15 2.23 ± 0.74 5.88 ± 0.71 
Post 1.19 ± 0.25 4.33 ± 1.05 2.21 ± 0.83 6.20 ± 0.55 
SI 
Pre 1.27 ± 0.30 3.74 ± 1.50 2.31 ± 1.09 5.69 ± 0.94 
Post 1.44 ± 0.47 4.20 ± 1.35 2.25 ± 0.95 5.99 ± 0.84 
TPJ 
Pre 1.61 ± 0.58 4.19 ± 1.06 1.79 ± 0.55 5.92 ± 0.84 
Post 1.48 ± 0.45 3.70 ± 1.01 2.63 ± 0.69 5.76 ± 0.70 
  
 
 
Figure 13. Mean ratings ± SD for Moral Judgment. Asterisks indicate significant post-hoc comparisons (P < 0.05). Error 
bars denote s.e.m. 
 
 
Punishment 
Explicit judgments on punishment for the active character’s action did not show any effect associated 
with session or group. However, a main effect of Version emerged (F(3,135) = 303.790; p < 0.001). 
Post hoc analysis showed that (independently from session or experiment) participants attributed 
different levels of punishment to every version proposed in the current design. This suggests that they 
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took into account both intention and outcome to express their judgments about the punishment for 
the action of the active character.  
 
Table 7. Mean ratings ± SD for Punishment 
  Punishment 
  Int-Harm Acc-Harm Att-Harm Neutral 
  mean SD mean SD mean SD mean SD 
SHAM 
Pre 6.06 ± 0.74 2.78 ± 0.81 5.06 ± 0.87 1.55 ± 0.52 
Post 6.20 ± 0.62 2.60 ± 0.90 5.13 ± 0.84 1.32 ± 0.36 
SI 
Pre 6.13 ± 0.82 3.30 ± 1.30 4.80 ± 1.58 1.73 ± 0.69 
Post 5.90 ± 1.14 3.26 ± 1.27 4.59 ± 1.70 1.42 ± 0.54 
TPJ 
Pre 5.60 ± 1.00 2.68 ± 0.91 4.74 ± 1.23 1.44 ± 0.45 
Post 5.80 ± 0.85 2.85 ± 1.28 4.68 ± 1.28 1.23 ± 0.30 
 
 
Intention to Harm  
Explicit judgments of active character’s intention to harm revealed a main effect of Version (F(3,135) 
= 327.896; p < 0.001), explained by significantly different judgments for all the different versions in 
the current design. As for Moral Judgment and Punishment, post hoc analysis revealed that this 
judgment was influenced both by information about intention and outcome in scenarios. 
 
Table 8. Mean ratings ± SD for Intention to Harm 
  Intention to Harm 
  Int-Harm Acc-Harm Att-Harm Neutral 
  mean SD mean SD mean SD mean SD 
SHAM 
Pre 5.27 ± 1.11 1.63 ± 0.68 4.96 ± 0.99 1.43 ± 0.56 
Post 5.61 ± 1.02 1.57 ± 0.65 4.95 ± 0.99 1.16 ± 0.22 
SI 
Pre 5.04 ± 1.42 1.88 ± 1.14 4.69 ± 1.36 1.45 ± 0.51 
Post 4.99 ± 1.60 1.57 ± 0.76 4.40 ± 1.37 1.17 ± 0.31 
TPJ 
Pre 5.17 ± 1.06 1.63 ± 0.84 4.82 ± 1.13 1.27 ± 0.41 
Post 5.33 ± 1.09 1.66 ± 0.94 4.70 ± 1.02 1.17 ± 0.29 
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Physical Pain: 
Analysis on the explicit judgment about the victim’s physical outcome showed a main effect of 
Session (F(1,45) = 5.196; p = 0.03), indicating that participants reported victims to have felt less pain 
in the Post-Session, compared to the Pre-Session. Post hoc analysis on the main effect for Version 
revealed a significant difference between scenarios with negative outcome (Intentional Harm: 6.26 ± 
0.56; Accidental Harm: 6.23 ± 0.51) for the passive character and scenarios with neutral outcome 
(Attempted Harm: 1.24 ± 0.42; Neutral: 1.06 ± 0.17). 
Moreover, we observed a significant two-way interaction Session X Group (F(2,45) = 9.020; p < 0.001). 
Post-hoc analysis showed that participants reported the passive character to have felt less physical 
pain in the SI group, comparing Post-Session (3.52 ± 0.40) to Pre-Session (3.80 ± 0.47; p < 0.001). 
No other comparison reached statistical significance (ALL p > 0.18). 
Interestingly, also a three-way Session X Version X Group (F(6,135) = 2.99; p = 0.009) interaction was 
discovered. Further exploration with post-hoc analysis showed that, this analgesic-like effect in the 
SI group was specific for Intentional and Accidental Harm scenarios. In these scenarios participants 
attributed less pain to the victim in Post-Session (5.81 ± 0.86, 5.90 ± 0.76) compared to Pre-Session 
(6.27 ± 0.73, 6.41 ± 0.53; all p < 0.001). 
Table 9. Mean ratings ± SD for Physical Pain 
 
  Physical Pain 
  Int-Harm Acc-Harm Att-Harm Neutral 
  mean SD mean SD mean SD mean SD 
SHAM 
Pre 6.35 ± 0.43 6.39 ± 0.47 1.14 ± 0.38 1.11 ± 0.28 
Post 6.46 ± 0.35 6.31 ± 0.46 1.28 ± 0.43 1.01 ± 0.04 
SI 
Pre 6.27 ± 0.73 6.41 ± 0.53 1.41 ± 0.86 1.13 ± 0.42 
Post 5.81 ± 0.86 5.90 ± 0.76 1.33 ± 0.46 1.03 ± 0.09 
TPJ 
Pre 6.35 ± 0.45 6.11 ± 0.45 1.14 ± 0.34 1.04 ± 0.17 
Post 6.32 ± 0.57 6.29 ± 0.51 1.14 ± 0.34 1.02 ± 0.08 
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Figure 14. Mean ratings ± SD for Physical Pain. Asterisks indicate significant post-hoc comparisons (P < 0.05). Error 
bars denote s.e.m. 
 
 
 
Emotional Suffering: 
Analysis of judgment of emotional suffering for the passive character showed a significant two-way 
interaction Session X Group (F(2,45) = 0.99; p = 0.005). Post-hoc analysis showed that, in the SI group, 
participants reported that the passive character had felt less emotional suffering in the Post-Session 
(3.30 ± 0.57) compared to the Pre-Session (3.57 ± 0.77; p = 0.002), all other p > 0.16. 
Post hoc analysis on the main effect for Version revealed a significant difference between scenarios 
with negative outcome (Intentional Harm: 5.94 ± 0.86; Accidental Harm: 5.77 ± 0.93) for the passive 
character and scenarios with neutral outcome (Attempted Harm: 1.34 ± 0.52; Neutral: 1.13 ± 0.24). 
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Table 10. Mean ratings ± SD for Emotional Suffering 
 
  Emotional Suffering 
  Int-Harm Acc-Harm Att-Harm Neutral 
  mean SD mean SD mean SD mean SD 
SHAM 
Pre 5.96 ± 0.83 5.83 ± 0.91 1.19 ± 0.55 1.20 ± 0.48 
Post 6.07 ± 0.76 5.89 ± 0.72 1.42 ± 0.59 1.04 ± 0.17 
SI 
Pre 5.82 ± 1.19 5.65 ± 1.40 1.54 ± 0.97 1.26 ± 0.45 
Post 5.32 ± 1.09 5.28 ± 1.15 1.47 ± 0.68 1.13 ± 0.29 
TPJ 
Pre 6.26 ± 0.55 5.95 ± 0.85 1.21 ± 0.32 1.08 ± 0.24 
Post 6.20 ± 0.57 6.03 ± 0.56 1.22 ± 0.36 1.08 ± 0.18 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Mean ratings ± SD for Emotional Suffering. Asterisks indicate significant post-hoc comparisons (P < 0.05). 
Error bars denote s.e.m. 
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Displeasure: 
Participants reported less displeasure in reading scenarios in the Post-Session compared to the Pre-
Session (F(1,45) = 7.013; p = 0.01). The main effect of Version discovered (F(3,135) = 498.568; p < 
0.001) was accounted for by different judgments for each version, with displeasure felt by participants 
decreasing from Intentional Harm (5.96 ± 0.87) to Accidental Harm (5.59 ± 0.89), Attempted Harm 
(2.15 ± 1.23) and finally Neutral (1.17 ± 0.32) scenarios. 
Table 11. Mean ratings ± SD for Displeasure 
  Displeasure 
  Int-Harm Acc-Harm Att-Harm Neutral 
  mean SD mean SD mean SD mean SD 
SHAM 
Pre 6.14 ± 0.78 5.77 ± 0.77 2.00 ± 1.07 1.18 ± 0.37 
Post 6.27 ± 0.60 5.78 ± 0.65 1.90 ± 1.25 1.08 ± 0.20 
SI 
Pre 5.99 ± 1.18 5.52 ± 1.20 2.72 ± 1.55 1.38 ± 0.67 
Post 5.72 ± 1.34 5.51 ± 1.33 1.91 ± 1.09 1.23 ± 0.45 
TPJ 
Pre 5.94 ± 0.60 5.43 ± 0.76 2.33 ± 1.47 1.08 ± 0.22 
Post 5.72 ± 0.87 5.51 ± 0.70 2.07 ± 1.44 1.06 ± 0.12 
 
 
 
 
Positive and Negative Valence 
Explicit judgments about valence active characters attributed to their own actions were divided in 
positive and negative valence. Analysis on positive valence revealed a main effect of Version (F(3,135) 
= 121.045; p < 0.001), accounted for by a post hoc difference for all versions (ALL p < 0.01).  
Analysis on negative valence revealed a main effect of Session (F(1,45) = 6.668; p = 0.01), showing 
that participants attributed less negative valence to active character’s actions in the Post-Session () 
compared to the Pre-Session (). Moreover, the main effect of Version discovered (F(3,135) = 199.105; 
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p < 0.001), was again accounted for by a post hoc difference for all versions (ALL p < 0.001). 
Moreover, a significant two-way interaction Session X Version (F(3,135) = 3.678; p = 0.01) was 
explained by less negative valence judgments for Intentional Harm in the Post-Session (3.20 ± 0.68) 
compared to the Pre-Session (3.35 ± 0.57).  
 
Table 12. Mean ratings ± SD for Positive Valence 
  
Positive Valence 
  Int-Harm Acc-Harm Att-Harm Neutral 
  mean SD mean SD mean SD mean SD 
SHAM 
Pre 2.86 ± 1.42 1.67 ± 0.94 4.38 ± 1.40 5.53 ± 0.92 
Post 3.04 ± 1.43 1.74 ± 0.82 4.47 ± 1.19 5.41 ± 1.24 
SI 
Pre 2.67 ± 1.19 1.69 ± 0.75 3.76 ± 1.18 5.15 ± 1.07 
Post 3.18 ± 1.19 1.63 ± 0.65 3.81 ± 1.18 5.16 ± 0.95 
TPJ 
Pre 2.67 ± 1.22 1.75 ± 0.93 3.70 ± 0.88 5.27 ± 0.95 
Post 2.80 ± 1.17 1.81 ± 1.11 3.57 ± 0.62 5.21 ± 0.95 
           
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 13. Mean ratings ± SD for Negative Valence 
  Negative Valence 
  Int-Harm Acc-Harm Att-Harm Neutral 
  mean SD mean SD mean SD mean SD 
SHAM 
Pre 4.42 ± 1.55 5.98 ± 1.28 2.15 ± 0.79 1.22 ± 0.49 
Post 3.95 ± 1.72 5.64 ± 1.26 2.07 ± 0.74 1.09 ± 0.24 
SI 
Pre 4.22 ± 1.29 5.58 ± 1.08 2.18 ± 0.76 1.33 ± 0.52 
Post 3.78 ± 1.51 5.47 ± 1.43 2.36 ± 0.97 1.10 ± 0.18 
TPJ 
Pre 4.38 ± 1.40 5.31 ± 1.21 2.16 ± 1.18 1.24 ± 0.48 
Post 4.02 ± 1.45 5.31 ± 1.41 2.51 ± 1.17 1.08 ± 0.12 
 
 
Intention to Act: 
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The main effect of Version (F(3,135) = 134.77; p < 0.001) for judgments about the active characters’ 
intention to act was accounted for by the different intentionality attributed to Accidental Harm 
scenarios compared to all others (ALL P < 0.001). This showed that participants were able to 
understand the active characters’ mental states, correctly attributing to her intention to act. 
 
Table 14. Mean ratings ± SD for Intention to Act 
  Intention to Act 
  Int-Harm Acc-Harm Att-Harm Neutral 
  mean SD mean SD mean SD mean SD 
SHAM 
Pre 5.73 ± 0.91 2.99 ± 1.53 5.63 ± 0.79 5.83 ± 0.51 
Post 6.05 ± 0.60 3.39 ± 1.66 5.55 ± 0.92 6.06 ± 0.85 
SI 
Pre 5.57 ± 1.38 3.44 ± 1.71 5.54 ± 1.18 5.80 ± 1.18 
Post 5.66 ± 1.14 3.19 ± 1.71 5.61 ± 1.14 5.52 ± 1.43 
TPJ 
Pre 5.96 ± 0.73 3.58 ± 1.82 5.99 ± 0.73 5.84 ± 1.07 
Post 5.86 ± 0.75 3.74 ± 1.72 5.78 ± 0.71 5.58 ± 1.43 
 
 
 
Unpleasantness of the stimulation: 
To control for a possible involvement of unpleasantness of the stimulation, a control analysis was 
conducted on subjective ratings provided by participants after tDCS. The ANOVA on Group (SHAM, 
SI, TPJ) did not show any significant difference that might explain the specific results found in the 
task (F(2,45) = 0.78; p = 0.47). 
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Table 15. Mean subjective ratings ± SD of the unpleasantness felt during neuromodulation (SHAM, tDCS over SI and 
TPJ) 
SHAM SI TPJ 
1.1 ± 0.3 1.4 ± 0.2 1.3 ± 0.4 
 
 
Discussion 
Evidence from cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience suggests that morality is composed 
by multiple processes taking place in several brain regions (Moll et al., 2005; Young and Dungan, 
2011; Fumagalli and Priori, 2012). Among these processes, two central aspects used in third party 
moral judgments about harmful actions are the attributions of intentions and beliefs to the person 
performing the action and the reactions to the outcome of the action on the victim (Young et al., 2007; 
Cushman, 2008; Greene, 2009; Reniers et al., 2012; Buon et al., 2016). In this view, morality is 
supported by distinct evaluative systems that can act in concert or in conflict, each resting upon 
specific cognitive processes, helping individuals decide what is right and what is wrong. However, 
most of the evidence available is correlational, and clear functional evidence of the contribution of 
these systems (and networks) in healthy adults’ moral judgment is missing. 
In the present study, we used cathodal tDCS to inhibit two key regions subserving mental state 
attributions or reaction to others’ pain, namely the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) and the primary 
somatosensory cortex (SI). We thus explored whether these regions are functionally involved in moral 
judgments about textual scenarios depicting harmful interactions between two individuals or in 
explicit judgments about the two characters’ internal states. Scenarios were previously designed  
(Young et al., 2010) to explore the role of agents’ beliefs (neutral vs negative) and actions’ outcomes 
(neutral vs negative). Moreover, we specifically adapted them to include more subtle modulations of 
the outcome, to test participants’ reactions to it. In specific, in the published version of our scenarios, 
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negative outcomes always implied death for the victim, whereas in our version negative outcomes 
implied physical pain and emotional suffering for the victim, but not death. 
We found that cathodal tDCS over the TPJ altered participants’ moral judgments. In specific, after 
modulation of TPJ, participants judged accidental harm situations as more morally forbidden and 
were more permissive in judging attempted harm situations.  The effect we found on moral judgments 
after TPJ modulation was specific for situations in which intent- and outcome-based processes are 
conflicting (Accidental and Attempted Harm scenarios), this suggests that information about the 
victim’s outcome is present at the behavioural level, contributing to moral judgments. Traditionally, 
these changes in moral judgments for accidental and attempted harm after modulation of the TPJ are 
interpreted as a proof of a reduction of the influence of beliefs in moral judgments after interference 
on a key node for mental state attribution (Young et al., 2010; Sellaro et al., 2015; Ye et al., 2015).  
To test this interpretation, in the present study we directly tested participants’ judgments about the 
active characters’ internal mental states. However, our results did not show any tDCS-related change 
in participants’ ratings when they were explicitly asked to rate the active character’s intention to harm 
the passive character, or when they were asked to attribute punishment to her/his actions.  After 
inhibition of the SI, a brain region involved in processing others’ pain, we did not observe any changes 
in participants’ moral judgments. Interestingly, in the present study when the victim’s outcome was 
explicitly explored, we found that after SI modulation participants reported significantly milder rating 
for both the physical pain and the emotional suffering felt by passive characters in scenarios. 
From this complex set of results, we can conclude that:  
1. Inhibition of the TPJ altered participants’ moral judgments for scenarios in which 
intention and outcome are in conflict. However, it had no effect on participants’ explicit 
judgments of the agent’s internal mental states. 
2. Inhibition of the SI altered participants’ explicit judgments of the outcome on the passive 
character but had no effect on participants’ moral judgments.   
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Rating others’ pain in our somatosensory cortex 
The primary somatosensory cortex is essential for our sense of touch and pain (Peyron et al., 2000; 
Bingel et al., 2004). Moreover, evidence shows that somatosensory cortices are also active during 
observation of action (Costantini et al., 2005; Avenanti et al., 2007; Dinstein et al., 2007; Gazzola 
and Keysers, 2009)  touch (Keysers et al., 2004; Blakemore et al., 2005; Ebisch et al., 2008; Schaefer 
et al., 2009) and pain (Morrison et al., 2004; Avenanti et al., 2005, 2006, Jackson et al., 2005, 2006a; 
Bufalari et al., 2007; Lamm et al., 2007a; Morrison and Downing, 2007; Decety and Meyer, 2008; 
Akitsuki and Decety, 2009; Keysers et al., 2010) in others. Previous studies show that stronger SI 
activation are associated with visual stimuli suggesting more pain (Costantini et al., 2008) and 
correlate with the intensity participants attribute to the observed pain (Bufalari et al., 2007). Taken 
together these results suggest that activity in the primary somatosensory cortex might convey 
discriminative/quantitative information to the observed painful stimulus, following an intensity 
coding (Keysers et al., 2010). Moreover, activity in the SI has been observed when participants are 
directly asked to judge how painful a stimulus was (Lamm et al., 2009). In this framework, the 
somatosensory cortices might be a part of the simulation network, processing the perceived pain into 
a somatic representation that conveys information about how it would feel to experience the observed 
or imagined pain ourselves. This would provide useful information for judging the underlying 
emotional state (i.e., pain). Previous neuromodulation studies show that interference with 
somatosensory cortices impairs processing of observed actions (Valchev et al., 2016, 2017) emotional 
facial expressions (Paracampo et al., 2016) and touch (Bolognini et al., 2011). 
Our results significantly expand our knowledge about the role of the somatosensory cortices in 
emotion processing and social cognition by showing that the SI has a role in rating others’ pain, even 
when participants cannot directly observe the painful interaction and must extract information 
through verbal descriptions.  
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Text (e.g. in books, newspapers, websites, social networks) is one of the dominant modalities through 
which we interact and (try to) understand others. A single sentence can convey a vivid representation 
of another’s internal emotional and cognitive state, in some cases much more effectively than any 
image. Previous studies show that reading descriptions of pain in others produces activity in brain 
regions involved in first-hand painful experiences (Osaka et al., 2004; Gu and Han, 2007; Richter et 
al., 2010; Bruneau et al., 2012, 2013).  Following an embodied approach, several authors have 
proposed that sensorimotor neurons that are active during both production and perception have a role 
in language comprehension (Gallese, 2008; Pulvermüller and Fadiga, 2010; Glenberg and Gallese, 
2012; Marino et al., 2012; Pulvermüller, 2013). Beyond correlational evidence, this study shows that 
activity within the somatosensory cortex is causally involved in creating a vivid representation of 
pain perceived through language. Despite this behavioural effect on explicit ratings for the victim’s 
outcome, modulation of the SI did not produce any change in participants’ moral judgments.  This 
dissociation is consistent with a framework that puts mental state attribution in a dominant position 
for healthy adults’ moral judgments and reaction to the victim’s outcome as a secondary source of 
information (Cushman 2008, Decety 2012, Young-Tsoi 2013). 
Behavioural changes after TPJ modulation 
Inhibitory modulation of the TPJ altered our participants’ moral judgments. Research on the neural 
mechanisms supporting moral judgments has focused on the mentalizing network (Young and 
Dungan, 2011; Young and Tsoi, 2013). The temporo-parietal junction is a key region within the 
mentalizing network (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Bzdok et al., 2012) and previous correlational 
studies show that its activation correlates with participants’ consideration for agent’s intentions 
during moral judgments (Young et al., 2007; Young and Saxe, 2009; Koster-Hale et al., 2013). 
Moreover, previous interferential studies show that transient disruption of TPJ activity has a 
behavioural effect on participants’ moral judgments (Young et al., 2010; Jeurissen et al., 2014; Sellaro 
et al., 2015; Ye et al., 2015).  
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In line with previous findings, our results show that, after TPJ inhibitory modulation, participants’ 
moral judgments were more outcome-based and less intent-based. In specific, they were less morally 
permissible in judging scenarios in which the agent had no intention to cause harm but ended up 
causing harm anyway and were more morally permissible in judging scenarios in which the agent had 
the intention to cause harm but did not manage to do it. No differences were observed for intentional 
harm or neutral scenarios. However, when explicit judgments of characters’ mental states were tested, 
TPJ modulation did not produce any behavioural change.  Previous studies show that modulation of 
TPJ activity can impair performance in false belief tasks (Costa et al., 2008), change interpretation of 
others’ behaviours (Giardina et al., 2011), interfere with self-other distinction (Santiesteban et al., 
2012; Silani et al., 2013; Kelly et al., 2014) see (Hétu et al., 2012; Schuwerk et al., 2014). The lack 
of any change in participants’ explicit judgments after TPJ modulation in our task might be due to 
the specific stimuli used. Indeed, in our scenarios, internal mental states are clearly described to 
participants and their interpretation doesn’t pose any challenge. Neuromodulation techniques require 
calibrated tasks as their effect on behaviour might be subtle. A possible future development of the 
present task might consist of more subtle description of characters’ internal mental states, to highlight 
the possible contribution of the mentalizing network (in specific the TPJ) to their interpretation. 
Conclusion 
Previous studies suggest that morality is supported by multiple processes, in particular judging an 
action as morally right or wrong implies both reacting to its outcome and to the intention of the agent 
performing the action. In the present study, we aimed at exploring the contribution of a key region 
for intention attribution (i.e., the temporo-parietal junction - TPJ) and a key region for reactions to 
others’ emotions and sensations (i.e., the primary somatosensory cortex - SI) in moral judgment and 
explicit judgments about others’ internal emotional and cognitive states, using tDCS to modulate their 
activity. Our results show that modulation of the TPJ had a behavioural effect on participants’ moral 
judgment. This effect was specific for situations in which agent’s intention and outcome are in 
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conflict, thus showing that the victim’s outcome is taken into account when judging the morality of 
an action. Moreover, SI modulation produced changes in participants’ explicit ratings of the physical 
pain and emotional suffering felt by the victim. However, modulation of the SI did not produce any 
change in moral judgments. This evidence shows that moral judgment largely depends on mental 
state attribution taking place in the temporo-parietal junction, information about the victim’s outcome 
despite being present both at the neural and behavioural level, is secondary when participants are 
asked to judge whether an action is morally right or wrong.  On the other hand, the somatosensory 
cortex is functionally involved in creating vivid representation of pain in others, even when the 
painful experience is conveyed through text and is not directly observable. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The idea that our bodies participates in our understanding of the world is ancient. We use them as a 
tool to interact with others. 
The discovery of mirror neurons in monkeys and mirror mechanisms in humans provided simulation 
theories with a biological substrate.  
Regions involved in moving and sensing our bodies show overlapping activations when…  
The activation of the same parieto-premotor regions active when performing a motor act during 
observation of the same action, has been thus interpreted as internal simulation of the perceiver action. 
A mechanism matching perceptual representation (visual or auditory) of the observed action with 
one’s own motor representation is the perfect candidate to be the cornerstone of social cognition with 
the power to attribute intention to others’ motor act in the same way as we plan our motor acts before 
performing them (Caspers et al. 2010; Keysers et al. 2010; Gallese and Sinigaglia 2011; Avenanti et 
al. 2013b; Valchev et al. 2016). A growing body of evidence suggests that the same mirror 
mechanisms in sensorimotor cortices are involved in processing others’ sensations and emotions 
(Carr et al., 2003; Winston et al., 2003; Leslie et al., 2004; Dapretto et al., 2006; Warren et al., 2006; 
Keysers et al., 2010).  Sensorimotor regions might, thus, be involved in  processing others’ emotion 
and in social cognition in general (Pobric and Hamilton, 2006; Avenanti et al., 2007; D’Agata et al., 
2011; de Gelder et al., 2012; Tidoni et al., 2013; Bolognini et al., 2014; Costa et al., 2014; Urgesi et 
al., 2014; Jacquet and Avenanti, 2015; Tamietto et al., 2015; Valchev et al., 2016). In sum, human 
beings can understand internal states in others by looking or imagining others’ behaviour. In this 
view, internal simulation in the sensorimotor network can be used to interpret the internal mental state 
that caused the behaviour. However, a major unsolved issue for a clear understanding of the role of 
these mirror mechanisms in social cognition has been the lack of established connections between 
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shared activations and behavior, in particular for high-level explicit inferences about others’ internal 
emotional states.  
The present thesis significantly expands upon previous evidence by demonstrating that those sectors 
of the sensorimotor cortex showing vicarious activations are critical for our ability to understand 
others’ internal states from behavior. Our findings establish a strong and direct causal link between 
sensorimotor brain networks and emotion understanding that was only suggested in the past. From 
Experiment 1 to 7 we focused on the emotional facial expression of amusement. The smile is a 
prominent facial expression in social life, however, it is also the most ambiguous expression we 
encounter.  We designed two novel tasks to track participants’ accuracy in judging others’ internal 
emotional states (Empathic Accuracy, EA) and used repetitive TMS to interfere with key regions of 
the sensorimotor simulation and the mentalizing network. This way, we explored if these networks 
are critical for fine-grained judgments about amusement from observed smiles. TMS over 
sensorimotor regions representing the face (i.e., in the inferior frontal gyrus, IFG, and ventral primary 
somatosensory cortex, SI), disrupted the ability to infer amusement authenticity from observed 
smiles. In Experiment 8, 9 and 10 we focused on the involvement of the somatosensory cortex in 
moral judgment and in explicit judgments of another’s emotional experience described through text. 
We know from previous studies that healthy moral judgments in adulthood strongly rely on our theory 
about others’ intentions, however, observing or imagining a person causing pain to another leads to 
rapid vicarious activation in brain regions involved in our first-hand painful experiences. Here we 
used tDCS to inhibit the sensorimotor simulation or the mentalizing network while participants were 
asked to read written narratives describing harmful situations involving two individuals and judge 
different aspects of these. Theoretical models propose that one mechanism for inferring the 
unobservable emotional feelings of others is to simulate their observed or imagined behavior within 
one’s own sensorimotor system (Adolphs et al. 2000; Adolphs 2002; Gallese et al. 2004; Goldman 
and Sripada 2005; Gallese 2007; Keysers et al. 2010; Niedenthal et al. 2010; Gallese and Sinigaglia 
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2011; Avenanti et al. 2013b; Wood et al. 2016).  According to these models, sensory representations 
of observed behavior in high-order visual regions (e.g., the superior temporal sulcus, STS) would be 
coupled with sensorimotor representations of the same expressions. This sensorimotor embodiment 
would help observers to intuitively grasp what the other person is experiencing.  Covert emotional 
states (e.g., happiness) are continuously associated with overt motor behaviours (e.g., smiling). Given 
this, observers can simulate the covert emotional state of another by embodying their overt motor 
state (Carr et al., 2003; Gallese, 2007b; Jabbi et al., 2007; Bastiaansen et al., 2009; Niedenthal et al., 
2010). Thus, sensorimotor simulation could support access to stored knowledge, grounded in the 
brain regions involved in first-hand emotional experiences (including the anterior insula and cingulate 
cortex), about the emotional states associated with the behavior (Goldman and Sripada, 2005; 
Niedenthal, 2007; Bastiaansen et al., 2009; Niedenthal et al., 2010; Wood et al., 2016).  Thus, when 
observing or imagining behaviors with emotional content in others, activity in sensorimotor networks 
may partially or fully reactivate related concepts and affective states and thus contribute to accurate 
cognitive inferences about the underlying emotional feeling. 
However, to date the idea that sensorimotor regions are essential for accurate inference of the covert 
mental state underlying performed actions (i.e., the social target’s emotional feeling) has received 
only partial empirical support from studies using causal methods.  Previous studies used simplified 
stimuli for the most part (e.g., static pictures of actions or facial expressions) and did not clarify to 
what extent sensorimotor cortices play a role in higher-level explicit inferences about the emotional 
feelings underlying those facial movements (possibly via access to stored knowledge in affective 
brain regions) (Adolphs et al. 2000; Pitcher et al. 2008; see also Keysers et al. 2010; Avenanti et al. 
2013b) (Pazzaglia et al., 2008a; Michael et al., 2014).  
The present thesis provides evidence supporting this hypothesis. Indeed, one important feature of our 
findings is that active interference with the sensorimotor network using neuromodulation tools (TMS 
and tDCS) disrupted participants’ performance in tasks requiring to perform fine-grained explicit 
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inferences. Thus, we suggest that rTMS and tDCS disrupted sensorimotor processing necessary for 
making sense of those behaviors and inferring the underlying emotions.  
These shared activations reflect one form of mind-reading, involving attributions of mental states 
(goals, intentions, emotions, sensations) that have a bodily format (that are grounded in the self). 
However, we cannot always understand others using our internal states as a basis to understand others. 
A different line of research has focused on the hypothesis that understanding others is based on 
explicit inferential processes (Mitchell et al., 2002; Saxe, 2005; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2005).  
Focusing on the neural bases of mental state attributions, scholars have isolated a network of brain 
regions recruited during explicit inferences about the intentions, beliefs, and feelings of others: the 
mentalizing network (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Frith and Frith, 2006; Mitchell, 2009; Bzdok et al., 
2012; Schurz et al., 2014). The mentalizing system provides a different route to understanding others 
that it is not through sharing, but through the creation of propositional cognitive knowledge about 
what others are feeling, inherently based on self-other distinction. As we are considering complex 
social tasks, the present thesis would not be complete without considering the role of the mentalizing 
network alongside the sensorimotor simulation network 
The present thesis provides significant evidence on the role of the two networks in social cognition. 
Neuromodulation of the mentalizing network produced different behavioural outcomes depending on 
the specific task participants were asked to perform. In experiment 3 and 4, interference with the 
mentalizing network did not produce behavioural effects on our dichotomic EA task, however, in 
experiment 7, interference with this network affected participants’ performance in a modified version 
of the same EA task. Finally, in experiment 9, tDCS modulation of the mentalizing network altered 
subjects’ moral judgments. Beyond purist approaches to social cognition we propose that motor 
simulation and mentalizing might represent two processes with the same goal. Both participate in 
understanding others (Olsson and Ochsner, 2008; Bastiaansen et al., 2009; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 
2009; Zaki et al., 2012). Recent imaging studies show that the two systems might be concurrent active 
95 
 
in complex social tasks (Zaki et al., 2009b; Schippers et al., 2010; Schippers and Keysers, 2011; 
Spunt et al., 2011; Spunt and Lieberman, 2012a, 2013; Harvey et al., 2013; Sperduti et al., 2014; 
Kanske et al., 2015) and might even show functional connectivity during social interactions 
(Lombardo et al., 2010).  Our results suggest that the role of the simulation and the mentalizing 
networks is not tied to specific stimuli used to convey information about internal states in others. 
Instead, it seems to be flexibly influenced by the specific process that people use to understand the 
situation they encounter during social cognition.  
Finally, our sensorimotor cortices are not only crucial to retrodict the internal emotional state from 
behaviors, but influential theories suggest that humans predict others’ upcoming actions by using 
their own motor system as an internal forward model. However, functional evidence that the motor 
system is causally essential for predicting others’ actions is meager.  In Appendix A, using 
transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) we tested the role of the inferior frontal cortex (IFC), 
in action prediction (AP). We devised a novel AP task where participants observed the initial phases 
of right-hand reaching-to-grasp actions and had to predict their outcome (i.e., the goal/object to be 
grasped). We found that suppression by cathodal (inhibitory) tDCS of the left IFC, but not the left 
superior temporal sulcus (STS) or the right IFC, selectively impaired performance on the AP task, 
but not on a difficulty-matched control task (Non-human Prediction, NP task). Remarkably, anodal 
(excitatory) tDCS of the left IFC brought about a selective improvement in the AP-task. These 
findings indicate that the left IFC is necessary for predicting the outcomes of observed human right-
hand actions. Crucially, our study shows for the first time that down- and up-regulating excitability 
within the motor system can hinder and enhance AP abilities, respectively. These findings support 
predictive coding theories of action perception and have implications for enhancement of action 
prediction abilities. 
In Appendix B, we explored the role of the primary motor cortex in predicting others’ actions. 
Although correlational studies suggest that the motor cortex (M1) might be involved in this process, 
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it is unclear whether M1 is also causally essential for making predictions about observed actions. To 
test the functional relevance of M1 to action prediction we used offline monopolar transcranial direct 
current stimulation (tDCS) in healthy participants. In four different tDCS experiments, we 
administered 15 minutes of anodal or cathodal currents at 1 or 2 mA over the left M1 before 
participants performed the AP and NP task. In each experiment, participants received sham and active 
tDCS on two separate sessions. We found that 2mA cathodal tDCS selectively impaired performance 
on the AP task, but not on the NP task. The effect was specific to polarity (it was not present after 
anodal currents) and intensity (it was not present after 1mA tDCS). These findings establish specific 
tDCS parameters for effective M1 stimulation in action prediction and highlight the functional 
relevance of M1 to making accurate predictions about the outcome of human actions.  
 
From reaching the things we want to grasp, to reaching the minds we want to grasp, brain regions 
that primarily evolved to allow movement are crucial to accurately understand what others are feeling 
or to predict what they are about to do. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Boosting and decreasing action prediction abilities through excitatory 
and inhibitory tDCS of inferior frontal cortex  
 
INTRODUCTION 
The ability to predict the outcomes of observed actions is vital for social life, given its 
importance for both cooperative (e.g., joint actions) and competitive interactions (e.g., sport). Yet, 
the neural bases of this ability are poorly understood. There is widespread evidence that seeing the 
actions of others activates an action observation network (AON) that includes higher-order visual 
regions involved in encoding biological motion (i.e., the superior temporal sulcus, STS) and parieto-
frontal regions involved in controlling and sensing body actions (Keysers and Perrett, 2004; Gazzola 
and Keysers, 2009; Perrett et al., 2009; Caspers et al., 2010; Rizzolatti et al., 2014; Urgesi et al., 
2014). In particular, the inferior frontal cortex (IFC), which includes the ventral premotor cortex and 
the posterior part of the inferior frontal gyrus, represents a key node of the AON involved in coupling 
action perception with execution. In the monkey IFC, a class of multimodal neurons – called mirror 
neurons – is directly involved in such coupling, which may be important for making sense of others’ 
actions (di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al., 2014).  
Studies suggest that the motor node of the AON builds up an anticipatory representation of 
observed actions (Kilner et al. 2004; Urgesi et al. 2006, 2010; Sebanz et al. 2006; Aglioti et al. 2008; 
Abreu et al. 2012; Avenanti et al. 2013a; Avenanti, Candidi, et al. 2013; Wurm et al. 2014; Balser et 
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al. 2014; Ondobaka et al. 2014; Makris and Urgesi 2015; Sacheli, Christensen, et al. 2015). This 
proposal echoes influential theoretical models positing that the motor system is designed to act as an 
anticipation device, and that one's own motor system can be used as an internal forward model when 
perceiving the actions of others (Prinz, 1997; Blakemore and Decety, 2001; Wolpert et al., 2003; 
Grush, 2004; Wilson and Knoblich, 2005; Kilner et al., 2007; Schütz-Bosbach and Prinz, 2007; 
Friston et al., 2011). In this vein, predicting the outcomes of observed actions would critically rely 
on motor areas of the AON like the IFC. However, whether the IFC or other nodes of the AON are 
causally essential for predicting others’ actions remains speculative, and establishing whether the IFC 
is critical for action prediction is the goal of the present study. 
Human and monkey correlational studies indicate that: i) activity in motor regions can occur 
prior to the observation of a predictable grasping movement (Umiltà et al., 2001; Kilner et al., 2004; 
Fogassi et al., 2005; Maranesi et al., 2014); and ii) there is a clear anticipatory bias in simulating the 
upcoming phases of observed reaching-grasping actions (Gangitano et al. 2004; Borroni et al. 2005; 
Urgesi et al. 2010; Avenanti et al. 2013b). These anticipatory motor activations appear to rely on the 
AON, as they are disrupted if the IFC is suppressed by low-frequency repetitive transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (TMS) (Avenanti et al. 2013a). Moreover, the IFC and other motor nodes of the AON are 
recruited during tasks requiring participants to predict the outcomes of observed actions (Abreu et al., 
2012; Amoruso et al., 2014; Balser et al., 2014; Ondobaka et al., 2014; Wurm et al., 2014). An 
anticipatory bias in processing observed actions has also been shown in STS neurons (Perrett et al., 
2009). 
It is worth noting here that the notion of anticipatory bias is supported almost exclusively by 
indirect correlational evidence that leaves unsolved the fundamental question of whether motor and 
visual nodes of the AON are causally essential for behavior and, in particular, for the ability to make 
predictions about others’ actions. Only two interferential studies on the anticipatory bias have been 
conducted thus far in humans. The first showed that, while low-frequency TMS suppression of the 
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IFC disrupted anticipatory motor activations during observation of implied actions (see above), 
suppression of the STS  had an opposite, enhancing effect on anticipatory motor activations, 
suggesting that motor simulation plays a compensatory role when visual input is degraded (Avenanti 
et al. 2013a). The second study showed that online repetitive TMS interference of the STS disrupted 
the ability of both novices and soccer players with great visual expertise (i.e., goalkeepers) to predict 
the direction of a ball after perceiving the initial phases of penalty kicks. In contrast, TMS interference 
with the dorsal premotor cortex impaired performance only in soccer players, whether outfield players 
or goalkeepers (Makris and Urgesi, 2015). Although the lack of a control task for assessing 
nonspecific, distracting effects of online TMS makes any conclusion tentative, this study is in keeping 
with the idea that visual and motor nodes of the AON may play different roles in action prediction. 
Yet, the causal roles of the STS and the IFC in the ability to predict the outcomes of observed actions 
have not been established. Crucially, whether action prediction abilities can be enhanced by 
exogenous boosting of cortical excitability in the AON is a critical and entirely unexplored question.  
Another fundamental, but thus far unresolved, theoretical issue is whether the IFC is critical 
for predicting event dynamics in general, or whether its involvement is specific to predicting human 
actions (Schubotz and von Cramon, 2004; Schubotz, 2007; Press and Cook, 2015). Imaging evidence 
indicates that the IFC is active when predicting sequences of events, suggesting domain-general 
involvement (Schubotz and von Cramon, 2004; Schubotz, 2007). However, only causal methods can 
establish the domain-general vs. domain-specific role of IFC in action prediction. 
All these issues are dealt with in the present study, which used transcranial direct current 
stimulation (tDCS) to alter cortical excitability in the IFC and the STS before participants made 
predictions about human actions and non-human movements. tDCS is a valuable method of non-
invasive cortical stimulation that allows researchers to induce polarity-dependent excitability changes 
in the underlying stimulated area. Using weak offline cathodal or anodal DC currents, tDCS can 
induce cortical inhibition or excitation, respectively, and alter neural functioning for several minutes 
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after the end of the stimulation (Nitsche, 2003; Antal et al., 2004; Horvath et al., 2015). In four tDCS 
experiments, we applied 15 minutes of tDCS just before participants performed two novel tasks 
requiring them to predict the future end-states/outcomes of human actions (Action Prediction, AP) or 
non-human movements (Non-human Prediction, NP) based on the initial phases of the movements. 
The tasks were calibrated and matched for difficulty in three behavioral studies that allowed us to 
select sets of AP and NP stimuli in which the outcome could be correctly predicted with ~75% 
accuracy. With this accuracy criterion, we prevented ceiling and floor effects, thus providing the 
optimal behavioral conditions for revealing any potential detrimental or beneficial effects of tDCS.  
In the tDCS experiments, task performance was assessed after active tDCS or a control sham 
tDCS condition that provided a baseline for behavioral performance. In Experiment 1 and Experiment 
2 we applied cathodal tDCS (c-tDCS) to suppress neural functioning in the left IFC and the left STS, 
respectively. We tested whether these regions are specifically tuned to (and critical for) the prediction 
of human actions, or involved in event prediction in general. To test hemispheric specificity, in 
Experiment 3 we applied active and sham c-tDCS over the right IFC. Moreover, to test stimulation-
polarity specificity, in Experiment 4 we applied anodal tDCS (a-tDCS) over the left IFC with the goal 
of increasing its excitability and thus enhancing its functioning.  
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Participants  
A total of 142 healthy volunteers took part in the study. Fifty-two participants were tested in 
one of four tDCS experiments, and 90 participants were tested in one of three pilot studies. Thirteen 
different participants were assigned to each tDCS experiment (Experiment 1: 6 females, mean age ± 
S.D. 23.4 ± 3.8 years, range 19-32; Experiment 2: 6 females, mean age 23.2 ± 1.5 years, range 21-
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31; Experiment 3: 6 females, mean age 24.3 ± 2.6 years, range 21-26; Experiment 4: 6 females, mean 
age 23.6 ± 3.6 years, range 19-30).  
Sample size was determined though a power analysis conducted using G*Power 3 (Faul et al., 
2007), with power (1 – β) set at 0.80 and α = .05, two-tailed. We expected a large effect size based 
on three recent transcranial stimulation experiments from our laboratory (exp2 and exp3 in Tidoni et 
al. 2013; Paracampo et al. 2016). In these studies, we targeted the left IFC to test its role in action 
perception, and used similar design and task requirements (i.e., participants had to discriminate 
between two observed actions and their performance was compared during active and sham 
stimulation), indices of task performance (d’), and task validation procedures (all stimuli were 
selected to be recognized with 75% accuracy) as in the present study (see below). We conducted two 
power analyses, one using the mean effect size across the three experiments (Cohen’s d = 0.94), and 
the other using the effect size obtained by pooling data across the experiments (Cohen’s d = 0.89). 
These analyses yielded required sample sizes of 11 and 12 participants, respectively. We thus decided 
to have 13 participants in each group. 
All participants were right-handed and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Participants 
were screened for any general contraindications to non-invasive brain stimulation (Brunori et al. 
2011) using the questionnaire developed by Rossi and colleagues (2009, 2011) for TMS. No 
participant was on medication at the time of the experiment or reported a history of neurological or 
psychiatric disorders. Participants provided written informed consent. Experimental procedures were 
approved by the ethics committee at the Psychology Department of Bologna University, and were 
performed in accordance with the ethical standards of the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki. All 
participants were naïve to the purposes of the study. Information about the experimental hypothesis 
was provided only after the experimental tests were completed. No discomfort or adverse effects 
during tDCS were reported or noticed. 
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General Design 
In four tDCS experiments, we tested the roles of the IFC and the STS in predicting the 
outcomes of observed movements. In Experiments 1, 2 and 3 we applied c-tDCS over the left IFC, 
the left STS and the right IFC, respectively. In Experiment 4, we applied a-tDCS over the left IFC. 
In each experiment, participants were tested in two separate sessions that were carried out 
immediately after 15 min of active (cathodal or anodal) or sham tDCS over the target region. The 
order of the sessions was counterbalanced across participants, and the two sessions were separated 
by 7 ± 3 days. 
 
Tasks and stimuli 
In the Action Prediction (AP) task, participants observed 120 video-clips (640 x 480 pixels, 
30 fps) depicting actors who were individually filmed while reaching and grasping an object. All 
stimuli subtended a 22.3° x 33.4° visual angle from the participant’s viewing position. Videos started 
by showing two objects (left side of the screen) located in front of a still right hand (right side of the 
screen; see Figure 1A). The two objects were placed at a distance of ~45 cm from the actors’ hand. 
One object was located to the left and the other to the right of the actor’s hand (~15-20 cm from one 
another). After a variable delay (1000-2200 ms), the hand started to reach for and grasp one of the 
two objects. The final phases of the action were occluded and the video interrupted. In these clips, 
only 30-70% of the entire movement duration was shown, followed by a random-dot mask (150 ms 
duration) that interrupted the video. Then a response screen showing the two objects appeared and 
lasted until the response (Figure 1B). The objects placed to the left and to the right of the actor were 
displayed on the left and right sides of the screen, respectively. Participants had to guess which of the 
two objects was going to be grasped by the actor’s hand, and provided their answers using two 
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computer keys. The left and right keys were used to select the left and right target objects, 
respectively.   
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Figure 1. Trial example and stimuli. Example of Action Prediction (AP) task movie (A) and response screen (B). Target 
stimulus pairs in the AP task (C). Example of Non-human Prediction (NP) task movie (D) and response screen (E). Target 
stimulus pairs in the NP task (F). On each trial, a video-clip showed the initial movement of a hand (in the AP task) or a 
geometrical form (in the NP task) reaching and adapting to one of two targets. Participants were then presented with the 
two targets and had to guess which was selected by the hand/form. 
 
 
Video-clips in the AP task included 8 non-professional actors (4 females; mean age ± S.D.; 
23.6 y ± 1.06) reaching and grasping 8 different pairs of objects (i.e., lighter vs. glass; highlighter vs. 
corkscrew; deodorant spray vs. coffeepot; mug vs. book; clothespin vs. nutcracker; scoop vs. cup; 
little ball vs. soccer ball; fork vs. stapler; Figure 1C). The two objects in each pair were located near 
to each other in space, thus implying slightly different reaching trajectories of the grasping hand. The 
two objects in each pair also presented different affordances, thus implying different grips (i.e., from 
power grips performed with the whole hand to precision grips performed with the index finger and 
the thumb). The hand-object interaction was not visible in any of the videos. Thus, the AP task 
required participants to process kinematic cues (i.e., hand trajectory and finger pre-shaping before 
grasping) signaling the upcoming grasping of one the two objects. 
In the NP control task, participants observed 120 video-clips showing an articulated 
geometrical form approaching one of two targets (Figure 1D). Participants had to guess which target 
was going to be approached by the geometrical form by pressing one of two keys during the 
presentation of the response screen (Figure 1E). The NP videos (640 x 480 pixel, 30 fps) were 
animations created with Adobe Flash Professional software to grossly match temporal and spatial 
features of the AP stimuli. Similarly to the AP task, the NP stimuli showed incomplete movements 
(30-70% of the total duration) of a geometrical form which moved from the right side of the screen 
in order to reach and fit with one of two different geometrical targets placed on the opposite side. The 
trajectories of the moving forms were designed to roughly match the hand movements in the AP task. 
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As in the AP task, the two targets were located in different spatial positions and had different 
geometrical properties. Analogous to pre-shaping of the fingers in the AP task, the configuration of 
the moving geometrical form changed over time during the reaching phase in order to optimally fit 
with one of the two targets. Yet, the NP movement was clearly non-biological. For the NP video clips, 
we created eight different pairs of geometrical targets (Figure 1F) and eight moving geometrical 
forms, and random-dot images were used for masking. 
 
Pilot studies and task validation 
The final sets of 120 AP videos and 120 NP videos used in the main experiment were selected 
from an initial sample of ~1400 AP and ~1200 NP videos using a two-step procedure. Initially, we 
selected 180 stimuli for each task based on the performance of two groups of participants. We 
presented the initial sample of AP stimuli to 30 participants (15 female, mean age: 24.5 y ± 2.4) and 
the sample of NP stimuli to 30 other participants (15 female, mean age: 24.2 y ± 2.6). In these two 
pilot studies, stimuli included movies showing 30-80% of the entire movement. We selected stimuli 
that were recognized with ~75% accuracy (range: 65-85%) in these two groups of participants. This 
resulted in about 350 stimuli per task, from which 180 stimuli per task were chosen (90 stimuli for 
the upper object/target and 90 stimuli for the lower object/target, with comparable representations of 
the different actors/forms). To assure that the two tasks were matched for difficulty, in a third pilot 
study, 30 additional participants (15 female, mean age: 23.9 y ± 2.9) were presented with the 180 AP 
and 180 NP stimuli selected in the first step. Each video was presented twice (720 trials in total).  
The final set of stimuli included 120 AP stimuli and 120 NP stimuli whose outcome could be 
correctly predicted with ~75% accuracy (range: 65-85%). In both tasks, the hand/form reached both 
objects/targets with 50% probability. The percentage of the total movement shown in the two tasks 
was matched (AP: mean 45% of total movement, range 30-70%; NP: mean 45% of total movement, 
106 
 
range 30-70%; p > 0.99). With this procedure we created two difficulty-matched tasks with an optimal 
accuracy level for avoiding floor and ceiling effects. Importantly, half of stimuli in the AP task 
(N=60) showed only 30-40% of the total movement, with the hand remaining far from the target 
objects (not crossing the midline of the screen) and displaying only the initial phase of hand pre-
shaping (well before the maximal grip aperture). In a control analysis, we used this subsample of AP 
stimuli to assure that tDCS acted on the ability to predict the outcomes of observed actions based on 
the processing of very early kinematic cues. 
 
Transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) and neuronavigation  
tDCS was delivered  using a battery-driven Eldith constant direct current stimulator 
(neuroConn GmbH, Ilmenau, Germany). A pair of surface sponge electrodes was soaked in a standard 
saline solution (NaCl 0.9%) and held in place with elastic rubber bands. In Experiments 1-3 the 
cathodal electrode (25 cm²) was applied over the target region (left IFC, left STS, or left IFC). In 
Experiment 4 the anodal electrode (25 cm²) was applied over the left IFC. In all four experiments, the 
reference electrode (35 cm²) was applied over the contralateral deltoid muscle (Priori et al., 2008; 
Bolognini et al., 2010). It is thought that extracephalic electrode montages allow more focal 
stimulation, and avoid the confounding effect of the reference electrode (Cogiamanian et al., 2007; 
Brunoni et al., 2011).  
tDCS has been shown to elicit polarity-dependent excitability changes in the cortical area 
under the stimulation electrodes. Studies of the motor cortex showed that anodal tDCS increases 
motor excitability while cathodal tDCS decreases it (Nitsche and Paulus 2001; Nitsche 2003; Antal 
et al. 2004; Nitsche et al. 2008 see Horvath et al. 2015 for a recent quantitative meta-analysis), 
although many factors may contribute to the efficacy of the stimulation, including intensity, electrode 
size and disposition and duration of stimulation (Cogiamanian et al., 2007; Nitsche et al., 2008; 
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Moliadze et al., 2010; Brunoni et al., 2011). Importantly, similar polarity-dependent effects can be 
reliably observed at the behavioral level, at least when testing perceptual/attentional cognitive 
functions (Jacobson et al., 2012), with anodal and cathodal tDCS being involved in the enhancement 
and inhibition of such functions, respectively. 
Active tDCS was delivered with a constant current of 2 mA (current density ~0.08 mA/cm2), 
complying with current safety guidelines (Nitsche, 2003; Poreisz et al., 2007). Stimulation lasted for 
15 min, plus 20 s of ramp-up and ramp-down at the beginning and end of stimulation. Impedance was 
constantly monitored and kept below 8 kOhm. This protocol is known to affect cortical excitability 
for more than 30 minutes after the end of stimulation (Nitsche and Paulus, 2001; Nitsche et al., 2008), 
thus covering the entire duration of the testing phase. For sham tDCS the electrodes were placed on 
the same locations, but the current was turned on for only 30 seconds at the beginning of the session, 
and then turned off in a ramp-shaped fashion (fade in/out: 20 sec), so that participants experienced 
the sensations initially associated with the onset of stimulation (mild local tingling), without inducing 
any effective modulation of cortical excitability. This procedure ensures successful blinding of 
participants (Gandiga et al., 2006; Ambrus et al., 2012). Although, the intensity used in our study (2 
mA) may be less effective in ensuring blinding (O’Connell et al., 2012); but see (Loo et al., 2010, 
2012), we used relatively small cephalic electrodes to reduce scalp sensations and make active and 
sham stimulation feel comparable (Turi et al., 2014; Fertonani et al., 2015; Tang et al., 2016). 
Electrode positions were identified on each participant’s scalp with the SoftTaxic Navigator 
system (Electro Medical Systems, Bologna, Italy), as in previous research (Avenanti et al., 2007, 
2012; Bertini et al., 2010; Serino et al., 2011; Tidoni et al., 2013; Jacquet and Avenanti, 2015; Sacheli 
et al., 2015a). Skull landmarks (nasion, inion and two preauricular points) and ~80 points providing 
a uniform representation of the scalp were digitized by means of a Polaris Vicra digitizer (Northern 
Digital Inc, Ontario, Canada). An individual estimated magnetic resonance image (MRI) was 
obtained for each participant through a 3D warping procedure fitting a high-resolution MRI template 
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with the participant’s scalp model and craniometric points. This procedure has been proven to ensure 
a global localization accuracy of roughly 5 mm, a level of precision closer to that obtained using 
individual MRIs than can be achieved using other localization methods (Carducci and Brusco, 2012). 
Talairach coordinates of target regions and corresponding scalp projections were automatically 
estimated by the SofTaxic Navigator from the MRI-constructed stereotaxic template. Figure 2 shows 
the stimulated sites. In Experiments 1, 3 and 4, the IFC was targeted over the pars opercularis of the 
inferior frontal gyrus at the border with the anterior-ventral aspect of the precentral gyrus i.e., the 
ventral premotor cortex (coordinates: x = ± 54, y = 10, z = 24, corresponding to Brodmann’s area 
6/44) (Mayka et al. 2006; Avenanti et al. 2007, 2012; Gazzola et al. 2007; van Overwalle and Baetens 
2009; Caspers et al. 2010; Avenanti et al. 2013a). In Experiment 2, the STS was targeted in its 
posterior aspect (x = –52, y = –53, z = 9, corresponding to Brodmann’s area 21; (van Overwalle and 
Baetens 2009; Caspers et al. 2010; Avenanti et al. 2013a). Talairach coordinates corresponding to the 
projections of the IFC and STS target sites on the brain surface were automatically estimated through 
the neuronavigation system. In Experiment 1, mean left IFC surface coordinates ± S.D. were: x = -
53.6 ± 1.5; y = 10.0 ± 0.6; z = 24.0 ± 0.5. In Experiment 2, left STS coordinates were: x = -55.1 ± 
1.9; y = -53.6 ± 0.8; z = 9.3 ± 1.0. In Experiment 3, right IFC coordinates were: x = 55.3 ± 1.7; y = 
10 ± 0.6; z = 24.5 ± 0.8. In Experiment 4, left IFC coordinates were: x = -54.0 ± 1.5; y = 10.1 ± 0.7; 
z = 24.2 ± 0.4 (Figure 2A). 
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Figure 2. Brain stimulation sites and experimental design. (A) Brain areas targeted in Experiments 1-4. Stimulation sites 
are reconstructed on a standard template using MRIcron (http://www.mccauslandcenter.sc.edu/mricro/mricron/). (B) 
Schematic representation of the experimental design. Participants took part in two sessions in which performance in the 
two tasks was tested immediately after 15 minutes of sham/active tDCS over a target brain region.  
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Procedure  
The experiments were programmed using Matlab software to control the video-clip sequence 
and acquire behavioral responses. Participants sat in front of a computer screen located ∼50 cm from 
their head in a dimly illuminated room. After neuronavigation and tDCS electrode setup, participants 
received task instructions and performed two training blocks (one for each task, 30 trials each) in 
order to familiarize them with the tasks. They were asked to respond as quickly and accurately as 
possible by pressing one of two response buttons with the hand ipsilateral to the tDCS scalp site (the 
left hand in Experiments 1, 2 and 3, and the right hand in Experiment 4). Training trials were not 
included in the experimental blocks, but were similarly difficult (~75% accuracy). If a participant’s 
accuracy was < 60% in one of the tasks, the corresponding instructions and training block were 
repeated. 
After training, participants received a 15-min session of active or sham-tDCS over the target 
site (left IFC, left STS or left IFC) and then performed four blocks of 60 trials (2 blocks for each 
task).  Block order and the order of trials within each block were randomized. A one-minute break 
was allowed between blocks. All participants completed the four blocks within 35 minutes after tDCS 
(mean ± S.D. across experiments: 30 min ± 2), well within the temporal window of cortical 
modulation induced by active tDCS (Figure 2B). Indeed, tDCS with a current density and duration 
comparable to those used in our study can alter neural activity for approximately 1 hour (Nitsche and 
Paulus, 2001; Nitsche, 2003; Antal et al., 2004; Ardolino et al., 2005; Kuo et al., 2013; Horvath et 
al., 2015). 
To test whether sham or active tDCS induced different scalp sensations, at the end of each 
session we asked participants to evaluate the discomfort caused by the stimulation using a 5-point 
Likert scale with 1 indicating “not unpleasant at all” and 5 indicating “extremely unpleasant”. 
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Data Analysis 
Behavioral data were processed offline. For each task (AP, NP),  tDCS condition (sham, 
active) and Experiment (1-4), we calculated measures of sensitivity (d’) and response bias (β) in 
accordance with signal detection theory (Macmillan and Creelman, 1991; Stanislaw and Todorov, 
1999). For both tasks, the target objects/forms located in the left/bottom and right/upper parts of the 
scene were considered targets 1 and 2, respectively. Two types of responses were scored as correct: 
a “target 1” response to target 1 (hit), and a “target 2” response to target 2 (correct rejection). Two 
responses were scored as incorrect: a “target 2” response to target 1 (miss), and “target 1” response 
to target 2 (false alarm). A three-way mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed on d’ and 
β with Task (2 levels: AP and NP) and Stimulation (2 levels: sham tDCS and active tDCS) as within-
subjects factors and Experiment (4 levels: Exp 1, Exp 2, Exp 3 and Exp 4) as the between-subjects 
factor.  
Response times (RTs) were extracted for each trial associated with a correct answer. RTs 
longer than 2 s were removed from the analysis (less than 1%). For each task and tDCS condition, 
we computed the median RTs as this measure is less sensitive to outlier values than the mean. RTs 
were analyzed with a Task x Stimulation x Experiment ANOVA. 
The tDCS discomfort ratings collected at the end of each session were analyzed with a two-
way mixed ANOVA with Stimulation as a within-subjects factor and Experiment as a between-
subjects factor.  
In all the ANOVAs, post-hoc comparisons were performed using Newman-Keuls tests to 
correct for multiple comparisons. Partial η2 was computed as a measure of effect size for the main 
effects and interactions, whereas repeated measures Cohen’s d was computed for post-hoc 
comparisons. The normal distribution assumption was checked for each dependent variable using 
Shapiro-Wilk tests. In all the ANOVAs, we checked for participants with outlier values deviating >3 
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S.D. from the group mean. When outliers were detected, we assured that the results of the ANOVA 
were not due to such participants by replicating the ANOVA effects after removal of these 
participants. When violations of normality were detected, we also computed Wilcoxon matched pair 
tests to confirm critical comparisons using non-parametric analyses. Statistical analyses were carried 
out using STATISTICA 8.0 software (StatSoft, Inc.). 
 
RESULTS 
Task sensitivity (d’) 
The Experiment x Task x Stimulation ANOVA conducted on d’ values revealed a significant 
three-way interaction (F3,48 = 3.83 p = .02, Partial η2 = .19) indicating that sensitivity in the two tasks 
was differentially modulated by active tDCS across the four experiments. No other effects were 
detected in the analysis (all F < 2.11, all p > .11). To identify the source of the triple interaction, two 
separate Experiment x Stimulation ANOVAs were performed, one for each task.  
The Experiment x Stimulation ANOVA conducted on d’ values from the AP task (Figure 3) 
showed a significant two-way interaction (F3,48 = 7.95, p < .001, Partial η2 = .33) but no main effects 
(all F < .93, all p > .34). Post-hoc analysis showed that, relative to sham c-tDCS (mean d’ ± S.D.: 
1.64 ± .42), active c-tDCS of the left IFC in Experiment 1 robustly reduced AP sensitivity (1.31 ± 
.59; p = .04, Cohen’s d = .85). No similar effects were found in Experiments 2 and 3, suggesting that 
suppression of the left STS and the right IFC did not change AP sensitivity (all p > .42). In contrast, 
relative to sham a-tDCS (1.47 ± .72), active a-tDCS of the left IFC in Experiment 4 strongly increased 
AP sensitivity (1.85 ± .69; p = .006, Cohen’s d = 1.07). 
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Figure 3. AP task sensitivity in Experiments 1-4. Dark grey and light grey columns indicate d’ values in the sham and 
active tDCS conditions, respectively. Suppression (Exp 1) and excitation (Exp 4) of the left IFC disrupted and boosted 
task sensitivity, respectively. No change in AP task sensitivity was found after suppression of the left STS (Exp 2) or the 
left IFC (Exp 3). Asterisks indicate significant post-hoc comparisons (p < .05). Error bars denote s.e.m. 
 
 
We directly compared the influence of different types of tDCS on AP task sensitivity by 
computing an index of change in d’ (active tDCS – sham tDCS) in each of the four experiments 
(Figure 4A). Mean index values in Experiment 1 were negative (mean difference index ± S.D.: -.33 
± .39), indicating task interference after active c-tDCS over left IFC (see Figure 4B for individual 
index difference values). They were also lower than the difference indexes in Experiments 2, 3 and 4 
(all difference indexes > .07 ± .44; all p < .009, all Cohen’s d > .97). Mean index values in Experiment 
4 were positive (.38 ± .36), indicating task enhancement after active a-tDCS over left IFC (see Figure 
4C for individual values). They were also greater than the difference indexes in Experiments 1 and 2 
(all difference indexes < .08 ± .30, all p < .05, all Cohen’s d > .78). Indexes were comparable in 
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Experiments 3 and 4 (p = .92). Thus, the reduction (Experiment 1) and increase (Experiment 4) in d’ 
values induced by active tDCS were large, as indicated by the effect sizes, and corresponded to 
changes of -20% and +26% relative to sham tDCS.  
In sum, the analysis of the differential indexes further demonstrates the selectivity and 
robustness of the bidirectional influence of left IFC tDCS on the ability to predict others’ actions.  
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Figure 4. Changes in AP task sensitivity (active – sham tDCS). (A) Mean changes in Experiments 1-4. When applied 
over the left IFC, active c-tDCS (Experiment 1) and a-tDCS (Experiment 4) brought about a reduction and an increase in 
AP task sensitivity, respectively. Asterisks indicate significant post-hoc comparisons (p < .05). Error bars denote s.e.m. 
(B) Changes in the AP task sensitivity of individual participants in Experiment 1. (C) Changes in the AP task sensitivity 
of individual participants in Experiment 4. 
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To ensure that the modulatory effects of tDCS found in Experiments 1 and 4 influenced the 
ability to predict the outcomes of observed actions based on the processing of early kinematic cues, 
we conducted an additional control analysis. For these two critical experiments, we computed a 
measure of AP task sensitivity (d’) on a subsample of 60 AP videos (i.e., half of the total number of 
videos in the AP task) that showed only the initial 30-40% of the entire movement (i.e., displaying 
the initial phase of hand pre-shaping, well before the maximal grip aperture). Planned t-tests showed 
that relative to sham c-tDCS (1.60 ± .46), active c-tDCS of the left IFC in Experiment 1 reduced AP 
sensitivity (1.20 ± .60; p = .01, Cohen’s d = .85), whereas, relative to sham a-tDCS (1.46 ± .72), 
active a-tDCS of the left IFC in Experiment 4 increased AP sensitivity (1.92 ± .65; p = .004, Cohen’s 
d = .98). These values corresponded to a d’ change of -25% in Experiment 1 and +31% in Experiment 
4, suggesting reliable tDCS modulation of performance with this subsample of AP stimuli. 
The Experiment x Stimulation ANOVA conducted on the d’ index for the NP task (Figure 5) 
revealed no main effects or interactions (all F < 0.64, all p > .59), thus indicating that active tDCS 
specifically affected AP but not NP task sensitivity. 
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Figure 5. NP task Sensitivity in Experiments 1-4. Dark grey and light grey columns indicate d’ values in the sham and 
active tDCS conditions, respectively. No effects on NP task sensitivity were found. Error bars denote s.e.m. 
 
Note that the tDCS effects on AP task sensitivity and the lack thereof on the NP task sensitivity 
were not due to outlier participants, as no participant had d’ values (or a d’ difference index) deviating 
3 S.D. or more from the group mean. We also checked whether our findings were due to tDCS acting 
mostly on some outlier trials by performing an item analysis. Thus, for each trial, we computed a 
difference in accuracy (% of correct answer) between the sham and active tDCS session across 
participants. This was done for each task and experiment separately. In both tasks, no trial deviated 3 
S.D. or more from the mean group difference. In sum, although there was variability in the magnitude 
of c-tDCS (Figure 4B) and a-tDCS effects (Figure 4C) across participants, the results at the group 
level were strong, as shown by large effect sizes, and not driven by outlier participants or outlier 
trials. 
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Response bias (β) 
The Experiment x Task x Stimulation ANOVA conducted on the β index showed no 
significant main effects or interactions (all F < 2.35, all p > .08; Table 1). However, there were 
violations of normality in the distribution of β values (Shapiro-Wilk tests: p < .05). These were mostly 
due to one participant with β values deviating 3.15 S.D. from the group mean in one condition (active 
a-tDCS in the NP task) of Experiment 4. Removing this participant partially normalized the 
distribution of β values, but kept the results of the ANOVA non significant (all F < 3.11, all p > .08). 
Additionally, we used Wilcoxon matched pair tests on the entire sample to confirm that, relative to 
sham tDCS, active tDCS did not change response bias in the AP task (all p > .15) or the NP task (all 
p > .31) across experiments. In sum, manipulations of AON cortical excitability through active tDCS 
only affected task sensitivity, and did not change response bias.  
 
Table 1. Mean ± S.D. Response bias (β) index. 
 
 
 
Response times (RTs) 
The Experiment x Task x Stimulation ANOVA conducted on RTs showed a significant 
Experiment x Stimulation interaction (F3,48 = 2.99 p = .04, Partial η2 = .16), but no other main effects 
or interactions (all F < 1.72, all p > .20; see Table 2). The two-way interaction was accounted for by 
 
Exp 1                                   
c-tDCS left IFC 
Exp 2                              
c-tDCS left STS 
Exp 3                                   
c-tDCS right IFC 
Exp 4                                   
a-tDCS left IFC 
 sham active sham active sham active sham active 
AP task .97 ± .51 .94 ± .54 1.55 ± .70 1.30 ± .54 1.06 ± .48 1.04 ± .43 .87 ± .28 .75 ± .45 
NP task .94 ± .48 .99 ± .65 .97 ± .91 .75 ± .45 1.11 ± .84 .90 ± .60 .90 ± .52 1.39 ± 1.91 
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faster RTs in the active tDCS session (RTs ± S.D.: 376 ms ± 130) than in the sham tDCS session of 
Experiment 2 (470 ms ± 178; p = .014; Cohen’s d = .71), indicating that c-tDCS over the left STS 
made participants respond faster in both the AP and NP tasks. No significant effects of active vs. 
sham tDCS were found in the other experiments (all p > .24). It should be noted that the RT data in 
Experiment 3 (right IFC) slightly violated the normality assumption (Shapiro-Wilk test p < .05), 
possibly due to one participant with RTs deviating 3.03 S.D. from the group mean in one condition. 
Removing this participant corrected the violation of normality in that experiment (Shapiro-Wilk test, 
all p > .21), but did not change the Experiment x Stimulation interaction (F3,47 = 2.93 p = .04, Partial 
η2 = .16). In addition, the critical post-hoc comparison between sham and active tDCS in Experiment 
2 remained significant (p = .016), whereas the same comparisons were not significant in the other 
experiments (all p > .25), a pattern of results that was further replicated using Wilcoxon matched pair 
tests on the entire sample of participants (p = .05 and all p > .27, respectively). 
Table 2. Mean ± S.D. RTs 
 
 
 
We also calculated an index of the RT difference in each experiment by subtracting the RT in 
the sham tDCS session from the RT in the active tDCS session. The RT difference found in 
Experiment 2 (mean RTs ± S.D.: -88 ms ± 124) was more negative than the RT difference found in 
Experiment 1 (+40 ms ± 120; p =.008; Cohen’s d = 1.05) and non-significantly more negative than 
the RT differences in Experiments 3 (-10 ms ± 80; p =.09; Cohen’s d = .77) and 4 (-22 ms ± 109; p = 
.13; Cohen’s d = .56).  
 
Exp 1                                   
c-tDCS left IFC 
Exp 2                              
c-tDCS left STS 
Exp 3                                   
c-tDCS right IFC 
Exp 4                                   
a-tDCS left IFC 
 sham active sham active sham active sham active 
AP task 462 ± 142 508 ± 222 470 ± 178 376 ± 130 433 ± 115 431 ± 139 452 ± 112 432 ± 103 
NP task 440 ± 138 475 ± 151 460 ± 165 378 ± 174 445 ± 117 427 ± 126 457 ± 128 433 ± 130 
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Discomfort ratings 
At the end of each session, we asked participants to rate the discomfort they felt during tDCS 
using a 5-point Likert scale. Discomfort ratings were very low, in keeping with the small size of the 
electrodes (Turi et al., 2014; Fertonani et al., 2015; Tang et al., 2016). Ratings were comparable 
across tDCS sessions and experiments, as suggested by the lack of any main effects or interactions in 
the Experiment x Stimulation ANOVA (all F < 2.14, all p > 0.11; Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Mean ± S.D. ratings of subjective tDCS unpleasantness. 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion 
In four different experiments, we used tDCS to induce polarity-dependent excitability changes 
(inhibitory for c-tDCS and excitatory for a-tDCS) (Nitsche and Paulus, 2001; Antal et al., 2004; 
Ardolino et al., 2005; Nitsche et al., 2008; Kuo et al., 2013; Horvath et al., 2015) over two main nodes 
of the AON, namely, IFC and STS. We thus explored whether these regions play a causative role in 
action prediction, and whether any such role can be boosted or suppressed by exogenous manipulation 
of their functionality. In Experiment 1, we found that c-tDCS over the left IFC impaired AP task 
sensitivity (d’), compared to sham tDCS. No change in NP sensitivity was found. These results 
Exp 1                                   
c-tDCS left IFC 
Exp 2                               
c-tDCS left STS 
Exp 3                                   
c-tDCS right IFC 
Exp 4                                   
a-tDCS left IFC 
sham active sham active sham active sham active 
1.54 ± .66 1.62 ± .62 1.15 ± .38 1.77 ± .83 1.54 ± .66 1.46 ± .52 1.62 ± .65 1.77 ± .73 
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indicate that suppression of the left IFC selectively disrupted the ability to choose between possible 
goals/outcomes of a reaching-to-grasp action (i.e., which object was going to be grasped) that could 
be predicted based on kinematic cues (reaching direction and finger pre-shaping) shown in the initial 
phases of the observed action. No similar impairments in AP task sensitivity were observed in 
Experiments 2 and 3, which targeted the left STS and right IFC, respectively. Remarkably, in 
Experiment 4, an opposite behavioral effect – i.e., enhanced sensitivity in the AP task – was obtained 
by a-tDCS excitation of the left IFC. No changes in the β index were found, indicating that tDCS-
induced suppression and excitation of the IFC resulted in selective disruption and enhancement of 
AP task sensitivity, respectively. No significant changes in RTs were found in Experiments 1 or 4, 
thus ruling out that the observed effects were due to a speed-accuracy trade off. Finally, we found 
that disruption and enhancement of AP task sensitivity in Experiments 1 and 4 was detected even 
when testing performance with only those AP videos showing very early action kinematic cues (30-
40% of the total movement). 
From this complex set of results we can draw five main conclusions: i) the IFC is a crucial 
node of the AON involved in predicting the outcomes of observed hand actions based on early 
kinematic cues; ii) down- and up-regulation of left IFC excitability can hinder and boost action 
prediction abilities, respectively; iii) the critical involvement of the IFC in making predictions is 
specific for human actions, and does not extend to prediction of non-human movements; iv) 
prediction of right hand actions relies on the left, not the right, IFC; v) motor (left IFC) more than 
visual (left STS) regions appear to be critical for action prediction. 
 
Functional relevance of motor vs. visual nodes of the AON for action prediction 
We provide the first causal evidence that the IFC is involved not only in planning the 
execution of an upcoming action, but also in making predictions about the outcomes of observed 
actions. By optimally calibrating task difficulty through a series of behavioral pilot studies, we 
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demonstrate that down-regulation (Experiment 1) and up-regulation (Experiment 4) of cortical 
excitability in the left IFC reduce and boost the ability to predict others’ actions, respectively. These 
novel findings provide strong support to theoretical models emphasizing that the IFC is a key node 
in the anticipatory neural network for the predictive coding of one’s own and others actions (Prinz 
1997; Blakemore and Decety 2001; Wolpert et al. 2003; Grush 2004; Wilson and Knoblich 2005; 
Kilner et al. 2007; Brown et al. 2011; Avenanti et al. 2013a; Urgesi et al. 2014) and provide the first 
direct demonstration of the essential role of the IFC in making explicit predictions about others’ 
actions.  
Our findings complement previous causal evidence showing that brain lesions and non-
invasive stimulation of the IFC can affect the ability: i) to match/discriminate different actions/body 
postures (Urgesi et al., 2007; Pazzaglia et al., 2008a; Cattaneo et al., 2010; Tidoni et al., 2013; 
Michael et al., 2014; Jacquet and Avenanti, 2015; Paracampo et al., 2016); ii) to judge whether an 
observed action has been correctly performed (Pazzaglia et al., 2008b; Nelissen et al., 2010); iii) to 
estimate the weight of a box seen being lifted (Pobric and Hamilton, 2006); and iv) to perform/control 
the imitation of an observed action (Heiser et al., 2003; Catmur et al., 2009; Hogeveen et al., 2015). 
However, none of these previous studies tested whether the IFC (or the STS) is also critical for action 
prediction. Thus, our study goes beyond previous evidence by showing that the IFC is not only 
functionally relevant to recognition or imitation of others’ actions, but also plays an essential causal 
role in action prediction.  
Together with the recent study of Hogeveen et al. (2015) that addressed the neural bases of 
imitation control, our study is the first to show that off-line tDCS can affect the functioning of the 
AON. Hogeveen and colleagues (2015) found that a-tDCS over the right IFC (i.e., with anodal and 
cathodal electrodes over the FC6 and Cz scalp positions of the 10-20 system, respectively) improved 
performance in an imitation inhibition task and increased spontaneous imitation in a social interaction 
task. In contrast, a-tDCS did not change performance in a non-imitative inhibition task, suggesting 
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that increasing excitability in the IFC selectively improves the control of imitation. Our study expands 
previous evidence by showing that: i) c-tDCS and a-tDCS over the IFC can exert opposite behavioral 
influences; ii) tDCS can modulate not only motor (control of imitation) but also visual (action 
prediction) functions of the AON; iii) stimulation of motor and visual nodes of the AON lead to a 
combination of anatomical and polarity specific effects, suggesting a division of labor within different 
AON regions during action prediction. It would be also worth considering that the use of relatively 
small active electrodes applied with an image-guided monocephalic montage might allow us to draw 
stronger neuroanatomical inferences about the causal role of the AON in behavior. 
Although prior evidence suggested STS involvement in anticipatory action mechanisms 
(Perrett et al., 2009; Abreu et al., 2012; Makris and Urgesi, 2015), we found no change in AP 
sensitivity after c-tDCS over this region (see Experiment 2). This suggests that the role of STS in 
action prediction is less crucial than that of the IFC. On the one hand, our AP task required participants 
to predict the goal of an action, and the IFC, more so than STS, may be critical for goal processing 
(di Pellegrino et al. 1992; Gallese et al. 1996; Cattaneo et al. 2010; Rizzolatti et al. 2014; Jacquet and 
Avenanti, 2015). On the other hand, our findings may appear to contradict brain stimulation and 
neuropsychological evidence that both the IFC and the STS may be critical for action perception 
(Saygin 2007; Pazzaglia, Smania, et al. 2008; Kalénine et al. 2010; van Kemenade et al. 2012; 
Avenanti et al. 2013a; Tidoni et al. 2013; Urgesi et al. 2014; Jacquet and Avenanti 2015).  
Our AP task clearly differs from previous action perception tasks, as it requires participants 
to extrapolate, from limited visual cues, the outcome of an observed action (i.e., its goal/the object to 
be grasped) that is blocked from view. According to predictive coding theories (Kilner et al., 2007; 
Friston et al., 2011), action perception requires constant feedforward and feedback interactions 
between visual (STS) and frontal (IFC) regions, with the latter being involved in generating 
predictions about observed actions, and the former being involved in comparing predicted actions 
with incoming sensory input, so as to adjust the initial prediction. However, such a continuous 
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comparison in the STS may not be fully instantiated in our AP task because video interruption limited 
sensory inflow. This distinctive feature of the AP task could explain why task sensitivity (i.e., the d’ 
index) was more affected by exogenous manipulations of the IFC than the STS – at variance with 
previous studies that tested action perception in full vision and found comparable sensitivity of action 
perception to both STS and IFC manipulations (Saygin 2007; Pazzaglia, Smania, et al. 2008; Kalénine 
et al. 2010; van Kemenade et al. 2012; Avenanti et al. 2013a; Tidoni et al. 2013; Urgesi et al. 2014). 
Interestingly, active c-tDCS in Experiment 2 reduced RTs relative to the sham c-tDCS 
condition. This hints at a beneficial effect of c-tDCS over the STS, in keeping with studies showing 
that decreasing cortical excitability in visual regions evokes compensatory mechanisms that can 
improve task performance (Antal et al., 2004; Pirulli et al., 2014). The RT reduction was observed in 
both tasks, indicating nonspecific improvements. It is likely that this RT effect was not due to a local 
tDCS effect on the STS, a region that typically shows selectivity for biological movements (Press, 
2011; Lingnau and Downing, 2015), but involved a spreading of the tDCS effect to nearby 
interconnected middle temporal regions (e.g., hMT+/V5) that represent dynamic information 
independently from the biological or non-biological nature of the stimulus (Antal et al., 2004; 
Lingnau and Downing, 2015). Indeed, the location of the reference electrode may have induced a 
spread of cathodal current in a ventral direction from the STS to hMT+, and this region may have 
contributed to the observed effects. The nonspecific RT changes found in Experiment 2 stand in 
contrast with the task-specific accuracy changes found in Experiments 1 and 4, further suggesting 
distinct roles of visual and motor AON nodes in action prediction (see also Avenanti et al. 2013a). 
Taken together, previous studies and our present data allow us to draw two preliminary conclusions. 
First, during classical action perception tasks where the entire action is visible, both the STS and the 
IFC are functionally relevant to task performance (Avenanti et al. 2013a; Rizzolatti et al. 2014; Urgesi 
et al. 2014). In contrast, the IFC, but not the STS, plays an essential role in making accurate 
predictions about an action’s outcome when, as in our AP task, limited information is provided. 
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Second, brain stimulation over the STS may facilitate prediction of both human and non-human 
movements because of nonspecific effects, possibly involving visual motion-sensitive regions. 
 
Human action selectivity in the IFC 
The modulatory effects found in Experiments 1 and 4 were specific for the prediction of 
human actions, as c-tDCS and a-tDCS over the left IFC did not alter performance in the NP task, 
which was designed as a difficulty-matched control to assess prediction of non-human motion. This 
selectivity is in line with the notion that the AON responds more to the observation of human 
movement than non-human movement (Press, 2011). This tuning refers both to body form and 
kinematic profile. For example, reduced activation in the AON was found when participants saw 
humans moving with a non-human kinematics (Dayan et al., 2007; Casile et al., 2010). Moreover, 
interference with the IFC impairs perception (Candidi et al., 2008) and motor resonance with possible, 
but not biomechanically impossible, human body movements (Avenanti et al., 2007). Relevant to the 
present study, seeing human actions activates the anterior node of the AON more than seeing non-
human movements – including movements of geometrical stimuli (Kessler et al., 2006; Engel et al., 
2008), inanimate objects (Costantini et al., 2005; Oberman et al., 2005), humanoid robots (Tai et al., 
2004; Chaminade et al., 2010) and virtual hands (Perani et al., 2001), even when all movements are 
matched for kinematic profile. While all the above studies indicate greater IFC sensitivity for human 
actions than for non-human movements, they cannot distinguish whether the IFC is only necessary 
for predicting human actions. Indeed, the same sector of the IFC that is involved in action perception 
is also recruited during predictions of abstract event sequences (Schubotz and von Cramon, 2004). 
These studies suggest that the predictive properties of the IFC are not limited to human actions, but 
extend to event prediction in general, and thus reflect domain-general processes (Schubotz, 2007; 
Press and Cook, 2015).   
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Our study provides novel insight into this issue by showing that altering cortical excitability 
in the left IFC affects the ability to predict the outcomes of human actions, but not the outcomes of 
non-human movements. Importantly, during the NP task participants were required to predict 
movements of an articulated geometrical form with a spatial trajectory resembling that of the reaching 
hand in the AP task. Moreover, the form changed its geometrical configuration during the 
approaching phase in order to fit one of the two target objects, a process analogous to the finger pre-
shaping in the AP clips. Yet, only the hand appeared to be and moved as a biological entity. Although 
it can be safely assumed that moving hands in the AP task were more familiar than geometrical forms 
in the NP task (Press and Cook, 2015), it is worth noting that the two tasks were matched in difficulty 
based on a series of pilot studies with a large sample of participants. Thus, the fact that tDCS failed 
to induce changes in NP task sensitivity cannot be due to ceiling or floor effects (see (Pobric and 
Hamilton, 2006; Tidoni et al., 2013). Our data provide causal evidence that the frontal node of the 
AON is tuned to human actions, and suggest that motor activations during non-human event 
prediction may reflect an outflow of neural activity into the motor system that is not essential for 
making an accurate prediction.  
The AP task required participants to predict the goal of the action (i.e., which object would be 
grasped) on the basis of kinematic cues (reaching direction, finger pre-shaping) observed in the initial 
phase. Thus, our study does not clarify whether the IFC could rely on a prediction of the future 
trajectory of the movement (i.e., where the hand will end up) to identify a goal that is blocked from 
view. To shed light on this point, future studies could investigate whether IFC modulation affects the 
ability to predict the end-state of intransitive actions. Also, it remains unclear whether IFC modulation 
could affect processing of reaching direction, finger pre-shaping or both. Dorsal and ventral sectors 
of the premotor cortex play critical roles in motor control for reaching movements and grasping 
movements, respectively (Davare et al., 2006; Hoshi and Tanji, 2007). Thus, future studies could 
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orthogonally manipulate these two action components to test whether the left IFC and dorsal premotor 
cortices maintain similar divisions of labor during AP.  
In principle, tDCS may have also affected visuo-spatial processing of targets i.e., processing 
of their location or their geometrical properties, which would suggest specific grips. However, target 
objects were shown in full view for the entire duration of every clip (i.e. 1500-3000 ms) and it is 
unlikely that tDCS of premotor regions would have affected perceptual processing of non-visually 
degraded material (Avenanti et al. 2013a; Uithol et al. 2015). Moreover, spatial processing of targets 
was also required in the NP task, because the two targets were placed in distinct spatial locations and 
suggested different end-state configurations of the moving form. This suggests that tDCS mainly 
modulated prediction of (human) action-related information rather than visual processing of targets. 
 
A lateralization of action prediction in the IFC?  
Another issue we addressed in our study deals with the differential roles of the left IFC and 
the right IFC in action prediction. We found that only left IFC manipulation (in Experiments 1 and 
4) but not right IFC manipulation (in Experiment 3) affected task performance. These data may 
suggest a left hemisphere lateralization in action prediction. However, it should be noted that only 
right hand actions were shown in the AP task, and our sample was limited to right-handers. Although 
AON activity is bilaterally distributed (van Overwalle and Baetens, 2009; Grosbras et al., 2012), 
studies have shown a gradient of lateralization which depends on the laterality of the body part 
involved in the observed action, as well as the observers’ hand preference. In particular, during 
observation of right hand actions, AON activation of right-handers tends to be stronger (Aziz-Zadeh 
et al., 2002; van Schie et al., 2004; Shmuelof and Zohary, 2005; Gazzola and Keysers, 2009; Cabinio 
et al., 2010; Caspers et al., 2010) and can be detected earlier (Ortigue et al., 2010) in the left, relative 
to the right, hemisphere. Such (partial) lateralization may account for the observed effects. Further 
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studies will test whether suppression of activity in the left or the right IFC alters the ability to predict 
left hand actions both in right- and left-handers.  
Because our AP task was optimized to show early kinematic cues of grasping (e.g., the pre-
shaping of the right index finger and thumb), the AP stimuli depicted the mesial aspect of the actors’ 
right arm, and the forward reaching movement of the actor went from the right to the left side of the 
screen, resulting in leftward visual motion for the viewer. Studies have suggested an asymmetry in 
the motor control of leftward vs. rightward movements with fronto-parietal regions in the right 
hemisphere controlling leftward movements (Fujii et al., 1998; Mattingley et al., 1998; Neggers et 
al., 2007). Our results may appear in contrast with this asymmetry, as we found that stimulation of 
the left IFC but not the right IFC modulated performance in the AP task. However, the aforementioned 
asymmetry pertains to the direction of performed actions, whereas the leftward motion in our AP 
movies is only due to the viewer’s perspective, while the actors actually moved their hand in a forward 
direction. However, future studies might use different actions and test additional movement directions 
to fully address the issue of IFC laterality in action prediction. 
Although only the left IFC (but not the left STS or the right IFC) seems to be critical for our 
AP task, it is worth noting that tDCS can modulate the excitability of distant interconnected regions 
(Boros et al., 2008; Nitsche et al., 2008; Avenanti et al., 2012). Thus, it is entirely possible that other 
interconnected frontal (e.g., dorsal premotor cortex; see Stadler et al. 2012; Makris and Urgesi 2015) 
or parietal (e.g., inferior parietal or somatosensory; Caspers et al. 2010; Valchev et al. 2015, 2016) 
regions of the AON may have contributed to the observed effects. For example, Stadler and 
colleagues (2012) have implicated the dorsal premotor cortex in the ability to detect timing 
incongruities between predicted and observed actions.  
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Conclusions  
Predictive coding theories posit that the brain is a machine evolved to reduce any discrepancy 
between what is expected and what actually happens (i.e., prediction error) when acting and 
interacting with others. In keeping with these theories, our current findings emphasize the active role 
of the frontal node of the AON in the predictive coding of others’ actions. Our findings fit with recent 
evidence supporting predictive coding in frontal regions when processing action language (García 
and Ibáñez, 2016), action intentionality (Hesse et al., 2016) and others’ decisions (Ibañez et al., 2016; 
Melloni et al., 2016). Importantly, our experimental design allowed us to demonstrate that changes 
in the excitability of a specific region within the AON bring about impairment or enhancement of the 
ability to predict the outcomes of human actions, depending on the polarity of stimulation. This result 
indicates that tDCS represents an important tool not only for disrupting human performance, but also 
for improving it.  
It should be considered that we found a performance enhancement in healthy neurotypical 
participants. Atypical or patient populations may present different baseline levels of cortical 
excitability, and additional factors might interact with the efficacy and direction of stimulation effects 
(Krause and Cohen Kadosh, 2014). Nevertheless, our study may have therapeutic value (e.g., in 
people with defective social prediction abilities, such as those with autism spectrum disorders or with 
impaired action perception due to a lesion affecting the AON), and implications for 
neuroenhancement (e.g., in healthy people who need to improve their prediction skills for 
professional reasons, like elite athletes of competitive and cooperative sports). Therefore, future 
studies should carefully assess clinical and applied potentialities of AON stimulation with tDCS. 
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APPENDIX B 
Primary motor cortex crucial for action prediction: a tDCS study 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Seeing the actions of others activates an action observation network (AON), encompassing 
high-order visual regions encoding biological motion i.e. the superior temporal sulcus (STS) (Jellema 
and Perrett, 2003; Keysers and Perrett, 2004; Perrett et al., 2009) and parieto-frontal regions involved 
in controlling and sensing body actions (Gazzola and Keysers, 2009; Grafton, 2009; van Overwalle 
and Baetens, 2009; Caspers et al., 2010; Rizzolatti et al., 2014; Urgesi et al., 2014; Valchev et al., 
2016). Premotor and parietal regions have been classically considered key nodes of the AON, as they 
implement a mirror mechanism coupling action perception with execution (di Pellegrino et al., 1992; 
Gallese et al., 1996; Fogassi et al., 2005; Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2010; Bonini, 2016). Moreover, 
causal evidence indicates that transient stimulation or stable lesion of premotor or parietal region 
affect action recognition in humans (Pobric and Hamilton, 2006; Urgesi et al., 2007, 2014; Moro et 
al., 2008; Fazio et al., 2009; Cattaneo, 2010; Cattaneo et al., 2010; Avenanti and Urgesi, 2011; 
Avenanti et al., 2013b; Tidoni et al., 2013; Michael et al., 2014; Jacquet and Avenanti, 2015). 
Mounting evidence suggest that also the primary motor cortex (M1) might implement a mirror 
mechanism (Tkach et al., 2007; Dushanova and Donoghue, 2010; Vigneswaran et al., 2013). 
However, M1 is not classically considered as a key node of the AON (Keysers and Gazzola, 2009; 
Caspers et al., 2010) and whether M1 is causally essential for perceiving the actions of others remains 
unclear as previous studies using causal methods have provided mixed results (Avenanti et al., 2007; 
Cattaneo, 2010; Borgomaneri et al., 2015; Palmer et al., 2016; Valchev et al., 2016). 
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A key function of the AON is to process observed action in order to make predictions about 
their outcome. Theoretical models suggest that the motor system is designed to act as an anticipation 
device that humans use to generate internal forward models when perceiving the action of others 
(Prinz, 1997, 2006; Blakemore and Decety, 2001; Wolpert et al., 2003; Grush, 2004; Wilson and 
Knoblich, 2005; Kilner et al., 2007; Schütz-Bosbach and Prinz, 2007; Friston et al., 2011). There is 
substantial correlational evidence indicating that the motor nodes of the AON form an anticipatory 
representation of observed actions and M1 activity reflects such anticipatory encoding (Kilner et al., 
2004; Sebanz et al., 2006; Urgesi et al., 2006, 2010; Abreu et al., 2012; Avenanti et al., 2013a, 2013b; 
Balser et al., 2014; Maranesi et al., 2014). Recently, brain stimulation studies have provided causal 
evidence that targeting frontal premotor regions of the AON affects action prediction abilities (Stadler 
et al., 2012; Makris and Urgesi, 2015; Avenanti et al., 2017).  
Stadler and colleagues (Stadler et al., 2012) administered online rTMS over the dorsal 
premotor cortex (dPMc) during a task requiring to detect timing incongruities between predicted and 
observed everyday actions. On their side, Makris and Urgesi (Makris and Urgesi, 2015) administered 
online rTMS over the same brain region on soccer players during a task requiring to predict the 
outcome of a penalty kick. Both studies found that active dPMc stimulation reduced task performance 
relative to control rTMS conditions. More recently, Avenanti and colleagues (Avenanti et al., 2017) 
used transcranial Direct Current Stimulation (tDCS) to test the functional relevance of the AON to 
action prediction. Weak offline cathodal (c-tDCS) or anodal (a-tDCS) currents were used to alter 
AON functioning for several minutes after the end of the stimulation (Nitsche and Paulus, 2000; 
Nitsche, 2003; Antal et al., 2004; Kincses et al., 2004; Horvath et al., 2015). It was found that tDCS 
over the left inferior frontal cortex (IFC, in a position at the border between the ventral premotor 
cortex and the pars opercularis of the inferior frontal gyrus) affected performance in an Action 
Prediction (AP) task, requiring to observe the initial phases of a reaching-to-grasping action and to 
predict its outcome (i.e., which of two objects would be grasped) that was blocked from view. In 
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particular, c-tDCS and a-tDCS, which are expected to decrease and increase cortical excitability, 
respectively (Nitsche et al., 2008; Nitsche and Paulus, 2011), hindered and boosted AP task 
performance, respectively. No behavioral effects were observed when tDCS was administered over 
other visual or motor regions of the AON or when participants were tested in a difficulty-matched 
control task requiring to predict the outcome of a non-human movement (Non-human Prediction, 
NP). These findings provided strong evidence that classical frontal nodes of the AON – in particular 
the IFC – are critical for making predictions about human actions.  
However, these previous studies have left unanswered the critical question of whether M1 is 
also causally essential for making predictions about others’ actions and answering this question is the 
main goal of the present study. In four experiments (N=48), we targeted M1 using tDCS that, relative 
to rTMS, provides a better sham control and avoids any potential distracting effect of stimulation 
over frontal regions. As in Avenanti and colleagues (Avenanti et al., 2017), we administered offline 
tDCS using a monopolar montage (extracephalic reference) for 15 min before task performance. In 
that previous study, both anodal and cathodal currents affected AP task performance, however, 
stimulation occurred only at 2 mA intensities. Thus, it remained to be established whether the 
polarity-dependent influence on AP task performance is a unique attribute of IFC modulation and 
whether lower tDCS intensities (i.e., 1 mA) can be effective when targeting M1. This is particularly 
relevant as tDCS aftereffects can vary as a function of polarity and current intensity, but changes are 
not linear (Nitsche et al., 2008; Jefferson et al., 2009; Nitsche and Paulus, 2011; Bastani and 
Jaberzadeh, 2013; Batsikadze et al., 2013). 
To address these issues, in four experiments we administered tDCS using different polarities 
(c-tDCS and a-tDCS) and intensities (1 mA and 2 mA) following a 2x2 between subject design. Also, 
in each experiment, we implemented a 2x2 within subject-design as we assessed participants’ ability 
to make predictions about the future outcome of human actions or non-human motion (i.e., using the 
AP and NP tasks from Avenanti and colleagues, (Avenanti et al., 2017) and, in different 
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counterbalanced sessions, task performance was assessed after active tDCS or a control sham tDCS 
condition, which provided a baseline for behavioral performance.  
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Subjects  
Forty-eight healthy volunteers took part to the study. Twelve participants were assigned to 
Experiment 1 testing c-tDCS at 2mA intensity (6 females, mean age ± SD: 25.1 ± 3.34 years, range 
21-30) and constituting the ‘c-tDCS2mA’ group; 12 were assigned to Experiment 2 testing a-tDCS at 
2mA intensity (7 females, mean age 25.6 ± 3.12 years,  range 21-30) and constituting the ‘a-tDCS2mA’ 
group; 12 were assigned to Experiment 3 testing c-tDCS at 1mA intensity (7 females, mean age 22.9 
± 1.7 years,  range 20-25) and constituting the c-tDCS1mA group; and, 12 to Experiment 4 testing a-
tDCS at 1mA intensity (6 females, mean age 22.3 ± 1.7 years,  range 20-25) and constituting the a-
tDCS1mA group. All subjects were right-handed according to a standard handedness inventory (Briggs 
and Nebes, 1975) and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. None had a history of neurological, 
psychiatric illness, or any contraindication to brain stimulation (Rossi et al., 2009, 2011) or was on 
medication at the time of the experiments. Participants provided written informed consent, and the 
procedures were approved by the local ethics committee and were in accordance with the ethical 
standards of the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki. No discomfort or adverse effects during tDCS were 
reported or noticed. 
Sample size was determined though a power analysis conducted using G*Power 3 (Faul et al., 
2007), with power (1 – β) set at 0.80 and α = .05, two-tailed. We expected a large effect size based 
on our previous study showing strong modulation of action prediction task performance due to active 
a-tDCS and c-tDCS over the IFC (mean Cohen’s d = 0.96) (Avenanti et al. 2017). The analysis 
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yielded required sample sizes of 11 participants. We thus decided to have 12 participants in each 
group. 
 
Tasks and stimuli 
In the Action Prediction (AP) task, participants observed 100 video-clips (640 x 480 pixels, 
30 fps) depicting the initial phase of a reaching-grasping action. All stimuli subtended a 22.3° x 33.4° 
visual angle from the participant’s viewing position. Videos started showing two objects (left side of 
the screen) placed in front of still right hand (right side of the screen; Figure 1). After a variable delay 
(1000-2200 ms), the hand started to reach and grasp one of the two objects. The final phases of the 
action were prevented by sight and subjects had to guess which object was going to be grasped by the 
hand. In different clips, only 30-70% of the entire movement duration was shown, followed by a 
random-dot mask (150 duration) interrupting the video. Then a response screen showing the two 
objects lasted until response. Participants provided their answer using two computer keys.  
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Figure 1 (A) Trial example and stimuli. Example of movie, response screen and targets in the Action Prediction (AP) 
task (above) and the Non-human Prediction (NP) task (below). On each trial, a short movie showed the initial movement 
of a hand (AP) or a geometrical form (NP) reaching and adapting to one of two targets. Participants were then presented 
with the two targets and had to guess which was selected by the hand/form. (B) tDCS montage showing the position of 
the active and reference electrode. (C) Schematic representation of the experimental design. Participants took part in 2 
sessions in which performance in the 2 tasks was tested immediately after 15 min of sham/active tDCS over a target brain 
region. 
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Video-clips in the AP task included 8 non-professional actors (4 females) reaching and 
grasping 8 different couples of objects (i.e., lighter vs. glass; highlighter vs. corkscrew; deodorant 
spray vs. coffeepot; mug vs. book; clothespin vs. nutcracker; scoop vs. cup; little ball vs. soccer ball; 
fork vs. stapler). The two objects of each couple were located in two positions closed in space and 
presented different affordances, thus implying slightly different hand trajectories and grips (i.e. from 
power group performed with the whole hand to precision grips performed with the index finger and 
the thumb). In different trials, only a percentage of the entire movement was shown (from 30% to 
70%). In none of the videos, the hand-object interaction was visible. Thus, AP task required to process 
contextual (objects’ location and affordance) and kinematic cues (i.e. hand trajectory and finger pre-
shaping) during the initial reaching component of the action. 
In the NP control task, subjects observed 100 similarly interrupted video-clips showing a non-
biological geometrical shape approaching one of two targets. Participants had to guess which target 
was going to be approached by the geometrical shape. The NP videos (640 X 480 pixel, 30 fps) were 
animations created with Adobe Flash Professional software to match temporal and spatial features of 
AP stimuli. Similarly, to the AP task, NP stimuli showed incomplete movement (30-70%) of a 
geometrical form which moved from the right side of the screen in order to reach and fit with one of 
two different geometrical targets placed on the opposite side. The path trajectory of the moving shapes 
was designed to roughly match hands’ movement in the AP task. As in the AP task, the two targets 
were located in two different spatial positions and presented different geometrical properties. In 
analogy with the pre-shaping of the fingers (AP task), during the reaching phase, the configuration of 
the moving geometrical form changed over time in order to optimally fit with one of the two targets. 
Also for the NP video clips, we created eight different couples of geometrical targets and eight 
moving geometrical forms and random-dot image were used as masking. 
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The two tasks were adapted from Avenanti et al. (Avenanti et al., 2017) and were designed to 
have the same difficulty (~75% accuracy, i.e., they were doable but not trivial) based on a series of 
pilot studies. In both tasks, the hand/form reached both objects/targets with 50% probability. The 
percentage of the hand/shape total movement shown in the two tasks was matched (AP: mean 45% 
of total movement, range 30-70%; NP: mean 45% of total movement, range 30-70%; p > 0.99).   
 
Transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) and Neuronavigation  
tDCS was delivered  using a battery-driven Eldith constant direct current stimulator 
(neuroConn GmbH, Ilmenau, Germany). A pair of surface sponge electrodes were soaked with a 
standard saline solution (NaCl 0.9%) and maintained in place by elastic rubber bands. To target M1, 
in all the Experiments the active electrode (5 × 5 cm2) was placed over the C3 electrode of the 10-20 
system and the reference electrode (5 × 7 cm²) over the contralateral deltoid muscle (Priori et al., 
2008; Bolognini et al., 2010). It is held that extra cephalic electrode montages allow more focal 
stimulation and avoid the confounding effect from the reference electrode (Cogiamanian et al., 2007; 
see Brunoni et al.,  2011 for a review). 
Active tDCS was delivered with a constant current of 2 mA (Experiment 1 and 2) or 1mA 
(Experiment 3 and 4) intensity (current density: ~0.08 mA/cm2 for Experiment 1 and 2, ~0.04mA/cm2 
for Experiment 3 and 4) complying with current safety data (Poreisz et al., 2007; Nitsche et al., 2008). 
Stimulation lasted for 15 min not including 20 s of ramp up and ramp down at the beginning and end 
of stimulation. Impedance was constantly monitored and kept below 5 kOhm.   
For the sham stimulation, the electrodes were placed on the same locations and the current 
was turned on for only 30 seconds at the beginning of the sham session and then was turned off in a 
ramp-shaped fashion (fade in/out: 20 sec), so that participants experienced the sensations initially 
associated with the onset of stimulation (mild local tingling), without inducing any effective 
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modulation of cortical excitability. This procedure ensures successful blinding of participants 
(Gandiga et al., 2006; Ambrus et al., 2012). Although, the 2 mA intensity used in Experiment 1 and 
2 may be less effective in ensuring blinding (O’Connell et al., 2012; but see Loo et al., 2010, 2012), 
we used relatively small cephalic electrodes to reduce scalp sensations and make active and sham 
stimulation feel comparable (Turi et al., 2014; Fertonani et al., 2015; Tang et al., 2016). 
 After C3 localization over the scalp, Talairach coordinates corresponding to the target region 
were automatically estimated by the SofTaxic Navigator from an MRI-constructed stereotaxic 
template (Electro Medical Systems, Bologna, Italy) (Avenanti et al., 2007, 2012, 2013a; Bertini et 
al., 2010; Serino et al., 2011; Tidoni et al., 2013; Jacquet and Avenanti, 2015; Sacheli et al., 2015a). 
Skull landmarks (nasion, inion and two preauricular points) and ~100 points providing a uniform 
representation of the scalp were digitized by means of a Polaris Vicra digitizer (Northern Digital Inc, 
Ontario, Canada). An individual estimated magnetic resonance image (MRI) was obtained for each 
subject through a 3D warping procedure fitting a high-resolution MRI template with the participant’s 
scalp model and craniometric points. Talairach coordinates corresponding to the projection of the 
targeted scalp sites on the brain surface were automatically estimated through the neuronavigation 
system (Fig. 1). An Experiment (4 levels: c-tDCS2mA, a-tDCS2mA, c-tDCS1mA and a-tDCS1mA) x 
Coordinates (3 levels: x, y, z) ANOVA assured that coordinates were similar across Experiments (all 
p > .34). 
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Figure 2. M1 stimulation site for Exp1-4 reconstructed on a standard template using MRIcron 
(http://www.mccauslandcenter.sc.edu/mricro/mricron/). Mean surface coordinates in Talairach space ± SEM were:  x = 
-53.2 ± 0.9; y = -8.3 ± 1.0; z = 48.0 ± 1.2. 
 
Procedure  
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Participants sat in front of a computer screen located ∼50 cm from their head in a dimly 
illuminated room. After neuronavigation and tDCS electrodes montage, participants received 
instruction and performed two training blocks (one for each task, 30 trials each) in order to familiarize 
with the tasks. They were asked to respond as fast and accurately as possible by button press with the 
hand ipsilateral to the tDCS scalp site (left hand). If subject’s accuracy was < 60% in one of the tasks, 
the corresponding instructions and training block were repeated. 
After the training participants received a 15min session of active or sham-tDCS over the target 
site and then performed four blocks of 50 trials (2 blocks for each task).  Block order and trials within 
each block were randomized. One minute break was allowed between different blocks. Subjects 
completed the four blocks within 30 minutes after tDCS, thus well within the temporal window of 
cortical modulation induced by active tDCS. Indeed, stimulations at current density and duration 
comparable to our study can alter neural activity for approximately 1 hour (Nitsche and Paulus, 2001; 
Nitsche, 2003; Antal et al., 2004; Ardolino et al., 2005; Kuo et al., 2013; Horvath et al., 2015). 
 To test whether sham or active tDCS induced different scalp sensations, after each session we 
asked participants to evaluate the discomfort caused by the stimulation using a 5-points Likert scale 
with 1 indicating “not unpleasant at all” and 5 “extremely unpleasant”. 
 
Data Analysis 
Participants’ accuracy (percentage of correct response) and median response times (RTs) were 
analyzed by means of a three-way mixed factors analysis of variance (ANOVA) with Task (2 levels: 
AP and NP) and Session (2 levels: sham tDCS and active tDCS) as within-subjects factors and 
Experiment (4 levels: c-tDCS2mA, a-tDCS2mA, c-tDCS1mA and a-tDCS1mA) as the between-subjects 
factor. Subjective evaluation of discomfort caused by tDCS collected at the end of each session was 
analyzed with a two-way mixed ANOVA with Session (2 levels: sham tDCS and active tDCS) as 
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within-subjects factor and Experiment (4 levels: c-tDCS2mA, a-tDCS2mA, c-tDCS1mA and a-tDCS1mA) 
as between-subjects factor. In all the ANOVAs, post hoc comparisons were performed using Tukey 
tests. Statistical analyses were carried out using STATISTICA 8.0 software (StatSoft, Inc.). 
 
RESULTS  
The Experiment x Task x Session ANOVA conducted on the accuracy index revealed a Task 
x Session interaction (F1,44 = 6.88, p = .012, Pη2 = .14), and, most importantly, a three-way 
Experiment x Task x Session interaction (F3,44 = 3.26 p = .03, Pη2 = .18; see Figure 3), indicating that 
tDCS differentially acted over accuracy in the two tasks and this was dependent on specific tDCS 
parameters being used in the different experiments. No other effects resulted significant in the 
ANOVA (all F < 1.21, all p > .31).  
To identify the source of the three-way interaction, four separated Task x Session ANOVAs 
were performed, one for each Experiment. The Task x Session ANOVA conducted on accuracy in 
Experiment 1 (c-tDCS2mA), showed a significant two-way interaction (F1,11 = 24.19, p = .0005, Pη2 = 
.69), but no main effects (all F < 3.50, all p > .09). Post-hoc analysis (Tukey test) showed that 
accuracy in the AP task was strongly reduced in the active (mean ± SD = 76% ± 4) relative to the 
sham session (83% ± 2; p = .003, Cohen’s d = 1.93), whereas no significant difference was found for 
the NP task between the active (80% ± 2) and sham sessions (83% ± 1; p = .17). Moreover, accuracy 
in the AP and NP tasks was comparable in the sham sessions (p = .51), but strongly differed in the 
active sessions (p = .001, Cohen’s d = 1.12).  
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Figure 3. Percentage of correct responses in Experiment 1 (A), Experiment 2 (B), Experiment 3 (C) and Experiment 4 
(D). Grey and Light blue columns indicate Sham and Active tDCS conditions, respectively. Asterisks indicate significant 
post-hoc comparisons (p < .05). Error bars denote s.e.m. 
 
No main effects or interactions were found for ANOVAs conducted for the other experiments, 
i.e., a-tDCS2mA (all F < 0.28, all p > .60; Figure 3B), c-tDCS1mA (all F < 1.21, all p > .29; Figure 3C) 
or a-tDCS1mA (all F < 1.42, all p > .26; Figure 3D), suggesting that the selective drop in AP accuracy 
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found in Experiment 1 might be specific for both polarity (c-tDCS) and intensity (2mA) of the DC 
stimulation.  
To directly compare the influence of different types of tDCS on AP task performance we 
computed an index of change in accuracy (active tDCS – sham tDCS) in each experiment. This index 
was negative in Experiment 1 (-6% ± 3) indicating AP task interference due to c-tDCS2mA. The index 
values were lower in Experiment 1 than in Experiment 2-4 (range 0-2%; all p < 0.05; all Cohen’s d 
> 1.35) which in turn did not differ from one another (all p > 0.84). 
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Figure 4. Changes in AP task accuracy (active tDCS – sham tDCS) in Experiments 1-4. Active c-tDCS2mA (Experiment1) 
brought about a reduction in AP task accuracy relative to the other stimulation conditions in Experiment 2-4. Asterisks 
indicate significant post-hoc comparisons (p < .05). Error bars denote s.e.m. 
 
To assure that the effects found in the c-tDCS2mA group were not due to a speed accuracy trade off, a 
Session x Task ANOVA was computed on RTs (Table 1). No main effects or interactions were found 
(all F < 2.47, all p > .12).  
 
Table 1. Mean ± SD RTs. 
 Exp1 Exp2 Exp3 Exp4 
 c-tDCS 2mA a-tDCS 2mA c-tDCS 1mA a-tDCS 1mA 
 Sham Active Sham Active Sham Active Sham Active 
AP task 447 ± 200 438 ± 209 406 ± 189 423 ± 194 485 ± 187 418 ± 92 334 ± 112 309 ± 129 
NP task 457 ± 154 438 ± 190 437 ± 189 480 ± 185 533 ± 227 391 ± 125 384 ± 227 340 ± 108 
 
 
 
Importantly, discomfort was very low, in keeping with the small size of the electrodes (Turi 
et al., 2014; Fertonani et al., 2015; Tang et al., 2016) and comparable across tDCS sessions and 
experiments as suggested by the lack of main effect or interaction in the Experiment x Stimulation 
ANOVA on stimulation unpleasantness ratings (all F < 2.31, all p > 0.09; Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Mean ± SD Ratings of subjective unpleasantness. 
Exp1 Exp2 Exp3 Exp4 
c-tDCS 2mA a-tDCS 2mA c-tDCS 1mA a-tDCS 1mA 
Sham Active Sham Active Sham Active Sham Active 
1.75 ± 0.75 1.75 ± 0.75 1.33 ± 0.49 1.67 ± 0.78 1.25 ± 0.45 1.25 ± 0.45 1.25 ± 0.45 1.58 ± 0.67 
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DISCUSSION  
 
In four different experiments, we used tDCS to exert polarity- and intensity-specific 
exogenous manipulation of the left M1 and test its role in action prediction. In Experiment 1, we 
found that c-tDCS2mA impaired accuracy in the AP task, compared to sham tDCS, whereas, accuracy 
in the NP task did not show any change. No changes were found in RTs, thus ruling out that 
detrimental effects of c-tDCS2mA were due to a speed-accuracy trade-off. No changes in performance 
were found in Experiment 2, 3 and 4 for either tasks, thus indicating that only the administration of 
cathodal currents at 2 mA were effective in modulating action prediction. These findings establish 
specific tDCS parameters for effective M1 stimulation and provide, to our knowledge, the first causal 
evidence of the critical role of M1 in action prediction. 
 
Functional relevance of M1 to action prediction  
Classically, the M1 has not been considered part of the AON as functional imaging studies 
have not consistently detected M1 activation during action observation (Gazzola and Keysers, 2009; 
Grafton, 2009; van Overwalle and Baetens, 2009; Caspers et al., 2010; Molenberghs et al., 2012) but 
see (Raos et al., 2007) and initial studies on monkey mirror neurons did not find any evidence of these 
neurons in M1 (di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Gallese et al., 1996) see also (Maranesi et al., 2012). 
Therefore, it was assumed that M1 had little role in action perception. However, more recently, three 
single-cell studies have reported modulation of neuronal activity in M1 during action observation 
(Tkach et al., 2007; Dushanova and Donoghue, 2010; Vigneswaran et al., 2013). Moreover, 
neurophysiological studies in humans have consistently reported ‘motor resonance’ effects in M1: 
similarly to action execution, action observation modulated the power of beta 
electro/magnetoencephalographic rhythms with source in M1 (Hari et al., 1998; Caetano et al., 2007; 
Koelewijn et al., 2008) and enhanced indices of M1 excitability collected in those muscles that would 
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be involved in performing the observed action, as shown by TMS-induced motor-evoked potentials 
(MEPs) (Fadiga et al., 1995; Strafella and Paus, 2000; Schütz-Bosbach et al., 2009; Alaerts et al., 
2010; Borgomaneri et al., 2012; Naish et al., 2014; Valchev et al., 2015b). Taken together, these 
findings have led scholars to propose that M1 might be considered as an additional node of an 
extended AON (Kilner and Frith, 2007; Lepage et al., 2008; Pineda, 2008; Alaerts et al., 2009a, 
2009b, 2012). Our study supports this proposal by providing causal evidence that, similarly to 
premotor stimulation, exogenous manipulation of M1 affects at least one key function of the AON, 
i.e., the ability to predict the actions of others. 
Correlational evidence suggest that classical regions of the AON form an anticipatory 
representation of the action of others   and M1 can reflect such anticipatory coding (Gangitano et al., 
2004; Kilner et al., 2004; Urgesi et al., 2006, 2010; Avenanti et al., 2013a), possibly via top-down 
influence from premotor areas, such as the IFC (Nishitani and Hari, 2000; Nishitani et al., 2004; 
Avenanti et al., 2007, 2013a; Koch et al., 2010; Catmur et al., 2011; Enticott et al., 2012). For 
example, motor resonance in M1 (i.e., the muscle-specific increase of MEPs induced by action 
observation) was found to reflect the encoding of future phases of observed actions (Gangitano et al., 
2004; Borroni et al., 2005; Urgesi et al., 2010) and inhibition of IFC by means of low-frequency 
repetitive TMS (rTMS) disrupted such anticipatory motor resonance in M1 (Avenanti et al., 2013a). 
However, while there is now causal evidence suggesting that IFC and other premotor areas might be 
critical for action prediction (Stadler et al., 2012; Makris and Urgesi, 2015; Avenanti et al., 2017), 
previous studies did not establish whether M1 activity is a mere epiphenomenon of the encoding of 
observed action in IFC (i.e., a simple downstream consequence of the strong reciprocal cortico-
cortical connections between IFC and M1; see (Rizzolatti and Luppino, 2001; Shimazu et al., 2004; 
Dum and Strick, 2005; Prabhu et al., 2009; Fiori et al., 2016) or it played a causal role in action 
prediction. By using exogenous manipulation of M1 we could demonstrate that this region does not 
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only reflect an anticipatory representation of observed actions, but it plays a functionally relevant role 
in making predictions about the outcome of observed actions. 
 
Biological tuning of M1 to human actions 
The functional relevance of M1 appears specific for the prediction of human actions, as in 
Experiment 1, c-tDCS2mA did not alter performance in the NP task – which was designed as a 
difficulty-matched control to assess prediction of non-human motion. This selectivity is in line with 
the notion that motor regions of the AON respond more to the observation of human movement than 
non-human movement (Dayan et al., 2007; Casile et al., 2010; Press, 2011), including movements of 
geometrical stimuli (Kessler et al., 2006; Engel et al., 2008), inanimate objects (Costantini et al., 
2005; Oberman et al., 2005), humanoid robots (Tai et al., 2004; Chaminade et al., 2010) and virtual 
hands (Perani et al., 2001), even when all movements are matched for kinematic profile. However, 
previous imaging evidence have also reported that the AON motor regions are active during 
predictions of abstract event sequences (Schubotz and von Cramon, 2004), raising the possible 
concern that anticipatory motor coding is not limited to human actions, but extends to event prediction 
in general, and thus can reflect domain-general processes (Schubotz, 2007; Press and Cook, 2015). 
Our study provides causal evidence that M1 is tuned to prediction of human actions and suggests that 
the motor activations, reported above, associated with non-human event prediction may reflect 
epiphenomenal activity that is not critical for making an accurate prediction. 
 
Polarity- and intensity-specific modulations of task-relevant networks in M1 
Using a factorial design manipulating the polarity and the intensity of tDCS we could 
demonstrate highly specific aftereffects of M1 perturbation. Not only c-tDCS2mA exerted a selective 
behavioral effect over AP task performance, while leaving unaffected NP task performance. Effects 
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of c-tDCS2mA on action prediction were also polarity- and intensity-specific. This indicates that task-
relevant networks in M1 required for accurate AP task performance are more sensitive to c-tDCS2mA 
than other manipulations involving reduced current intensity and/or inverted polarity. 
Polarity-specific effects suggest that c-tDCS2mA affected behavior through inhibitory 
interference with task-relevant networks, whereas excitatory manipulations of M1 were less effective 
in modulating such networks. This proposal finds support in the evidence that motor inhibition 
induced by several brain stimulation protocols affects alpha and beta band activity in sensorimotor 
regions (Chen et al., 2003; McAllister et al., 2013; Pellicciari et al., 2013; Baxter et al., 2016). For 
example, reduction of M1 excitability induced by continuous theta burst stimulation (cTBS) was 
associated with larger modulation of beta band activity in sensorimotor regions, relative to increase 
of M1 excitability (McAllister et al., 2013). In a similar vein, M1 inhibition induced by c-tDCS was 
associated with a larger alteration of alpha and beta oscillations than M1 facilitation induced by a-
tDCS (Pellicciari et al., 2013; Baxter et al., 2016). Because modulation of alpha and beta oscillations 
reflects the activity of the sensorimotor nodes of the AON (Hari et al., 1998; Kilner et al., 2004; 
Caetano et al., 2007; Koelewijn et al., 2008; Sebastiani et al., 2014), the suggestion is made that M1 
inhibition (c-tDCS) more than M1 excitation (a-tDCS) can alter motor resonance processes, including 
the anticipatory processing of observed actions that might underlie AP task performance (Gangitano 
et al., 2004; Kilner et al., 2004; Borroni et al., 2005; Urgesi et al., 2006, 2010; Avenanti et al., 2013a). 
However, we did not assess the physiological effects of our stimulation protocol. It is widely 
held that a-tDCS increases motor excitability while c-tDCS decreases it (Nitsche and Paulus, 2001; 
Nitsche, 2003; Antal et al., 2004; Nitsche et al., 2008; Horvath et al., 2015), although many factors 
contribute to the polarity and efficacy of the stimulation, including intensity, electrode size and 
disposition and duration of stimulation (Cogiamanian et al., 2007; Nitsche et al., 2008; Batsikadze et 
al., 2013). This is relevant for interpreting not only polarity- but also intensity-specific effects as our 
study indicates that greater current intensities were necessary for c-tDCS to alter task-relevant motor 
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networks in M1. There is ample evidence of intensity-dependent tDCS aftereffects (Jefferson et al., 
2009; Bastani and Jaberzadeh, 2013; Batsikadze et al., 2013) but see (Kidgell et al., 2013), however, 
such aftereffects are often not linear at higher intensities. For example, while c-tDCS1mA typically 
leads to reduction of M1 excitability (Nitsche et al., 2008; Nitsche and Paulus, 2011), a recent study 
of Batsikadze and colleagues reported that c-tDCS2mA performed for 20 minutes (with a 35 cm
2 
cathodal electrode and a large supraorbital reference) increased M1 excitability, i.e., in a way that 
resembled the excitatory effects of a-tDCS (Batsikadze et al., 2013) see also (Jamil et al., 2016). Other 
studies indicate that the same stimulation produces M1 inhibition or no effect when the stimulation 
is administered for 10 minutes only (Kuo et al., 2013; Wiethoff et al., 2014) and clear inhibition when 
administered with a different montage (i.e., using the so called high-definition tDCS, with a small 
cathodal electrode surrounded by four small anodal electrodes; (Kuo et al., 2013). Several factors 
speak against the possibility that our c-tDCS2mA was excitatory. First, anodal currents – that are 
known to reliably induce M1 excitation (Cogiamanian et al., 2007; Nitsche et al., 2008; Moliadze et 
al., 2010; Brunoni et al., 2011; Kidgell et al., 2013) – did not affect AP task performance in 
Experiment 2 or 4. Second, as discussed above, oscillatory activity in the frequency bands that 
underlie motor resonance process in M1 (Hari et al., 1998; Kilner et al., 2004; Caetano et al., 2007; 
Koelewijn et al., 2008) is sensitive to inhibitory rather than excitatory manipulations (McAllister et 
al., 2013; Pellicciari et al., 2013; Baxter et al., 2016). Third, our stimulation protocol is quite different 
from that producing excitation with cathodal current at 2mA: relative to the study of Batsikadze and 
colleagues (Batsikadze et al., 2013), we used a smaller active electrode (25 cm2) and thus a higher 
current density; however, this was counterbalanced by shorter stimulation duration (15 min) and an 
extracephalic montage that might have generically decreased the efficiency of the stimulation, 
possibly leading to a greater inhibitory modulation after c-tDCS2mA than after c-tDCS1mA 
(Cogiamanian et al., 2007; Nitsche et al., 2008; Moliadze et al., 2010; Brunoni et al., 2011). Notably, 
using the very same tDCS parameters, electrodes size and montage used here, Avenanti and 
colleagues (Avenanti et al., 2017) found that targeting the left IFC with a-tDCS2mA and c-tDCS2mA 
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enhanced and hindered AP task performance, respectively. Thus, although further research is needed 
to clarify the physiological effects of such stimulation protocol, these behavioral findings are in 
agreement with the ‘expected’ physiological aftereffects of tDCS, with a-tDCS2mA and c-tDCS2mA 
leading to inhibition and excitation, respectively. Thus, we preliminary conclude that c-tDCS2mA 
likely exerted an inhibitory influence over task-relevant M1 networks involved in the anticipatory 
coding of observed actions.  
 
Intensity-dependent recruitment of task-related networks for processing observed actions. 
Our study provides insights into the heterogeneous results reported by previous brain 
stimulation studies addressing the role of M1 in action perception. These studies have used TMS to 
perturb M1 and test its role. By showing that task-relevant networks for action prediction require 
higher intensity to be altered by c-tDCS2mA, our study suggests that previous inconsistencies might 
be related to the effectiveness of M1 stimulation. 
Early studies targeted M1 at a near-threshold stimulation intensity (i.e., at 100% of the 
threshold for evoking MEPs or visible movements) found that offline low-frequency repetitive TMS 
(rTMS) did not affect neural response to observed actions (Avenanti et al., 2007) and online single-
pulse TMS did not affect judgements about observed actions (Cattaneo, 2010). Conversely, online 
supra-threshold TMS disrupted effector recognition (Naish et al., 2016) and body posture recognition 
(Borgomaneri et al., 2015). Two recent studies used sub-threshold offline continuous theta burst 
stimulation (cTBS) (Palmer et al., 2016; Valchev et al., 2017) that avoids nonspecific, distracting 
effects of online supra-threshold TMS. Both studies reported variable behavioral responses following 
cTBS over M1, with no net changes in action perception. Remarkably, Palmer and colleagues (2016) 
also assessed M1 excitability and could demonstrate that cTBS induced highly variable physiological 
responses across participants, leading to suppression of M1 excitability in some and increase in other 
participants. Remarkably, only the subsample of participants showing reduction of M1 excitability 
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following cTBS showed hindered performance in the action perception task. In contrast, participants 
showing M1 facilitation did not show a significant change in performance (Palmer et al., 2016). This 
further provides convergent support to our proposal that effective M1 inhibition more than M1 
excitation is able to alter task-relevant networks for processing observed actions.  
 
Limitations  
Our study has two potential limitations. First, in the four experiments we only stimulated M1 
thus did not address the site-specificity of tDCS effects. However, using the very same procedure, 
Avenanti and colleagues (Avenanti et al., 2017) already demonstrated that AP task performance is 
disrupted by c-tDCS2mA over left IFC, but not by c-tDCS2mA over other visual (left STS) and motor 
(right IFC) nodes of the AON. Taken together present and previous findings indicate site-specificity 
of c-tDCS2mA and suggest that task-relevant networks for making prediction about the outcome of 
observed right hand actions are distributed across the M1 and IFC in the left hemisphere (contralateral 
to the observed hand). A second limitation is the focality of tDCS. To increase focality we used an 
extracephalic montage to avoid the confounding effect of a cephalic reference. Although the reduction 
in accuracy that we found with c-tDCS2mA over the left M1 (mean accuracy change ± s.e.m.: - 6.1% 
± 0.9) was similar to that detected by Avenanti and colleagues (Avenanti et al., 2017) with c-tDCS2mA 
over the left IFC (-4.7% ± 1.6), different results were observed with a-tDCS2mA: targeting left IFC 
increased performance in the previous study (+4.4% ± 1.5), whereas we found no effect when 
targeting left M1 (0.1% ± 1.6). Differential sensitivity of IFC and M1 to a-tDCS2mA further supports 
site-specificity of our manipulations. Lastly, although effects were site-specific, they were likely not 
site-limited. It is known that tDCS modulates the excitability of distant interconnected regions (Boros 
et al., 2008; Nitsche et al., 2008; Avenanti et al., 2012). Thus, it is entirely possible that other 
interconnected frontal (e.g., dorsal premotor cortex; see (Stadler et al., 2012; Makris and Urgesi, 
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2015) or parietal (e.g., inferior parietal or somatosensory; (Caspers et al., 2010; Valchev et al., 2015a, 
2016) regions of the AON may have contributed to the observed effects.  
 
Conclusions 
All in all, our study demonstrates that monopolar offline c-tDCS2mA administered over the left 
M1 disrupts performance in a task requiring to make predictions about observed human actions, but 
not on a difficulty-matched task requiring to make predictions about non-human motion. No similar 
effects were found with 1mA current or when reversing the polarity of the stimulation, thus indicating 
that only c-tDCS2mA perturbed task-relevant motor networks necessary for making accurate 
predictions about others’ actions. These findings provide causal evidence that M1 is functionally 
relevant to action prediction and highlight the tDCS parameters optimal to interfere with the 
anticipatory coding of observed action.  
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